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Abstract  
Airports are complex systems crucial to the effective movement of goods and people 
worldwide (Wheeler 2005, 5). Particularly in a nation like Australia, with vast 
distances between cities, airports serve a particular role in connecting otherwise 
remote parts of the country. Airports also represent forms of critical infrastructure, 
which society demands are provided constantly in an ‘always on’ economy (de 
Bruijne et al. 2006, 233).  Further, critical infrastructures are themselves linked in 
interdependent relationships which each other, meaning a failure of one often leads 
to ‘cascading failure’ to others (Rinaldi, Peerenboom and Kelly 2001, 14). The 
combination of these aforementioned factors results in a failure of airport operations 
having serious consequences, both for aviation travel and other large-scale 
infrastructure.  Therefore effective solutions are required to ensure the continued 
functionality of airports. Any solutions must take into account both the commercial 
nature of modern airports, and the wide variety of airport infrastructure in Australia.   
 
As airports are organisations with tight coupling of processes and complex 
interactions, Normal Accident Theory and High Reliability Theory are employed as 
theoretical perspectives to understand the identified research problem. High 
Reliability Theory, the perspective that organisations can operate hazardous systems 
while achieving high levels of continuous reliability (La Porte and Consolini 1991, 
42; Baker, Day and Salas 2006, 1576) is adopted by this research. Business 
Continuity Management is proposed as a means of achieving high reliability 
outcomes in airports. This study adopted the theoretical position that effectively 
implemented BCM produces organisational reliability, as defined by high reliability 
theory. A further focus of this research is to develop a scalable implementation 
approach for BCM, which takes into account the different airport environments in 
Australia.  
 
A multiple case study approach is adopted for this study. Three different airports, 
representing the range of airport infrastructure are investigated.  Qualitative methods 
are utilised to examine the two research questions, with a combination of semi-
structured interviews and documentary analysis as data collection instruments. Two 
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phases of data analysis are conducted, focusing individually on reliability in airports, 
and the nature of BCM practice.  
 
Findings could not conclude on the original research proposition, as none of the 
airports studied had completed a full implementation of BCM. Therefore, it was not 
possible to definitively state whether BCM produced organisational reliability. 
Reliability at airports was a complex notion, with a range of factors, both literature 
suggested and otherwise, informing an overall picture of reliability. Regarding BCM 
practice, this was in the nascent stage of development.  A number of existing parallel 
processes were identified which could be employed to increase the maturity of BCM 
practices. Further, an implementation and assessment framework is proposed, with 
the aim of guiding airports to both appropriate levels of BCM maturity for their 
requirements, and a means of self-assessing.                                
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1.1 Background and Introduction to Research 
 
Airports are complex systems crucial to the effective movement of goods and people 
worldwide (Wheeler 2005, 5). They form integral components of national and local 
economies. In the Australian context aviation specific business contributed $6,427 
million to Australia’s GDP in the 2007-08 financial year (Commonwealth of 
Australia 2008, 37). In a broader sense, Australian airports have more significant role 
than in other nations. This is due to the sheer size of Australia and the geographic 
distance between both urban centres and smaller regional towns, making aviation 
critical in connecting parts of Australia both with each other, and internationally with 
neighbours in our region and the rest of the world (Wheeler 2005, 5). Further 
evidence of the importance of aviation is demonstrated by recent national 
government enquiries relating to the aviation sector. These include An Independent 
Review of Airport Security and Policing for the Government of Australia (2005) 
(Wheeler Review), the National Aviation Green Paper (2008) and the White Paper 
into the Future of Aviation in Australia (2009). These documents highlight the 
importance from a government perspective for a structured approach to growth and 
planning of aviation in order for a more secure future for the industry.  
 
Airports, more widely and particularly in the Australian context, are considered 
forms of critical infrastructure (CI) (Wheeler 2005, 5). Society demands that critical 
infrastructures maintain constant operation. A factor with most forms of CI is that 
they are interconnected with other infrastructure components. The impacts of an 
interruption to critical infrastructure are enhanced due to the interconnected nature of 
many of the different components. Often critical infrastructures are dependent on one 
another, and a failure in one can result in what is known as ‘cascading failure’, 
characterised by a domino effect of infrastructure disruption. Airports themselves are 
subject to a wide range of high and low impact disturbances. Contemporary 
examples of how disturbances of various kinds can impact on airport operations are 
cogent to this work. An example of an internal failure occurred soon after the 
opening of the new Terminal 5, at London Heathrow.  The new building experienced 
major difficulties and widespread failure of passenger-specific and operational 
systems.  Brady and Davies (2010) report that little consideration had been given to 
planning for a failure of critical operational systems in the initial commencement of 
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the operational phase: this is a significant issue given the size and profile of the new 
facility. A major point of failure was the ‘fixed’ electrical power supplies, triggering 
a loss of the baggage handling system which culminated in the cancellation of 34 
flights during the first day of operation, leaving thousands of passengers stranded. 
This prime failure was surrounded by a range of ancillary incidents including a 
breakdown of automated temperature controls, the lack of staff car parking and 
aircraft guidance signals being incorrectly calibrated, requiring manual marshalling 
of aircraft (Brady and Davies 2010, 153). 
 
Internal operational failure is only one category of significant disruption. Complete 
shutdown of landside operations followed the 2007 terrorist incident at Glasgow 
airport.  This incident involved the attempted detonation of an improvised explosive 
device in a car deliberately crashed into the terminal building.  Disruption to services 
ensued resulting from damage to a passenger entry section of the terminal. In 
addition, the location was classified a crime scene and was subject to detailed 
forensic assessment as well as subsequent clean-up efforts (Crichton 2008).  
 
A further category of disturbance to aviation systems relates to climatic events, 
which are external to airport organisations. An extension of this category might 
include unusual yet natural occurrences. The eruption of Iceland’s Eyjafjallajokull 
volcano on April 14 2009 illustrated the vulnerability of the aviation network to 
unusual natural hazards, and how continuity of operations can be severely affected 
by such an uncontrollable natural event. The volume of volcanic ash in the 
atmosphere led to a five-day closure of European airspace, impacting around 1.2 
million passengers daily (Folattau and Schofield 2010, 2). The cost of this closure to 
the aviation industry was significant, with IATA estimates of 100,000 flights 
cancelled and a total 1.7 billion USD impact on global airlines (Folattau and 
Schofield 2010, 2; Wall 2010, 3). The scale of the disruption to operations was 
unforeseen within the industry.  The significance of this occurrence on the industry 
may be exemplified by British Airways PLC being forced to ground its entire UK 
based fleet for the first time (Sonne,Michaels and Niththyananthan 2010, A7). The 
nature of such an ultra wide-area disruption demonstrates the interconnectedness, as 
well as the relative vulnerability of the international aviation network. The continuity 
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of the aviation industry is critical to movement of goods, services and people and is a 
mainstay of modern life.  
1.2 Research Context and Significance 
 
It is critical to understand why the issue of susceptibility of airports to fail warrants 
the attention of detailed research. As discussed during Section 1.1, airports are 
subject to a wide range of disturbances that can have severe impacts on the continued 
operation of airports. As components of critical infrastructure, airports are a 
constantly utilised resource, with any loss of functionality having a great impact on 
the public and relevant regional economies. The following Section 1.2.1 outlines the 
key arguments regarding operability of such critical infrastructures.  
1.2.1 Critical Infrastructures 
 
The importance of airport continuity is brought into sharp focus when airports and 
related support facilities are examined using the thematic lens of airports as Critical 
Infrastructure (CI). Sullivant (2007, 538) defines CIs as: 
 
“Systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital that the incapacitation or 
destruction of such systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on national 
security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or any 
combination of these”.  
 
Airports, along with other ‘large technical systems’ including energy, information 
technology, telecommunications, healthcare, water, government, law enforcement 
and finance (de Bruijne and van Eeten 2007, 18), are classified as components of CI 
by the Australian aviation industry. The 2005 Wheeler Review cited airports’ 
vastness in terms of employability and national importance, in addition to their role 
in connecting cities both within Australia and internationally to establish themselves 
as CI (Wheeler 2005, 5).  As previously discussed, the 2009 White Paper into the 
Future of Aviation in Australia further reinforced the importance of airport 
infrastructure, with this paper becoming the first step in creating a national aviation 
policy.  
 
 5 
In many instances CIs are themselves linked in interdependent relationships with 
other major infrastructure elements. Interdependencies between these systems are 
complex, and characterised by multiple connections among infrastructures, with 
feedback occurring between infrastructures (Rinaldi, Peerenboom and Kelly 2001, 
14). The nature of interdependencies across CIs has been impacted by the increasing 
use of information and communication technologies (de Bruijne and van Eeten 2007, 
19).While this use of telecommunications has enhanced efficiencies and speed in 
control, it has also added  elements of vulnerability generated by dependency on the 
controlling technology.  
 
Society demands that Critical Infrastructures operate constantly in an ‘always-on’ 
economy (de Bruijne et al. 2006, 233), with daily life becoming so dependent on 
services provided by CIs that even a slight disruption can have significant 
consequences (Boin et al. 2003, 100).  In some cases, consequences also have a 
contagion effect in that they themselves cause ongoing disruptions through what is 
almost a domino effect into ‘connected’ (dependent) or vulnerable system 
components.  This is commonly referred to as a cascading failure, where small 
disturbances in one network evolve into large-scale breakdowns in other networks 
(Boin et al. 2003, 100). CIs are also subject to privatisation, liberalisation and 
deregulation, which acts to further complicate ensuring continued operation of CIs in 
the face of crisis (de Bruijne et al. 2006, 231; de Bruijne and van Eeten 2007, 19). 
This adds yet another layer of complexity to ensuring reliability of CIs, which has 
been thus far established as a crucial requirement for our modern society.   
 
In addition to general acceptance as an important instance of CI, airports also have a 
significant impact on the economic viability of the regions surrounding them 
(Auerswald et al. 2005, 78; de Bruijne and van Eeten 2007, 18). Graham and Guyer 
(2002, 261) outline three broad economic impacts of airports on their regions, 
consisting of employment, on-site commercial activities and regional multipliers. 
Employment results from both direct employment to airport activities and indirect 
employment stemming from increased economic activity. In most instances, the ratio 
for direct employment sits at one employee per 1000 passenger throughput (Graham 
and Guyer 2000, 261), and for each of these positions 1.31 indirect jobs are created 
(Graham 2003, 199). On-site commercial activities consist of all businesses and 
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operations taking place on airport land. This can be enhanced by the generation of 
aviation-based business clusters, which serve to create new employment rather than 
shifting pre-existing employment to the airport space from the surrounding region 
(Behnen 2004, 284). Finally, airports are also so-called ‘economic multipliers’, 
consisting of direct effects, indirect effects, and catalytic effects (Behnen 2004, 284). 
This demonstrates the significant role airports play as both sources of employment 
and economic drivers to their surrounding region. Any loss of functionality of 
airports will affect airport employment opportunities, and those with more advanced 
continuity practices will be more secure sources of employment than others. 
 
Beyond being considered as economic drivers of a region, airports also play an 
important role in the national and international aviation network.  Each airport 
represents a node in this network and a delay at any one airport can quickly ripple 
through and affect the remainder of the aviation network, causing costly delays. As 
for any critical infrastructure, failures or inefficiencies of the system have large 
economic costs (Guimera and Amaral 2004, 381). Ensuring continued functionality 
or single nodes in the system can enable the entire system to be more reliable, and 
for costly delays to be avoided. 
 
The broader context of this work begins with modern airports as both dependent and 
interdependent elements in the global aviation transport network with each airport 
existing as an independent organisation, operating within its own boundaries and to 
their own specific requirements. A delay at any one port will ripple throughout the 
network, by delaying aircraft and therefore affecting flights at other locations. 
Therefore a disturbance not only affects the individual airport organisation, but the 
operation of the wider international aviation network. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 7 
1.3 Problem Definition and Research Issues Examined in this Dissertation 
 
Airports as essential components of a contemporary, ‘always-on’, hyper-mobile 
society are a central focus of this work.  The research problem central to this thesis is 
focused on the goal of continuity of aviation services in the face of a range of 
potential disturbances with differing levels of severity. Airports vary greatly in terms 
of their size, operating environment and market demands and therefore a 
standardised approach to ensuring their continued operation may not be appropriate. 
Approaches are required which support the continuity of business operation during 
times of disturbance and allow for the most expeditious return to normal business 
operations, keeping in mind that no two airports are the same.  The notion of 
enhancing capability and capacity to sustain ‘normal’ business operations is critical 
when considering the wide range of possible threats airports face.1 
 
Further to the notion of normality, is the related phenomenon of organisational 
reliability. Of importance is the goal of achieving organisational reliability and the 
question of whether such an outcome can be enhanced by effectively implemented 
management practices – in this case Business Continuity Management. Such 
capabilities would not only ensure an expedited return to normal business operations 
following a disturbance in an organisation, but achievement of overall organisational 
reliability.  
 
How should this quest for reliable infrastructure be applied to airports? Australian 
airports represent both key forms of critical infrastructure, and face varying market 
demand. Airports also vary from major international ports through to small regional 
ports.  All airport types play a key role in connecting otherwise isolated parts of 
Australia with major metropolitan centres.  The challenge of addressing solutions for 
varying kinds of airport infrastructure is further coloured by the need for a 
comprehensive approach to manage risk and security in airports: both of which can 
also promote organisational resilience and enhanced levels of recovery capacity. 
 
                                                        
1 Viable threats include damage from natural disasters, loss of power, terrorist incidents, loss of 
terminal/runway usage and loss of telecommunications and information technology services. 
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In summary, a number of considerations must be taken into account when 
considering this research problem. A means of ensuring continued operations of 
airports is required. Further, any approach to ensuring continued operations must 
take into account the varied nature of airport infrastructure in Australia, and allow for 
adjustment to suit as necessary.  
 
1.4 Outline of the Research Methodology  
This research study utilised a multiple qualitative case study approach. All three case 
study sites were within the same industry (Australian aviation), however they were 
discrete units of analysis and represented different types of airport infrastructure. 
Purposeful sampling was utilised in order to select the airport case study sites.  
 
Data collection proceeded in two phases, the first investigating reliability practices at 
each airport, the second understanding current continuity management approaches. 
Both studies utilised semi-structured interviews and documentary analysis as data 
collection instruments. Analysis occurred both within case and cross-case, in order to 
identifying similarities and divergences in findings.  
1.5 Outline of the Dissertation  
The dissertation begins with Chapter 2, Literature Review. Chapter 2 discusses the 
key theoretical concepts surrounding the research problem, and identifies the 
research gaps the study will address. Key to Chapter 2 is the establishment of High 
Reliability Theory and Business Continuity Management as relevant theoretical 
constructs to inform the research problem. Chapter 3, Theoretical Framework 
develops the theoretical framework for the study, which develops and outlines the 
theoretical framework used for data collection. The theoretical framework 
demonstrates how the theory will be utilised to investigate the research problem. 
Chapter 4, Methodology, outlines the specific data collection steps that are 
undertaken, and details how the data collection phases answer the specific research 
questions. Chapter 5 and 6, Analysis, contains analysis and findings from studies one 
and two respectively. Chapter 7, Discussion and Conclusions links the findings back 
to the research questions, and the overall research problem.   
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2.1 Introduction  
Chapter 1 identified the research background and problem, and provided an outline 
of the complete thesis. This chapter presents the relevant conceptual and applied 
bases of the practice of Business Continuity Management.  It begins by reviewing 
seminal theories which seek to explain both the propensity for and response to 
disaster and crisis. These theories are Normal Accident Theory, Disaster Incubation 
Theory and High Reliability Theory. This is followed by a discussion of the crisis 
literature, to provide background to the concepts of crisis, crisis management and 
crisis-prone and crisis-prepared organisations. Following this, the Chapter examines 
approaches to applying risk management, leading to a discussion of Business 
Continuity Management, both in terms of historical development and contemporary 
approaches. This Chapter concludes with discussion of a summary of areas requiring 
further examination, as identified throughout the Chapter.  
2.2 Propensity to Fail  
In order to understand the nature of organisational failure, the key theories regarding 
organisational failure must be considered. As mentioned earlier, Normal Accident 
Theory, Disaster Incubation Theory and High Reliability Theory are examined. 
These three theories offer different perspectives on the nature of organisational 
failure. In order to attain a theoretical perspective, a critical review of each of these 
approaches is required. The following Sections (2.2.1-2.2.3) critically review these 
theoretical perspectives of organisational failure. 
2.2.1 Normal Accident Theory  
A fundamental drive for the development of crisis management as a discipline can be 
attributed to the increased complexity of modern technical systems, and the 
accompanying societal reliance on such systems. The genesis of Normal Accident 
Theory derived from the occurrence of series of high-profile accidents in complex 
socio-technical systems, where scholars attempted to better understand how these 
occurred. Emerging from this search for understanding was Charles Perrow’s 
Normal Accident Theory (NAT) (1984). Perrow2 examined a number of large-scale 
disasters, including the meltdown at the Three Mile Island nuclear power facility                                                         
2 While Perrow first published his work, Normal Accidents, in 1984, this research utilises the second 
edition, published in 1999.  
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near New York, searching for explanations as to the cause of these high-profile 
disasters. This empirical research extended to an analysis of the causes of other 
major disaster events, including the Challenger space shuttle disaster and other 
accidents involving great loss (Perrow 1999, 15).   
 
NAT, at its core, bases its analytical focus on two key parameters: interactive 
complexity and tight/loose coupling, related to opposing components of any complex 
organisation, control system or institution (Perrow 2006, 15; Shrivastava, Sonpar and 
Pazzaglia 2009, 1358). As a result of these unintended and complex interactions 
between both pre-existing conditions (vulnerabilities) exist, and unusual or 
unexpected interaction between system components leading to conditions where 
safety and or control systems are defeated (Pidgeon 1997, 3). The following sections 
discuss the role of interactive complexity and tight/loose coupling which Perrow 
associates with so-called ‘normal accidents’.  
2.2.1.1 Interactive Complexity and Tight Coupling  
Perrow (1999, 78) explains that complex interactions are those in which one 
component of the system can interact with one or more other components 
outside of the normal production sequence, either by design or not by design. 
It is important to note that while many systems do not have a complicated 
design, unexpected interactions between independent systems have been 
implicated in many systems failures (Rijpma 1997, 15). Complexity of 
interactions is greatly intertwined with coupling of processes. Recall that 
NAT relevant systems are presumed to contain not only complex interactions, 
but tight coupling of components within the system, therefore both of these 
components are required in order for organisations to be subject to ‘normal 
accidents’.  
 
‘Coupling’ explains the relative degree of dependence among system 
components (Tamuz and Harrison 2006, 1658). Tight coupling (in 
mechanical terms) refers to the lack of ‘slack’, ‘buffer’ or ‘give’ between two 
intersecting components, meaning that what happens in one can directly 
affect what happens in another (Perrow 1999, 90). This is in direct opposition 
to loose coupling described by Weick (1976, 3) where the coupled processes 
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are responsive, but each event still preserves its own identity and some 
evidence of its physical or logical separateness. 
 
 Loosely coupled systems also tend to have ambiguous or flexible 
performance standards, with little monitoring to ensure that the deviation 
from the intended connection is not observed (Perrow 1999, 91). Although 
loose coupling often results in outcomes other than those intended, it does 
allow certain parts of the system to express themselves in accordance with 
degrees of redundancy, something constricted under tight coupling (Perrow 
1999, 92). Another advantage is the ability of such systems to absorb shocks 
and failures without causing system destabilisation (Perrow 1999, 92). 
However, systems’ characteristics determine their status as loose or tightly 
coupled, something outside the control of their designers. An important point 
to consider is that tight coupling, although initially used to discuss the degree 
of dependence among components in a technical system, can be used to 
describe other interactions occurring in a complex-socio technical system. 
When levels of tight coupling are present in a system, this facilitates and 
expedites the escalation of errors. 
 
Tight coupling is especially likely in systems employing unifiable, invariant, 
time-dependant processes (Rijpma 1997, 15; Perrow 1999, 93). These 
processes, either due to efficiency or production reasons, cannot halt 
production at one stage or restart again. This is particularly evident when 
considering, for example, chemical reactions in plants, which are almost 
instantaneous and cannot be delayed or extended due to previous breakdowns 
in production (Perrow 1999, 93). Additionally, these processes must be 
performed in a set sequence, as it is simply impossible to achieve the 
outcome otherwise. Weick (1998, 72) further explains that such orderly 
systems both increase the likelihood that tasks will be accomplished and that 
mistakes will also be made and be allowed to diffuse more widely. Whereas 
in loosely coupled systems, the production sequence can be redesigned if a 
disturbance occurs: this is not possible in tightly coupled systems (Perrow 
1999, 94).  Tightly coupled systems are constrained in that there is, generally, 
only one way in which the entire process can be completed in order to meet 
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the required objective (Perrow 1999, 94).  These notions are especially linked 
to the notion of interdependency, noted earlier, but often at more detailed and 
mechanistic level.     
2.2.1.2 Complexity-coupling relationship  
The relationship between complexity and coupling, and the impact on the 
vulnerability of systems can be further illustrated using the classic Perrow 
(1999) diagram, displaying the four quadrants of NAT (Figure 2.1 
Complexity Coupling Relationship).  
 
Figure 2.1. Complexity Coupling Relationship (Perrow 1999, 97) 
 
As can be observed in the Figure 2.1 above, both aircraft and the wider 
aviation industry (airways) possess tight coupling, with interactions more 
complex in aircraft than in airways. Perrow (1999, 123) notes that while 
aircraft and airways remain somewhat complex and tightly coupled, accidents 
will continue to occur, especially when humans push these systems to higher 
levels of operation. Figure 2.1 identifies airports to be a system with both 
tight coupling and interactive complexity, particularly as they are discrete 
organisations themselves and nodes in the international aviation network.  
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When applied to organisations the combination of complexity and tight 
coupling allows for interesting insight into the causal sequence of failures 
that can escalate quickly through the system before both comprehension and 
recovery are possible (Rijpma 1997; Wolf 2001, 294; Rijpma 2003, 37; 
Shrivastava, Sonpar and Pazzaglia 2009, 1360). These said events are normal 
accidents, defined as: 
 
“Failures that result as a consequence of interactions among a technical 
system’s components that are unanticipated because of the very large 
number of potential interactions in complex systems” (Wolf 2001, 294) 
 
While accidents may be expected features of large and complex organisations, 
the means by which the impacts of relatively minor disturbances can escalate 
through a system to create major failures is an important aspect of post-
incident analyses. Perrow seeks to explain this phenomenon by dividing 
complex systems into four discrete levels, consisting of part, unit, subsystem 
and system. A straightforward way is to examine these differing levels in the 
context of a nuclear reactor. A part is the smallest component of a system, 
and is the first level of any system, for example a valve (Perrow 1999, 65). 
The second level is a unit, which consists of a functionally related collection 
of individual parts (Shrivastava, Sonpar and Pazzaglia 2009, 1359). The parts 
that make up the steam generator (to continue the previous example) 
constitute a unit. Disruptions to these two levels of the system are classified 
as incidents, which are minor events that impact on the system but do not 
have the serious nature of accident. Accidents represent more serious 
disturbances that interrupt the ongoing or future output of a system (Perrow 
1999, 64). Failures at levels three and four of the system are classified as 
accidents, as elaborated further below. Subsystems exist at level three – these 
consist of an array of units, such as the steam generator and water return 
system (Shrivastava, Sonpar and Pazzaglia 2009, 1359). The fourth and final 
level is a system, which is a collection of subsystems (in this case the nuclear 
power plant), with the environment lying beyond this (Perrow 1999, 65). The 
escalation of failures to levels three and four in an anticipated sequence, 
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interacting in a manner that is incomprehensible to system operators, failures 
can culminate in a component failure accident (Rijpma 1997, 16; Shrivastava, 
Sonpar and Pazzaglia 2009, 1359). This further facilitates the rise of 
previously discussed ‘normal’ accidents.  Thus a simplistic narrative of a 
‘normal accident’ is that they become more likely as a system or organisation 
increases in size and complexity.  
 
2.2.1.3 Further NAT factors 
 
In addition to the fundamental elements of interactive complexity and tight 
coupling of processes, Perrow (1999, 371; 2006, 25) presents a number of 
system characteristics that further enable classification under NAT. 
Unanticipated growth in production capacity often leads to inexperience with 
operating at higher production levels and can lead to increasing riskiness in 
systems. This operational inexperience can be further extrapolated to 
controlling in phases of critical organisational processes, for example, take 
off and landing sequences of aircraft (Perrow 1999, 88). When organisations 
are not as rehearsed in carrying out these critical processes they will be 
subject to ‘normal’ system failures. 
 
Levels of information sharing can also influence a system’s susceptibility to 
‘normal’ accidents. When information regarding known causes of system 
failures is shared both between and within organisations, organisational 
learning can occur, which can improve operating procedure and safety 
controls (Rijpma 1997, 19; Cooke and Rohleder 2006, 214). However, it is 
not only characteristics of the system and internal organisation traits that have 
an effect on the potential for systems to be subject to failures. The proximity 
of power elites in society has also been shown to be an important external 
influence over such systems – more attention is given to those systems that 
are frequented by elites in society than those systems that are outside their 
scope.  
 
Finally, two organisational factors assist in susceptibility of a system to NAT 
failures; the level of organisational control and the nature of the operating 
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environment (Perrow 2006, 25). The level of disciplined control an 
organisation exerts over members is best illustrated in military operations. 
Militarisation and regimented command and control serve to enhance 
functional reliability and safety (Sagan 1993, 50). However, it is not possible 
to militarise all risky systems, as many of these are private commercial 
enterprises which seek to make a profit. In addition, when the organisation’s 
environment is dense with many different members, there is often more 
impetus for investigations when a systems failure occurs. This is principally 
due to the increased number of stakeholders present who demand answers 
and solutions to identified problems (Perrow 2006, 25). 
 
Those organisations without a dense operating environment are often more 
prone to becoming error-inducing systems due to the lack of drive for 
accountability. If there exist more interested groups within a system, there are 
more likely to be persistent investigations and therefore greater attempts to 
increase safety features (Perrow 2006, 25). Furthermore, as Weick (1988, 
308) suggests, unwitting escalation of crises is especially likely when 
technologies are complex, highly interactive, non-routine and poorly 
understood. Within such organisations, where complex technologies interact 
in unexpected ways, this can result in a number of unusual outcomes that may 
be poorly understood, and a crisis can quickly escalate to unmanageable 
levels. The complete failure of the functionality of Terminal 5 at London 
Heathrow (see Section 1.1) displays aspects of this rapid propagation of 
failure in critical sub-systems. The failure of a number of smaller systems, 
such as aircraft signalling and baggage reclaim resulted in a number of flight 
delays and ultimate failure of the entire system.  
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2.2.1.4 Management of ‘Risky’ Systems 
 
NAT system characteristics require particular forms of management in order 
to ensure continued operation. However, the choice of management control to 
utilise can also contribute to the overall vulnerability of complex systems.  
Tightly coupled systems require centralised management processes in order 
to prevent failure (Bierly and Spender 1995, 641). According to NAT, 
decentralisation aids organisations in coping with complex interactions, as 
those close to the process have the power to improvise (Rijpma 1997, 17). 
This approach is in direct contrast with a central organisational maxim, that 
centralisation of processes helps organisations manage complex interactions 
because a view and understanding of the entire system is required 
(Shrivastava, Sonpar and Pazzaglia 2009, 1361). However, centralisation is 
key to effective operation of such systems, with operators performing tasks in 
a pre-determined and unquestioning manner, which will maximise the ideal 
of disaster avoidance (Hopkins 1999, 97).  
 
Perrow’s central perspective in creating NAT was that of a conservative 
theorist, which resulted, predominantly, in the use of classic bureaucratic 
views of control. Classic forms of control consist of top-down approaches to 
influencing behaviour, often by a means of reward or punishment.  More 
‘social’ forms of control, such as harnessing the self-interest of organisational 
actors by using an appropriate control system3 and the use of clan controls4 
are introduced as possibly more effective alternatives to bureaucratic forms of 
control (Bierly and Spender 1995, 641). 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
3 Using reward systems is framed within a market-based governance mode as an alternative to formal 
structural relationships (See Williamson 1975) 
4 Ouchi (1980) argues that contractual agreements described by Williamson (1975) are of little utility 
during times of extreme complexity and uncertainty. In contrast, social or cultural modes of 
management can be used to control behaviour more effectively, the so-called ‘clan’ arrangement. 
 18 
2.2.2 Disaster Incubation Theory 
 
One the earliest of the core theoretical frameworks is Disaster Incubation Theory 
(DIT) (Turner 1978; Pidgeon 1997; Pidgeon and O’Leary 2000). When considering 
the escalation of crises and incidents in complex socio-technical systems, DIT 
provided some of the first insights into the way these events are created and 
propagated in complex socio-technical systems. Turner (1978) first discussed the 
interaction of humans in complex systems, and how a human action often  influenced 
the propagation of errors in his theory of Man-Made Disasters (MMD). The simple 
message of MMD is that despite the best intentions of all involved, the objective of 
safely operating technological systems could be subverted by some very familiar and 
‘normal’ processes of organisational life (Pidgeon 1997, 2; Pidgeon and O'Leary 
2000, 16). Disaster incubation is defined as:  
 
“A discrepancy between some deteriorating but ill-structured state of affairs and the 
culturally ‘taken for granted’. More specifically the cultural norms, assumptions and 
beliefs adopted by an organisation or industry for dealing with hazard and danger” 
(Pidgeon and O'Leary 2000, 18).  
 
Key to MMD theory is that there are many preconditions to disaster, some 
originating years prior to the actual event (Turner 1994, 216; Pidgeon 1997, 2). What 
was so revolutionary about this approach was its recognition of the role humans and 
managerial systems played in the incubation and escalation of disasters in complex 
systems. This position provided a means to move away from the notion that risk (as a 
potential for loss or disruption) can be engineered out of the system, and accepted the 
inherent vulnerability in all systems that are operated (and designed) by humans 
(Pidgeon and O'Leary 2000, 16). The change of approach can be also observed 
within the concept of DIT, where it is human factors which create social and 
organisational contexts by which a disaster might propagate throughout the system, 
not technical failures. As highlighted by Turner (1994), it is wrong to assume that the 
cause of disasters or slightly lesser incidents are purely technical failure, or that their 
correction is solely the responsibility of engineers and other technical specialists. 
Turner (1994, 215) suggested that an appropriate strategy for reducing the possibility 
of disasters and accidents needs to tackle both sloppy management and failures of the 
normal (expected) operational procedure. Such ‘system’ failures are a critical 
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element of complex socio-technical systems.5 Hence, disasters are a combination of 
human and technical failure, and both components need to be considered in order to 
truly understand the nature of disasters.  
 
During the same decade as Perrow created NAT, the first nuances of a new 
organisational meta-theory of organisational crisis were developed. Scholars 
identified a group of organisations that should be subject to normal accidents, but 
managed to operate without experiencing such events. These military organisations 
include aircraft carriers (Rochlin, LaPorte and Roberts 1987; Roberts 1990), nuclear 
submarines (Bierly and Spender 1995), air traffic control (La Porte and Consolini 
1991),  in addition to processes such as airport security (Frederickson and LaPorte 
2002). This research led to High Reliability Theory, which offered an alternative, 
more optimistic view of complex organisations than presented by Perrow’s NAT.  
 
2.2.3 High Reliability Theory 
 
High Reliability Theory (HRT) offers an alternative view to the pessimistic approach 
of NAT when considering the propensity of complex organisations to fail. 
Organisations that display the functional traits described by HRT have been 
described as High Reliability Organisations. High Reliability Organisations (HROs) 
operate hazardous systems while achieving high levels of continuous reliability (La 
Porte and Consolini 1991, 42; Baker, Day and Salas 2006, 1576). Reliable 
functioning is absolutely essential within these organisations, as their operating 
environments seldom offer them a second chance (Shrivastava, Sonpar and Pazzaglia 
2009, 1363).  
 
HRT is based on the long-term observation of the operation of ‘error-free’ 
organisations across a range of contexts and time (Frederickson and LaPorte 2002, 
35). The first nuances of this theory arose from observation of the operation of 
aircraft carriers (see Rochin, LaPorte and Roberts 1987). The theory argues that 
when organisations employ certain characteristics effectively, risk can be reduced 
(Perrow 2006, 17) and reliability maintained, while simultaneously retaining their                                                         
5The concept of socio-technical systems (STS) describes a system which is made up of two jointly 
independent but correlative interactive systems – the social and the technical system. The technical 
component refers to the processes and technology required to create outputs while the social system 
relates to people, relationships among people and authority structures (Bostrom and Heinen 1977, 17). 
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capacity to meet highly unpredictable and demanding production goals (Shrivastava, 
Sonpar and Pazzaglia 2009, 1362). HROs also manage tightly coupled, complex, and 
highly interdependent technologies, such those discussed in NAT, for example 
nuclear aircraft carriers and air traffic control systems (La Porte and Consolini 1991, 
21). However, this approach is in direct contrast to NAT, which maintains that 
accidents are inevitable in tightly coupled systems (Sagan 1993, 46). Some authors 
go as far as to suggest if technical systems are necessarily subject to failure (Wolf 
2001, 295). HROs respond to crisis by switching to a mode of decision making that 
is distinctly different to what is observed in normal operations. Decision making 
becomes flexible, authority patterns change from hierarchical to collegial and 
informal networks supplement the formal organisational structure (Rijpma 1997, 18).   
 
A range of previous academic studies have discussed concepts of high reliability. In 
particular, a number of different kinds of organisations have been studied to help 
determine the overarching principles of HRO. Table 2.2.2 Previous studies of High 
Reliability outlines the differing organisations which have been the focus of high 
reliability study and the range of authors that have been active in the field.  
Table 2.2.3 
Previous Studies of High Reliability 
Type of Organisation/Practice Studies 
Crew Resource Management Training  Salas et al. (2001) 
Health Care Tamuz and Harrison (2006) 
Baker, Day and Salas (2006) 
Aircraft Carriers Rochlin, LaPorte and Roberts (1987) 
Roberts and Rousseau (1989) 
Rousseau (1989) 
Roberts (1990) 
Roberts, Rousseau and LaPorte (1994) 
LaPorte and Consolini (1998) 
Weick (1987) 
Air Traffic Control Roberts and Rousseau (1989) 
Rousseau (1989) 
LaPorte and Consolini (1998) 
Nuclear Power Stations Roberts and Rousseau (1989) 
Klein, Bigley and Roberts (1995) 
Hopkins (1999) 
Hopkins (2001) 
Airport Security Frederickson and LaPorte (2002) 
Nuclear Submarine Bierly and Spender (1995) 
Electricity Generation and Distribution de Bruijne (2006) 
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While differing perspectives of high reliability exist, for the purpose of this research 
the nine High Reliability (HR) traits identified by de Bruijne (2006) are utilised, as 
these are presented in a context of critical infrastructures (electricity industry) and 
demonstrate one of the more recent perspectives of HRT in the literature. These nine 
characteristics listed below and elaborated more fully in the following sections, 
should be present in HROs. These traits will be used as the underlying approach to 
understanding and determining high reliability within this thesis.     
 
1. Commitment to reliable operations in missions and goals 
2. Sustained high technical performance 
3. Structural flexibility and redundancy 
4. High degrees of responsibility and accountability 
5. Flexible decision making processes and collegial patterns of hierarchy 
6. Continual search for system improvement and training for worst-case 
scenarios 
7. Reliability not marginalisable, not fungible (cannot be traded off) 
8. Organisational culture of reliability 
9. Strong presence of external groups with access to credible and timely 
information 
 
HROs set reliability as a priority from the outset in their mission statement and goals 
(LaPorte and Consolini 1991, 21; LaPorte 1996, 96; Frederickson and LaPorte 2002, 
36). In other words, these organisations aspire to be failure free (Rijpma 2003, 39). 
This internal prioritising of failure free operation is almost always met with a high 
tacit societal agreement, where the inherent hazard of the technology being operated 
is recognised, are the consequences of not providing such a service (LaPorte 1996, 
63). This top management prioritising is parallel to an organisational culture of 
reliability, exemplified by operator autonomy and incipient tensions between skilled 
operators and technical experts (LaPorte 1996, 64).  
 
Sustained high technical performance is another common observation of HROs. This 
consists of two key components, systems which are required to provide a high level 
of performance, with limited downtime. A number of means can be used to ensure 
 22 
this, including quality assurance, maintenance measures and procedural activity 
(LaPorte 1996, 63).  Furthermore, often large amounts of performance-based data are 
also collected to ensure consistent performance and calculate deviation from set 
standards (LaPorte 1996, 63). 
 
Structural flexibility and redundancy is also evident in organisations demonstrating 
HRT. LaPorte (1996, 63) identified three forms of structural flexibility and 
redundancy in HROs.  The first of these is the parallel or overlapping design of 
functional processes. In the case of a unit breakdown or overload this design acts to 
provide a backup (Sagan 1993, 20). Secondly, staff are trained in multiple roles and 
are systematically rotated in order to promote a wide range of skills and to act as 
deep capacity. Consequently, key skills and knowledge are retained in more than a 
few key staff, as more than one staff member is trained in a particular role or task. 
Finally, work groups are designed in ways that limit the interdependence of 
incompatible functions (La Porte 1996, 64). A constant search for system 
improvement and intense training for worst-case scenarios provides HROs with 
highly reliable processes (Weick 1987, 113; LaPorte 1996, 64). This is due to a 
search for system weaknesses, which when identified, instigate a change in the 
system to reduce levels of vulnerability.  
 
Effective HROs also require a high level of managerial responsibility and 
accountability, where reporting error (including one’s own) is encouraged and 
rewarded (Roberts 1990, 168; LaPorte 1996, 64). Any deviations from operating 
procedures have severe consequences (Roberts and Rousseau 1989, 133). Not only is 
reliability emphasised in these organisations, safety is established as an equally 
important goal (Cooke and Rohleder 2006, 216). Critically, these organisations place 
reliability above profit, or any other organisational objective (Bierly and Spender 
1995, 643). Weick (1987) argues that while these social characteristics assist in 
embedding reliability into organisations, it is widely acknowledged that an 
overarching organisational culture of reliability is the most influential in achieving 
HRO status.  
 
HROs decentralise the authority to make decisions (Rijpma 1997, 17; Cooke & 
Rohleder 2006, 216). This allows low-level operators to react to situations as they 
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arise, therefore limiting the spread of one failure through the system, as usually 
occurs in tightly coupled systems where component failures quickly spread 
throughout the organisation (Rijpma 1997, 17). However, individual decision making 
powers are highly decentralised, there is still a centralised element to such practices. 
Recall that an organisational culture of reliability is a hallmark of HROs. This culture 
imbues members with clear operational goals, decision premises and assumptions 
(Rijpma 1997, 17). The presence of an appropriate organisational culture of 
reliability allows centralisation at the collective level to coexist with decentralisation 
at the individual level (Bierly and Spender 1995, 644). Therefore, while the decision 
making power is decentralised, members of the organisation are acting under some 
form of centralised process, through an embedded organisational culture of reliability 
(Boin 2006, 92). Such a culture is often underpinned by well-understood and 
comprehensive standard operating procedures and guidelines. Often, when these 
organisations shift into high-tempo mode, collegial authority and decision patterns 
overlay bureaucratic ones (La Porte and Consolini 1991, 32;). This was exemplified 
further by La Porte and Consolini (1998) and Reason (2006, 255), who identified 
routine mode, high-tempo mode and emergency response mode existing in HROs, 
each unique in operational requirement and actions. Each of these three structures 
has their own characteristic patterns, communication pathways and leadership 
patterns (Reason 2006, 255).  
 
In order to exhibit high reliability traits, it is critical for organisations to develop a 
capacity to learn from incidents (Sagan 1993, 25). Rijpma (1997, 19) illustrates that 
complexity simultaneously requires and complicates learning. In cases of effective 
organisational learning, precursor incidents are synthesised and information shared, 
which results in appropriate action to reduce the risk of disaster (Cooke and Rohleder 
2006, 214). Even near-accidents can set such learning processes in motion (Bierly 
and Spender 1995, 643). However, Cooke and Rohleder (2006, 214) also argue that 
organisational learning from safety incidents is not natural, and that even if ad hoc 
learning is occurring, it is not enough. This suggests organisational learning is not an 
automatic outcome of near misses and quasi-accidents. As discussed by Gilbert et al. 
(2007, 967) accidents are often not only the result of a single event, but rather the 
result of a ‘chain of events’ that led to the accident. Accidents are evidence of one or 
more bad detection mechanisms or containment actions in the system as whole rather 
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than as single operator errors. Hence, in order for organisations to become more 
resilient, they must develop the ability to learn from these incidents and implement 
procedures that allow them to become robust.  
 
The emphasis on an organisational culture of reliability served as a movement away 
from a focus on bureaucratic forms of control. As stated by Bierly and Spender 
(1995, 640), these organisations rely on high levels of individual and work-group 
commitment to the overarching goals rather than on conformance to established 
bureaucratic procedures.  A so-called ‘organisational culture of reliability’ provides 
for norms of individual and group relations which grow out of the particular 
demands and rewards of the hazardous systems involved (La Porte 1996, 64). In 
addition, cultures of reliability comprise a substantial body of higher level collective 
knowledge (or mind) which can support individuals when they are under pressure in 
high risk organisations (Bierly and Spender 1995, 643). Examples of such cultural 
norms include: operator/member élan; operator autonomy; and incipient tensions 
between skilled operators and technical experts (La Porte 1996, 64).  
 
The issue of organisational culture in high reliability systems is an important one for 
a number of reasons. Firstly, making meaning is an issue of culture, with particular 
influence about how individuals take notice of, adapt to and act during unusual 
situations (Weick 1987, 123). However, what makes the discussion of culture in high 
reliability systems even more important is that it is a means of achieving 
simultaneous centralisation and decentralisation (Weick 1987, 124). It has been 
established earlier in this Section that decentralisation is a key requirement of HROs 
– the ability for individual operators to take action to avoid the spreading of a failure 
to the rest of the system (Rijpma 1997, 17). Weick (1987, 124) argues that either 
complex standard operating procedures or culture can be used as a substitute for 
centralisation, but only culture has the ability to facilitate interpretation, 
improvisation and unique action.  
 
Relationships external to an organisation also inform the functioning of HROs.  La 
Porte (1996, 65) argues that without external support it is near impossible to achieve 
other HR characteristics and an overall outcome of a highly reliable organisation. 
These external influences are present in a number of forms, most prominently as 
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external stake holding groups and superordinate institutional elements of the parent 
organisation (La Porte 1996, 65). These bodies function in two specific ways to 
ensure reliability. First, there are a number of formally designated positions and/or 
groups who have oversight responsibilities (such as inspectors). In addition, periodic 
visits from ‘check’ or review groups that can exercise sanctions if reviews do not 
measure up. These external watchers must be provided with credible, timely 
information in order to give insightful review (La Porte 1996, 65).  
 
Another critical component of functioning HROs is the use of effective teamwork. 
The contribution of teams to achieving reliability in complex organisations was first 
discussed by Weick (1987). This paper argues that a team of divergent individuals 
present a more multi-faceted view on situations than a group of homogenous 
individuals, and can therefore match the high complexity of the kind of socio-
technical systems under investigation (1987, 116). Baker, Day and Salas (2006) 
examined the effect of teamwork in HROs in a health context, finding that good 
teamwork skills can assist in the generation of HRO characteristics. In the context of 
healthcare organisations, Baker, Day and Salas (2006) established that by selecting 
competent individuals, modifying tasks, workflow or structure and developing 
concepts through training, teamwork is promoted that can allow organisations to 
operate at a near error-free status (Baker, Day and Salas 2006, 1584). The role of 
teamwork has been further established in the context of aircraft cockpits, an 
environment that aims to achieve a status of high reliability. Initiatives such as Crew 
Resource Management training (CRM) in airline cockpits has shown significant 
increases in reliability of actions undertaken in cockpit situations (Baker, Day and 
Salas 2006, 1585). While the number of total accidents is not helpful in indicating 
the effect of CRM training (not least because of the low number of these incidents), 
criteria of positive reactions, enhanced learning and desired behavioural change 
show that such training programs have a positive teamwork effect and lead to the 
generation of HR traits (Salas et al. 2001, 657). 
 
Alternative approaches to understanding HROs 
Whilst initial conceptualisations of HROs consisted of mostly structural 
characteristics, an alternative approach has also been considered. This alternative 
approach has been utilised principally by Karl Weick, who, by examining how 
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organisations operate, has extracted ideas that have a broader context (Hopkins 
2009a, 9). Weick and Sutcliffe (2007) identify five characteristics of HROs, 
consisting of (1) Preoccupation with failure, (2) Reluctance to simplify, (3) 
Sensitivity to operations, (4) Commitment to resilience, and (5) Deference to 
expertise.  The following paragraphs will critically analyse each of these five 
principles in further detail. 
 
Principle 1: Preoccupation with Failure 
Preoccupation with failure within HROs contains two elements. First, they pay close 
attention to weak signals from systems which may indicate symptoms of a larger 
problem. Further, strategies of HROs often detail the mistakes which staff members 
would not dare make (Weick and Sutcliffe 2007, 46). HROs recognise that weak 
signals and smaller failures may be precursors to larger problems, and have well-
developed systems for reporting near misses and other forms of localised failures 
(Hopkins 2009a, 10). However, individuals must have an idea of the relevance of a 
failure within the wider system of the organisation, which is unlikely if staff work in 
silos and only have awareness of their own responsibilities and functionality (Weick 
and Sutcliffe 2007, 49).  
 
In addition to recognising the need to notice small failures in the organisation, the 
mechanism and motivation to report these errors is also required. The most effective 
HROs reward error reporting, as a means of increasing their knowledge base (Weick 
and Sutcliffe 2007, 50).  
 
Principle 2: Reluctance to Simplify 
HROs always attempt to understand the full and rich picture and context of their 
operations, rather than simplifying problems (Weick and Sutcliffe 2007, 53). In fact, 
HROs often have specific staff and departments whose key responsibility is the 
collection and analysis of relevant information regarding the weak signals and small 
failures that occur (Hopkins 2009a, 12). As Hopkins (2009a, 12) asserts, “HROs 
treat redundancy as vital for the collection and interpretation of information that is 
necessary to avert disaster.” 
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Principle 3: Sensitivity to Operations 
Sensitivity to operations refers to staff members having good situational awareness, 
and the ability to recognise how small changes and weak signals are significant and 
what should be done to report and address these (Hopkins 2009a, 12). It is about 
seeing what individuals are actually doing, as opposed to what they are supposed to 
be doing according to schedules and plans (Weick and Sutcliffe 2007, 59). 
 
Principle 4: Commitment to Resilience 
HROs are not disabled by errors or crises, but change the ways in which they operate 
to deal with them (Hopkins 2009a, 13). Weick and Sutcliffe (2007, 71) further detail 
three components of resilience, consisting of (1) the ability to absorb information, (2) 
an ability to recover or bounce back from events, and (3) an ability to learn and grow 
from previous episodes of resilient action.  
 
Principle 5: Deference to Expertise 
The final principle of HROs is the practice of diverting decision-making authority to 
the individual within the organisation who has the greatest level of expertise in 
regard to that particular problem (Hopkins 2009a, 13). This is regardless of the 
individual’s rank within the organisational hierarchy (Weick and Sutcliffe 2007, 74).  
 
While causal analysis of incidents can assist in understanding failure and how 
systems can be improved, due to their nature, complex, tightly coupled systems 
cannot afford to have accidents, much less learn from them. Although learning from 
accidents (in a trial and error form) is effective, this has dramatic impacts as often 
failures have severe consequences (Weick 1987, 112; Roberts and Rousseau 1989, 
132; La Porte and Consolini 1991, 19; Sagan 1993, 26; Bierly and Spender 1995, 
643; Rijpma 1997, 19). Cooke and Rohleder (2006, 214) suggest that organisations 
require some form of an incident learning system6 to effectively learn from so-called 
precursor incidents (accidents) to adapt their practices in order to avoid a disaster in 
the future. Indeed, comprehensive learning which leads to a breakthrough in 
reliability is often more a process of learning to build coalitions rather than                                                         
6 An incident learning system in this case refers to a formalised process of identification, reporting and 
investigation leading to corrective actions and learning from an incident (Cooke and Rohleder 2006, 
218) 
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understanding certain events (Rijpma 1997, 19). Therefore, simulation and 
imagination of errors is often utilised, to create these error-free environments without 
an accident, which creates the characteristics of intense training and continual search 
for system improvement (de Bruijne 2006).  
2.2.4 Normal Accident Theory v High Reliability Theory 
 
Both NAT and HRT present useful explanations of the nature of organisations in 
regard to propensity to failure. One of the key components of this debate is whether 
organisations can prevent a crisis, or at least intervene in the early stages, and 
whether the precepts for reliable management can explain why some organisations 
perform better in this respect than others (Boin 2006, 94). This research builds on the 
idea that the HRT School’s approach that organisations can imbue certain 
characteristics in order to ensure they are not subject to ‘normal’ failures.  
 
Sagan (1993, 47) outlines that while both theories of NAT and HRT are grounded in 
empirical research, they are derived from different conceptual and practical bases, it 
is not an easy task to decipher which of their meanings is more accurate. While not 
directly in contention, they ostensibly offer two comparable yet different lenses on 
crises prevention. In order to better understand the key contrasts between the two 
approaches, Table 2.1 below attempts to illustrate this further.  
 
Sagan’s comparisons highlight how HROs have adopted different procedures, which 
are an improvement in previous NAT concepts. Critically, as highlighted earlier, 
research has highlighted that many organisations, which fit the criteria for being 
subject to ‘normal’ accidents, have not been subject to them and have near error-free 
operations.  This demonstrates that there is potential for all complex socio-technical 
systems to become HROs, regardless of their propensity to be treated as NAT 
systems. 
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Table 2.2.4 
Competing Perspectives on Safety with Hazardous Technologies (Adapted from Sagan (1993, 46)) 
High Reliability Theory   Normal Accident Theory 
Accidents can be prevented through 
good organisational management and 
design. 
Accidents are inevitable in complex, 
tightly coupled systems. 
Safety is the priority of the 
organisation. 
Safety is one of a number of 
competing objectives. 
Redundancy enhances safety by 
duplicating key processes. 
Redundancy often causes accidents as 
it increases interactive complexity, 
opaqueness and encourages risk-
taking.  
Decentralised decision-making allows 
for prompt and flexible field-level 
responses to surprises.   
Contradiction as centralisation is 
required for tightly coupled systems 
yet decentralisation is needed for 
complexity.  
The culture of reliability enhances 
safety by encouraging uniform and 
appropriate responses by field-level 
operators, 
A military-like model of intense 
discipline, socialisation, and isolation 
is incompatible with democratic 
values. 
Continuous operations, training and 
simulations can create and maintain 
HROs. 
Organisations cannot train for 
unimagined, highly dangerous, or 
politically unpalatable operations. 
Trial and error learning from accidents 
can be effective, and can be 
supplemented by anticipation and 
simulations. 
Denial of responsibility, faulty 
reporting and reconstruction of history 
cripples learning efforts.  
As Sagan identifies in the above Table 2.2.4, there are salient differences between 
NAT and HRT systems. The most striking of these is the central maxim regarding 
the inevitability of failure. While NAT maintains these failures are inevitable, HRT 
has a more optimistic viewpoint of accidents being prevented through good 
organisational management and system design. This trickles down to differences in 
approach in terms of safety, redundancy, decision-making processes, organisational 
culture, training and learning practices. This comparison assists in illustrating that 
complex systems which should be subject to ‘normal’ accidents can, through a 
number of practices, being nearly error-free (HROs). This research project argues 
that organisations should strive to become HROs, as they act to avoid error and 
therefore avoid ‘normal’ accidents (Shrivastava, Sonpar and Pazzaglia 2009).  
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2.2.5 High Reliability as an Achievable Goal  
This research assumes that high reliability can be achieved in situations where 
normal accident theory would usually apply. This is consistent with the idea that 
HROs fit the core criteria for being NAT organisations, of interactive complexity and 
tight coupling. Such organisations include nuclear submarines and aircraft carriers 
(for a full list of HRO studies see Table 2.2.3 Previous studies of High Reliability). 
This is further supported by the work of Shrivastava, Sonpar and Pazzaglia (2009), 
who argue that HRT focuses on processes leading to an accident, wile NAT 
identifies organisational structures and circumstances at the point of an accident. In 
other words, HRT works to avoid an accident occurring, while NAT focuses on at 
the time of an incident (therefore creating a temporal dimension). It is these HRT 
characteristics (as outlined in Section 2.2.3 High Reliability Theory) that set these 
organisations apart, and if a means can be identified in order to produce these 
characteristics, enhanced reliability would result.  
 
This research argues that organisations should strive to become HROs in order to 
avoid system failures. If organisations that would normally be subject to normal 
accidents can move towards a model that is associated with fewer failures, this would 
be advantageous and create more reliable systems. What must be considered are 
processes which allow organisations to not only achieve HRO status, but to provide 
overall improved reliability.  
 
2.3 Crisis 
 
As the core theories regarding the nature of failure in complex socio-technical 
systems have been identified and explained, it is important to examine the concept of 
crisis and crisis management within organisations.  This section examines crisis 
management contributions, namely attempting to explain the nature, progression and 
resolution of organisational crises. Moreover, it explains the propagation of errors 
throughout complex socio-technical systems and management processes for dealing 
with such circumstances.  
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The nature of transition from normal operations to a crisis situation is critical to 
understand. Crisis management provides details of how organisations recognise they 
are entering a crisis (signal detection), cope with a looming crisis 
(prevention/preparation), limit the effects of a crisis when they occur 
(containment/damage limitation), recover from a crisis (recovery) and learn post-
incident (learning). Crisis management also provides the basis for Business 
Continuity Management approaches, which is further discussed in Section 2.3 
Contemporary Approaches to Business Continuity Management.  
 
2.3.1 Crisis as a Concept 
 
Crises are characterised by low likelihood/high consequence events that threaten the 
most fundamental goals of an organisation (Weick 1988, 305; 2006, 205). Pearson 
and Clair (1998, 60) define organisational crisis as: 
 
“A low probability, high-impact event that threatens the viability of the organisation 
and is characterised by ambiguity of cause, effect and means of resolution, as well as 
a belief that decisions must be made swiftly” 
 
Many scholars hold that psychological, socio-political, and technological-structural 
issues relevant to organisational crises should be explicitly considered and integrated 
when studying them (Smith 1990, 265; Pearson and Clair 1998, 59; Shrivastava et al. 
2006, 31). Mitroff, Pauchant and Shrivastava (2006) in their typology of corporate 
crisis suggest that there is a combination effect when considering crises: they can be 
either internal or external, or social or technical. This is displayed graphically in 
Figure 2.3 below.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 32 
Internal 
Technical/Economic 
 
External 
 
Undetected, Unanalysed, 
Unsuspected Product Defects 
Undetected Plant/Manufacturing 
Defects 
Faulty Detection Systems 
Faulty Backup Design/Controls 
 
 
 
 
 
Unanticipated, Unanalysed, 
Environmental Conditions 
Faulty Technical Monitoring Systems 
Faulty Strategic Planning 
Poor Societal Planning 
Poor Global Monitoring 
 
Faulty Organisational Controls: 
Poor Company Culture, 
Information/Communication, 
Structure, Rewards 
Poor Operator Training 
Poor Contingency Planning 
Human Operator Failures/Errors 
Internal Subcultures 
Faulty Employee Screening 
 
 
Failure to Design and Implement 
New Societal Institutions 
Faulty Social Monitoring of Criminal 
Stakeholders: 
Disgruntled Ex-employees, 
Assassins, Kidnappers, Terrorists,  
External Saboteurs, Copycat Killers, 
Psychopaths 
 
People/Social/Organisational 
 
Figure 2.3. Causes and Sources of Corporate Crises (Mitroff, Pauchant and Shrivastava 2006) 
 
Crises by their nature often cause massive disruption and change in organisations. 
While the overriding view is that crises can be a threat to the survivability of 
organisations, it is important to note that crises also have the potential to present 
opportunities (Kovoor-Misra, Clair and Bettenhausen 2001, 77). Organisations have 
the opportunity to identify vulnerabilities and implement strategies to improve such 
system weaknesses. In response to external crises, organisations also have the 
opportunity to adapt to new conditions and strategically improve their businesses.  
 
2.3.2 Crisis Management 
 
Now that the concept of crisis has been explained, it is critical to understand the 
process by which crises are managed. As shown in Figure 2.3 Causes and Sources of 
Corporate Crises, different types of crises exist, ranging across the four related 
impact terrains (Technical/Economic, People/Social/Organisational, Internal and 
External). While these types of crises can be disparate, a common methodology can 
be used in order to manage them. Pearson and Mitroff (1993) defined a five stage 
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model to describe a generic crisis management process applicable to a range of 
contexts. This model is displayed in Figure 2.3.2 The Crisis Management Process 
below.  
 
 
 
Figure 2.3.2. The Crisis Management Process (Pearson and Mitroff 1993, 53) 
 
Derived from the analysis of selected historical disasters, it describes consistent and 
repeatable stages of crisis-activity applicable to many organisations.  Each of the 
stages will be further discussed in the following Sections (2.3.2.1-2.3.2.5), with 
reference to how these are operationalised within an airport context. 
2.3.2.1 Signal Detection  
Signal detection is based on the observation that most crises leave a trail of 
early warning signals (Pearson and Mitroff 1993, 52). Signals of impeding 
crises should be considered as weak triggers in anticipation of an event. 
Specific activities or information activate triggers, which, in turn, generate 
some kind of information attractor (Hengsen, Desouza and Kraft 2003, 68). 
Pearson and Mitroff (1993, 52) further detail that for signal detection to be 
effective, organisations must learn to separate signals of suboptimal function 
from the looming noise that represents normal business. Organisations which 
probe and scrutinise their operations and management structure for potential 
errors or vulnerability, and who establish clear and open information 
channels, have been found to be more effectively prepared for crisis (Pearson 
and Mitroff 1993, 53). However, signal detection is not always a 
straightforward process. Organisations have many sources of data, of varied 
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types, and signals of impeding crisis may originate from any of these sources, 
there is always a high level of ambiguity present (Hengsen et al. 2003, 68).  
 
As noted by Boin (2006, 93) anything can serve as a trigger, including human 
error, faulty equipment or a faulty payment. These trigger events have the 
potential to cause damage to life, environment and property and often have a 
greater impact when infrastructure is weak and preparedness systems are 
inadequate (Shrivastava et al. 2006, 37). Hengsen et al. (2003, 68) further 
argue that early detection of signals and their efficient processing is not 
merely important, but essential to preventing crisis.  
 
2.3.2.2 Preparation/Prevention  
The preparation/prevention phase emphasises preparation and prevention 
strategies implemented by the organisation to handle a looming crisis, 
including the creation of crisis teams as well as crisis training and simulation 
exercises (Pearson and Mitroff 1993, 53). The aim of this stage is to do as 
much as possible to both prevent crises from occurring, and have the best 
approaches in place to manage those which nonetheless occur (Pearson and 
Mitroff 1993, 53). Airports currently undertake a number of preventative 
measures in order to more adequately handle crisis. In airports, these 
measures include compliance with the Transport Security Programme (TSP), 
which is a risk based approach to security, and Aerodrome Emergency Plans 
(AEP) which are designed to respond to aviation or aviation-related incidents 
at an airport.  
 
2.3.2.3 Containment/Damage Limitation  
The goal of the third phase, damage containment, is to limit the effects of a 
crisis, should one occur (Pearson and Mitroff 1993, 53). Damage containment 
contains a range of strategies which prevent a localised crisis from affecting 
other parts of the organisational environment, including evacuation plans and 
guidelines for containing hazardous spills (Pearson and Mitroff 1993, 53). 
Organisations which are better prepared for crises devote time and resources 
to ensure that these plans are in place and are effective (Pearson and Mitroff 
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1993, 53). Despite the best efforts of those undertaking the crisis 
management process, the scope of decision making process during a crisis is 
often narrowed by the urgent nature of events which require an expeditious 
resolution (Smith 1990, 267). Access to expert opinion is often critical in 
decision making in order for the most effective course of action to be 
undertaken, however, there is an argument that the application of certain 
types of technical risk-based problems can heighten conflict (Smith 1990, 
267). Therefore, during crises organisations must be able to gather 
appropriate information, and also understand how best to utilise it in the 
decision-making process.    
 
The process of containment/damage limitation can often be complicated in 
airports, due to the number of stakeholders involved in dealing with an 
incident. These can include both commercial entities operating within the 
airport, and external groups such as regulators, the travelling public or 
shareholders. Depending on the scope of the incident, these groups may 
include emergency services such as state and federal police, in addition too 
fire department and ambulance. This can cause complications to airport 
operators because the physical airport becomes the responsibility of the 
relevant forward police command and operators effectively lose access until a 
formal handover is made. 
 
2.3.2.4 Recovery  
When discussing recovery procedures, it is important to recognise that 
successful organisations in this respect have programs to assure both long and 
short term recovery (Pearson and Mitroff 1993, 53). Key to this process in 
organisations is to consider what minimal operations are needed to recover 
and conduct business, and what are the key activities and tasks required to 
serve the most important customers (Pearson and Mitroff 1993, 54). Airports 
require efficient recovery as airlines and other airport tenants expect to be 
able to return to normal operations as soon as possible in order to keep their 
businesses profitable.  
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2.3.2.5 Learning  
This stage of crisis management refers to adequate reflection and critical 
examination of the lessons learned from experiencing a crisis (Pearson and 
Mitroff 1993, 54). While this is unfortunately not often present in 
organisations to the extent that it should be, well prepared organisations study 
previous crises in order to establish what was done well, in addition to 
identifying shortcomings in the approach (Pearson and Mitroff 1993, 54). 
This phase of learning and feedback post-crisis has also been described as a 
crisis of legitimation, where an organisation seeks to restore external 
confidence in both its managerial structure and operating systems (Smith 
1990, 271).This process is complex as it involves a reassessment of and 
changes in social institutions and structures (Shrivastava et al. 2006, 38). The 
best organisations do this without assigning blame, as the emphasis should be 
on improving future capabilities by fixing current problems (Pearson and 
Mitroff 1993, 54).  
 
Airports also must share their learning of crises with multiple agencies acting 
within the airport environment in order to ensure that failures are identified 
and systems are modified in order to ensure the same failure does not occur 
again.  
2.3.3 Crisis Prone v Crisis Prepared Organisations 
 
Previous empirical work in the field of crisis management has identified that 
organisations possess certain characteristics which can either make them prepared for 
crisis (crisis-prepared) or more susceptible to crisis (crisis-prone). These were first 
identified by Pauchant and Mitroff (1988) who discussed cultural components of 
crisis prone and crisis avoiding organisations using Schein’s (1985) five categories 
of organisational culture. This approach specifically examined man-made disasters 
(in a similar vein to Disaster Incubation Theory (see Section 2.2.2)), such as 
tampering, product defects, technology failures and hostile takeovers (Mitroff, 
Pauchant and Shrivastava 1988, 88).  
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The crisis prone and crisis prepared approach discussed crisis readiness from a staff 
perspective over five different categories, from Schien’s 1985 work on 
organisational culture. These consist of; (1) humanity’s relationship to nature, (2) the 
nature of reality and truth, (3) the nature of human nature, (4) the nature of human 
activity, and (5) the nature of human relationship (Pauchant and Mitroff 1988, 55). 
This approach later developed into the framework known as the “Onion Model of 
Crisis” (Mitroff, Pauchant, Finney and Pearson 1989). This model combines the 
phases, factors and activities that must be performed in order to have an effective 
crisis management program in a complex organisation (Mitroff et al. 1989).  The 
framework is displayed below in Figure 2.2.3 The Onion Model of Crisis 
Management.  
 
Figure 2.2.3. The Onion Model of Crisis Management 
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These levels indicate how and where the different area of organisational behaviour, 
organisational structure and corporate culture impact on the crises readiness of an 
organisation (Mitroff et al. 1989, 272).  It is important to understand the function of 
the model. As the layers sit on top of one another, the effectives of areas identified at 
level one and two greatly affect the success of strategies implemented at levels three 
and four (Mitroff et al. 1989, 273). Each of the four levels are more fully explained 
in the following paragraphs.  
 
Levels 3 and 4 (organisational structure and organisational plans, actions and 
behaviour) deal with elements of the organisation which are the easiest to observe. 
Elements present at these levels are based around organisational structure and 
explicit phenomena, such as documentation and policy. Level 3 deals with items 
such as flexibility, work roles, resource sharing and information sharing (Mitroff et 
al. 1989, 278). Level 4, formal crisis management actions and policies, deals with the 
existence of formal crisis management planning, testing and exercising (Mitroff et al. 
1989, 279).  
 
Those attributes at level 1 and 2 (core organisational identity and organisational 
assumptions and beliefs) are the most difficult to observe. These levels deal with the 
root or core identity of the organisation, comprising the deepest set of primitive 
hopes, needs and anxieties of the individual and the organisation (Mitroff et al. 1989, 
273). Level 2 examines beliefs and assumptions of the organisation, including areas 
such as belief about size protecting the firm, location assumptions and beliefs 
regarding cost (Mitroff et al. 1989, 277). Level 1 examines the core belief of the 
organisation and organisational identity. This includes the three items of self-
centredness/narcissism, defence mechanisms and fatalism/passivity (Mitroff et al. 
1989, 274).   
 
Each of these elements of an organisation contribute to its ability to cope with a 
crisis event (Smith 1990, 269). Importantly, this approach recognises the role of an 
organisation’s culture and how this can impact on levels of crisis preparedness, 
moving away from surface level notions of plans and redundancy to fundamental, 
immaterial organisational components. This further supports the notions stemming 
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from HRT and in particular Weick’s (1987) work, that an organisational culture of 
reliability can be the most important factor in creating HROs.  
 
2.4 Risk as a Concept 
 
Risk is a concept that is central to all of the major theories examined so far. Risk has 
no common definition, in the sciences or public knowledge (Renn 1998a, 51; 1998b, 
50). Whilst this creates confusion and debate, there is a common element to most 
definitions of risk: a distinction between reality and possibility (Renn 1998b, 50). 
The term risk is defined by Renn (1998b, 51) as the “possibility that human actions 
or events lead to consequences that affect aspects of what humans value”. When 
considering this definition in a practical sense, the following definition can be 
utilised to understand risk as a function linking likelihood and consequence 
(Christopher and Peck 2004, 3; Norrman and Jansson 2004, 436).  
 
R= L x C 
 
This is where L represents the likelihood of an event occurring, and C the 
consequence should that event occur. This is multiplied together to create a total 
value for Risk. Or as described by Adams (1995, 30), as the product of probability 
and utility of some future event. These three elements, outcomes that affect what 
humans value (C), possibility of occurrence (L), and a formula to combine these (R) 
are found in some form in most definitions of risk (Renn 1998b, 51).  
 
This expression and understanding of risk will be utilised for the duration of this 
thesis. This is due to a number of factors. Principally, this definition has been most 
widely utilised in the social sciences, particularly within business studies (those 
relating to risk management of supply chains (see Christopher and Peck 2004; 
Norrman and Jansson 2004)). In addition, it presents the most developed approach 
toward a definition, and a bridge between the differing risk perspectives.  
 
Before beginning a discussion of applications of risk into present management 
practice, it is important to understand there are a number of differing risk 
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perspectives that currently exist within literature. The best means of understanding 
these perspectives can be found through Renn’s (1992) Typology of Risk 
Perspectives, displayed below in Figure 2.4. 
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INTEGRATED APPROACHES TO RISK 
 Actuarial 
approach 
Toxicology-
epidemiology 
Probabilistic 
risk analysis 
Economics of 
risk 
Psychology of 
risk 
Social theories 
of risk 
Cultural theory 
of risk 
Base unit Expected value Modelled value Synthesised 
expected value 
Expected utility 
(EU) 
Subjectively 
expected utility 
Perceived 
fairness & 
competence 
Shared values 
Predominant 
method 
Extrapolation Experiments Event & fault tree 
analysis 
Risk-benefit 
analysis 
Psychometrics Surveys Grid-group 
analysis Health surveys Structured 
analysis 
Scope of risk 
concept 
Universal Health & 
environment 
Safety Universal Individual 
perceptions 
Social interests Cultural clusters 
One-dimensional One-dimensional One-dimensional One-dimensional Multi-
dimensional 
Multi-
dimensional 
Multi-
dimensional 
Averaging over space, time, context Preference aggregation Social relativism 
Basic problem 
areas 
Predictive power Transfer to 
humans 
Common mode 
failure 
Common 
denominator 
Social relevance Complexity Empirical 
validity 
Intervening 
variables 
Major 
application 
Insurance Health Safety 
engineering 
Decision making Policy making and regulations 
Environmental 
protection 
Conflict resolution (mediation) 
Risk communication 
Instrumental 
function 
Risk sharing Early warning Resource 
allocation 
Individual 
assessment 
Equity fairness Cultural identity 
Standard setting Improving 
systems 
Political 
acceptance 
Social function Risk Reduction and Policy Selection 
(Coping and uncertainty) 
 
 
 
Figure 2.4.A systematic classification of risk perspectives (Adapted from Renn 1992)  
 Assessment Political legitimation 
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This typology demonstrates the varying approaches to understanding risk, and details 
the applicability of each of these approaches to different risk problems. As described 
by Jasanoff (1993, 124), such approaches are not distinct, but rather conceptually 
exist along a continuum of risk approaches. This continuum exists with one end of 
the scale adhering to a positivistic paradigm, with the other end of the spectrum 
consistent with a constructivist paradigm (Rosa 1998, 19). This is observed in the 
Renn (1992) risk typology Figure 2.4 above.  While the typology represents seven 
different approaches to risk, these can be broadly divided into the areas of technical 
approaches and social approaches, in order to facilitate a more effective discussion of 
the two areas.  
2.4.1 Technical Approaches to Understanding Risk   
Technical approaches argue that risk is an external phenomenon and constant across 
all groups in society (Renn 1992, 59). This is consistent with realist views of 
ontology and epistemology, whereby it is presupposed that an objective, external 
world exists, and that this external world can be observed (Rosa 1998, 18). The three 
approaches to risk, being actuarial, environmental and technological, have a similar 
methodology and aim and are therefore grouped together as technical perspectives of 
risk (Renn 1998b, 53). Technical approaches anticipate the potential physical harm 
to human beings, cultural artefacts or ecosystems, average these events over time and 
space, then use relative frequencies to specify probabilities (Renn 1998b, 53).  
 
Often when utilising a technical approach to risk, technical systems are at the 
foundation of the issue.  Therefore, technical risk assessments are a well-utilised 
methodology to understanding the risk present. The functions of technical risk 
assessments in society are principally concerned with risk reduction through 
mitigation of potential consequence, standard setting, and improvements in reliability 
and safety of technological systems (Renn 1998b, 53). The narrowness of this 
perspective is both its weakness and its strength, as a singular value of risk makes the 
concept universal, even if it is one dimensional (Renn 1998b, 54).  
 
Many social scientists criticise the positivist approach to risk, as they claim that risk 
is a social construction rather than a representation of real hazards (Renn 1998a, 49). 
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Further, the argument exists that technical risk assessments reflect only those 
opinions of an elite group who cannot claim universal validity or applicability and 
are therefore not as objective as they claim (Renn 1998a, 50; Jasanoff 1993, 124). 
Further, they represent a narrow framework for understanding, which should not be 
used as a single criterion for risk identification, evaluation and management (Renn 
1998b, 54). This approach is contrasted against the social school of risk thinking.  
2.4.2 Social Approaches to Understanding Risk 
 
Social approaches to risk are rooted in different paradigms within the constructivist 
approach (Rosa 1998, 19). Constructivist approaches to reality argue that the world 
that we see as individuals is created from our actions, wherein we are continually 
negotiating the world’s meaning (Rosa 1998, 21). This school of thought argues that 
as the identification of risk is a social process, risk does not exist in an objective 
reality, but in the collective consciousness of cultures, making it a cultural 
phenomenon (Renn 1998b, 55; Rosa 1998, 21). All risk concepts in the social 
sciences have the same central maxim, that likelihood and consequence of risk are 
mediated through social processes (Renn 1992, 61). Social approaches to risk; 
according to Renn’s (1992) taxonomy of risk perspectives (see Figure 2.4.1) include 
the economic, psychology, social theories and cultural theories perspectives. These 
approaches within the Renn Taxonomy include economics of risk, psychology of risk, 
social theories of risk and cultural theory of risk.  
 
Technical experts are often strongly against social approaches as they argue public 
perceptions may be misguided by those incidents that receive more media attention 
and individual biases (Renn 1998a, 49). This view does have some support in 
empirical research (see Covello 1983). In this research study, it was found that 
respondents had a representation of risk that was fairly similar to that of experts 
when asked to assess from less serious to most serious. However they were found to 
overestimate very publicised large-scale events and underestimated routine events 
associated with a low catastrophic potential (Renn 1998a, 50).  This viewpoint 
reinforces that the guidance of technical experts is important in understanding the 
severity of risk and communicating this to the wider public.  
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While progress has been made within the field, there remains a sense that 
quantitative analysis represents true risk as it “really is”, whereas qualitative analysis 
explains why people refuse to accept the reality that technical experts present to them 
(Jasanoff 1993, 123).   
2.4.3 Strategic Applications of Risk 
 
As the foundations of Risk as a concept have been established, it is important to 
understand the concepts of how to manage risk in an organisational context. Risk 
Management is an overarching term which effectively describes how organisations 
attempt to understand, manage and mitigate risk. Drennan and McConnell (2007, 2) 
define risk management as: 
 
“the process involved in managing risk in order to achieve objectives, by maximising 
potential opportunities and minimising potential adverse events.” 
 
This is similarly reflected by Standards Australia (2004), who define risk 
management as: 
 
“The culture, processes and structures that are directed towards realising potential 
opportunities whilst managing adverse effects.” (Standards Australia 2004, 40).  
 
In practice, risk management involves the process of reducing the ‘risk’ to a level 
deemed tolerable by society and to assure control, monitoring and public 
communication (Renn 1998a, 52). Frequently used actions for risk management are 
to avoid, transfer, share, or even take the risk (Norrman and Jansson 2004, 349).  
These risk management options are heavily influenced by the type of risk problem 
encountered. Simple risk problems can be managed through routine measures such as 
trial and error and technical standards, ranging through to ambiguity-induced risk 
problems which require discourse-based methods for appropriate management (Renn 
2006, 47). The full range of risk problems and management options can be viewed in 
the following Table 2.4.3. 
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Table 2.4.3 
Risk Characteristics and Their Implications for Risk Management (Renn 2006, 47) 
Knowledge 
Characterisation 
Management 
Strategy 
Appropriate instruments Stakeholder 
participation 
1. ‘Simple’ risk 
problems 
Routine-based: 
(tolerability/acc
eptability 
judgement) 
 
(risk reduction) 
Applying ‘traditional’ decision-making 
• Risk-benefit analysis 
• Risk-risk trade-offs 
 
• Trial and error 
• Technical standards 
• Economic incentives 
• Education, labelling, information 
• Voluntary agreements 
Instrumental 
discourse 
2. Complexity-
induced risk 
problems 
Risk-informed: 
(risk agent and 
causal chain) 
 Characterising the available evidence 
• Expert consensus seeking tools: 
o Delphi or consensus 
conferencing 
o Meta analysis 
o Scenario construction 
etc. 
 Results fed into routine operation 
Epistemological 
discourse 
Robustness-
focussed: 
(risk absorbing 
system) 
 Improving buffer capacity of risk target 
through: 
• Additional safety factors 
• Redundancy and diversity in designing 
safety devices 
• Improving coping capacity 
• Establishing high reliability 
organisations 
3. Uncertainty-
induced risk 
problems 
Precaution-
based: (risk 
agent) 
 Using hazard characteristics such as 
persistence, ubiquity etc. as proxies for 
risk estimates 
Tools include: 
• Containment 
• ALARA (as low as reasonably 
achievable) and ALARP (as low was 
reasonably possible) 
• BACT (best available control 
technology) etc. 
Reflective 
discourse 
Resilience-
focussed: (risk 
absorbing 
system) 
 Improving capability to cope with 
surprises 
1. Diversity of means to accomplish 
desired benefits 
2. Avoiding high vulnerability 
3. Allowing for flexible responses 
4. Preparedness for adaptation 
4. Ambiguity-
induced risk 
problems 
Discourse-
based: 
 Application of conflict resolution 
methods for reaching consensus or 
tolerance for risk evaluation results and 
management option selection 
• Integration of stakeholder 
involvement in reaching 
closure 
• Emphasis on communication 
and social discourse 
Participative 
discourse 
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As displayed within the previous table, the type of risk problem is instrumental in 
determining the approach to risk management. The type of risk problem defines the 
management strategy, individual instruments and level of stakeholder participation 
that is appropriate. Therefore, the fundamental first step in any risk management 
process is to determine the type of risk problem faced. 
2.4.4 Relationship between Risk and Business Continuity Management 
 
It is important to clarify the position of BCM within a broader framework of risk 
management. Most effectively, BCM and risk management should exist in a tightly 
bound interrelationship, with risk management providing the scope, needs and 
priorities for BCM (Standards Australia 2004, 5).  BCM is therefore conducted as an 
outcome of the risk management process, seeking to mitigate the consequences of a 
particular group of identified risks (e.g. high consequence - low likelihood) to the 
organisation. Further, BCM cannot be undertaken without the presence of effective 
risk management, especially in the components of Risk Assessment and Business 
Impact Assessment (See Section 2.5.3 Adopted Approach to Business Continuity 
Management).  
 
As a risk management strategy, BCM straddles a number of the approaches to risk 
identified in Figure 2.4. Risk in a BCM sense cannot be placed in a specific category, 
as it draws on both social and technical risk approaches, because although risk is 
believed to be an external concept to the minds of individuals, it cannot be reduced to 
a probabilistic value. Each organisation will place their own value on both the 
likelihood and consequence of individual threats or sources of disturbance during the 
threat assessment, a process which involves a certain amount of individual and group 
judgement. The Australian Standard for Risk Management (31000:2009) identifies 
BCM as a ‘risk treatment’ option. This reflects what is stated in the broader risk 
literature, which speaks of BCM as the risk management option for low probability 
risks whose potential impact is business failure (Norrman and Jannson 2004, 438).  
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2.5 Business Continuity Management 
2.5.1 Development of Business Continuity Management  
As outlined by Herbane, Elliott and Swartz (2004, 438), crisis management as a 
management practice can be considered strongly linked to BCM, establishing its core 
assumptions. However, where BCM diverges from crisis management is the focus on 
management processes and whereas crisis management is socio-centric (government, 
public bodies etc.), BCM is business centric (organisation, customers, suppliers etc.) 
(Herbane, Elliott and Swartz 2004, 438). Further, BCM responsibilities are present at 
all levels within the organisation, from senior management through to the officer 
level (this will be expanded upon during Section 2.5.3). Elliott, Swartz and Herbane 
(2002, 10) have established evolutionary stages of BCM, beginning at its most 
preliminary stage at the technology mindset, moving to the auditing mindset and 
finally the most advanced stage being the value-based mindset. The following Table 
2.5.1, Exploring assumptions about business continuity management provision, 
outlines the three principal stages of BCM evolution, according to Elliott, Swartz and 
Herbane (2002, 11). Following Table 2.5.1 each of these three stages is explained in 
more detail.  
 
Table 2.5.1 
Exploring Assumptions About Business Continuity Management Provision Elliott, Swartz and 
Herbane (2002, 11) 
Emerged during 
this decade 
Mindset Scope  Triggers 
 
Process 
1970s Technology Limited to 
technology 
Focus upon large 
corporate systems  
External 
physical 
triggers, flood, 
fire, bomb 
Contingency 
measures 
focused on hard 
systems 
1980s Auditing All facilities 
All systems – both 
corporate and 
departmental 
offices 
As above and 
legal or 
regulatory 
pressures 
Contingency 
measures 
outsourced 
Compliance 
driven 
1990s Value-based Maintain 
competitive 
advantage 
Includes 
customers and 
suppliers 
Entire 
organisation, 
including human, 
social issues 
Organisational 
stake-holders in 
value system 
BCM developed 
as business 
process focused 
on business 
managers 
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2.5.1.1 Technology Mindset (1970s)  
The technology mindset was the first observed within continuity management 
practice, with the sole focus being on the protection of computer systems and 
facilities (Elliott, Swartz and Herbane 2002, 11; Swartz, Elliott and Herbane 
2003, 69). The scope of this mindset is limited to technology aspects, 
particularly in large corporate systems. The main triggers for continuity 
action within the technology mindset principally consist of external failures 
and events such as terrorist attacks (Swartz, Elliott and Herbane 2003, 69). 
The technology mindset culminated in processes based on systematically 
backing up systems and the establishment of recovery sites (Elliott, Swartz 
and Herbane 2002, 12).   
2.5.1.2 Auditing Mindset (1980s)  
The second move within BCM practice was associated with the auditing 
perspective. The auditing perspective regards BCM as a ‘cost of doing 
business’, something which is required by either legislation or corporate 
governance frameworks (Elliot, Swartz and Herbane 2002, 12; Swartz, Elliott 
and Herbane 2003, 70). The scope expanded to include facilities outside 
technology, yet still maintained the focus of technology and how continuity 
can be established through protecting essential business activities (Swartz, 
Elliott and Herbane 2003, 70). Triggers within the auditing perspective are, 
for the most part, regulation (Elliott, Swartz and Herbane 2002, 13). Within 
the process of business continuity, some functions of disaster recovery are 
outsourced to consultants (Swartz, Elliott and Herbane 2003, 70). 
Compliance is the key outcome of this perspective, with little 
acknowledgement that BCM can add value to the organisation, and no regard 
to how people can impact disruption or influence the implementation of 
continuity management processes (Elliott, Swartz and Herbane 2002, 13; 
Swartz, Elliott and Herbane 2003, 70).  
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2.5.1.3 Value-based Mindset (1990s)  
The most advanced perspective of BCM, the value based mindset, arises from 
the understanding that continuity management can add potential value to the 
organisation (Elliott, Swartz and Herbane 2002, 13). The focus of the value-
based mindset expands outside the organisation, encompassing customers and 
suppliers, while also considering human and social issues. Triggers often 
exist at the design phase, with BCM protecting the organisation while 
simultaneously creating value (Swartz, Elliott and Herbane 2003, 70).  
 
2.5.2 Contemporary Approaches to Business Continuity Management 
 
The previous Section 2.5.1 outlined the development of BCM, from its roots in crisis 
management, and the maturation of the concept from dealing simply with 
technological failure, to an audit approach, to finally becoming a strategy that can 
add value to business. The following Section 2.5.2 presents approaches to BCM that 
are outlined in literature, in addition to examining practitioner use of the concept, 
with particular reference to the use of standards. There are a number of definitions 
evident in both theory and empirical research in relation to BCM. These are 
summarised in the following Table 2.5.2 Definitions of BCM.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 51 
Table 2.5.2 
Definitions of BCM 
Author Definition 
Gibb and 
Buchanan 
(2006) 
A tool that can be employed to provide greater confidence that the outputs 
of processes and services can be delivered in the face of risk.  
Botha and Von 
Solms (2004) 
A complete process of developing measures and procedures to ensure an 
organisation’s disaster preparedness.  
British Standard 
BS25999 (cited 
in Cornish 2011) 
A holistic management process that identifies potential threats to an 
organisation and the impacts to business operations that those threats, if 
realised, might cause, and which provides a framework for building 
organisational resilience with the capability for an effective response that 
safeguards the interests of key stakeholders, reputation, brand and value-
creating activities. 
Elliott, Swartz 
and Herbane 
(2002) 
A holistic management process that identifies potential threats to an 
organisation and the impacts to business operations that those threats, if 
realised, might cause, and which provides a framework for building 
organisational resilience with the capability for an effective response that 
safeguards the interests of key stakeholders, reputation, brand and value-
creating activities. 
Cerullo and 
Cerullo (2004) 
Designed to avoid or mitigate risks, to reduce the impact of a crisis and to 
reduce the time to restore conditions to a state of “business as usual.” 
Low, Liu and 
Sio (2010) 
Identification and protection of critical business processes and resources 
required to maintain an acceptable level of business, protecting such 
resources and preparing procedures to ensure the survival of the 
organisation in times of business disruptions.  
 
This research adopts the definition of Elliott, Swartz and Herbane (2002, 2): 
 
“A holistic management process that identifies potential threats to an organisation 
and the impacts to business operations that those threats, if realised, might cause, 
and which provides a framework for building organisational resilience with the 
capability for an effective response that safeguards the interests of key stakeholders, 
reputation, brand and value-creating activities.” 
 
As a definition of BCM has been established for this research, the specific 
components need to be unpacked and understood. The following Section 2.5.3 
outlines the adopted approach of BCM for this research, and compares this against 
other approaches evident in literature.  
 
 
 
 
 52 
2.5.3 Adopted Approach to Business Continuity Management 
 
This research has adopted the following model as an optimal approach to BCM. The 
utilised model consists of seven components, which are listed below and discussed in 
further detail in the following sections.  
 
1. Commencement 
2. Risk Assessment 
3. Business Impact Assessment 
4. Continuity Plans  
5. Testing and Training 
6. Communication and Consultation 
7. Monitoring, Review and Learning 
Commencement 
Commencement activities include all those involved in establishing the BCM process. 
This often includes setting the scope, boundaries, aims and personnel responsible for 
BCM (Standards Australia, 2010). Important during this stage is a firm commitment 
from senior management, because even though an organisation may identify BCM as 
a priority, it may be a long way from the allocation of appropriate funds and 
resources to enact the process (Howe 2007, 119). While the process required senior 
management support, staff throughout all levels of the organisation must be engaged 
in order for BCM to be implemented effectively. Further, commencement activities 
should include appropriate planning for the process. This often includes defining the 
boundaries of BCM, establishing objectives which are clearly stated, understood and 
communicated, creating and documenting top management commitment, allocating 
necessary resources and ensuring those allocated roles have the required skills to 
perform them (Gibb and Buchanan 2006, 129; Cornish 2011, 123). Responsibility 
usually falls to that of a senior manager who has the authority to lead BCM 
development, with relevant business process owners also established to ensure BCM 
remains relevant and current with the business structure and activities (Gibb and 
Buchanan 2006, 129).  
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Risk Assessment 
Following commencement, the first stage in continuity management is to conduct an 
organisation-wide risk assessment.  This involves an assessment of threats, from both 
internal and external sources, to the organisation’s physical infrastructure as well as 
threats to continued operations (Elliott 2006, 401; Griffiths 2008, 48; Charters 2011, 
157).  Although many frameworks for risk assessment exist, there are four main 
stages common to each, consisting of (1) threat identification, (2) calculation of 
likelihood, (3) vulnerability assessment, and (4) evaluation of solutions (Charters 
2011, 158). The risk assessment is designed to identify threats (from internal and 
external sources) to the organisation’s physical infrastructure as well as threats to 
continued operations (Elliott 2006, 401; Griffiths 2008, 48). These processes to a 
great extent define the trajectory of organisational efforts and the agility and 
sensitivity to detect the effects of known vulnerabilities.  
 
Business Impact Assessment (BIA):  
The Business Impact Assessment (BIA) is the key fundamental product of business 
continuity lifecycles (Barnes 2007, 145; 2011 166). In fact Meredith (1999, 139) 
establishes the BIA as “the backbone of the BCM process”. BIA is defined as: 
 
“the management level analysis by which an organisation assesses the quantitative 
(financial) and qualitative (non-financial) impacts, effects and loss that might result 
if the organisation were to suffer a Business Continuity emergency, incident or crisis. 
The findings from a BIA are used to make decisions concerning Business Continuity 
Management strategy and solutions.” (Barnes 2011, 168) 
 
The BIA is the foundation of the BCM process, allowing an organisation to identify 
its critical business functions and form responses to the loss of these without 
reference to a specific threat (Cornish 2011, 122).  The BIA process identifies the 
critical business functions that exist in an organisation, their maximum allowable 
outage time (MAO) (the period of time that the organisation can be without these 
functions), their recovery time objective (RTO), any sequential order required for 
these systems to come back online, and the resources that will be required to achieve 
these means (Elliott, Swartz and Herbane 2002, 79). Initially, the scope of 
investigation must be defined, which assists in detailing which processes should be 
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considered within the scope of the assessment (Cornish 2011, 169). Following this, a 
process must exist in order to identify critical business processes of the organisation, 
determine their maximum acceptable outage times and the order by which services 
must be restored (their interdependencies) (Cornish 2011, 176).  
 
Continuity Plans 
Once the BIA is complete, the organisation has identified their critical business 
functions. Continuity plans are constructed around each of these critical business 
functions or processes, to ensure adequate workaround strategies and steps to restore 
the function as soon as possible, in line with the identified MAO, RTO and 
interdependencies. While there is no specific formula for documenting these 
elements they should provide a process for activating the mechanisms required to 
ensure that the continuity response is conducted in the best interest of enhancing 
organisational functionality (Elliott, Swartz and Herbane 2002, 169). These 
processes may often be influenced by regulatory requirements or industry standards 
(Standards Australia 2006, 93). The plan should cover all phases of the disaster 
(Hiles 2011a, 384). Also contained in the plan are the appropriate mechanisms for 
activating the plan, responsible officers and steps for deactivation (Hiles 2011a, 385). 
Most effective continuity plans take the worst possible case scenario, which allows 
organisations to effectively handle less severe incidents (Hiles 2007, 279) while 
identifying the roles and responsibilities of relevant groups at the operational level 
for each business unit, team or support function (Elliott, Swartz and Herbane 2002, 
170). 
 
Testing and Training 
Testing and training involves a number of activities that are designed to evaluate 
whether plans direct business resumption effects as expected. Training includes 
training staff in their specific roles as well as coverage of organisational awareness 
of the need for BCM and relevant objectives (Hiles 2007, 318). In particular, training 
is based around not only training specific staff in their roles but maintaining levels of 
continuity management awareness throughout the organisation (Hiles 2011b, 414). 
Testing examines and explores the realities of implementing plans, alongside 
benefits of setting BCM as a practical priority rather than a theoretical necessity 
(Elliott, Swartz and Herbane 2002, 165). Coverage of testing includes the basic 
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forms of a plan through to a large-scale exercise (Armit 2007, 328-336). Hiles 
(2011b, 428) suggests four sequential stages of testing, beginning with plan audit, 
walkthroughs, component testing, and concluding with large scale testing such as 
complete activation of a plan.  
 
Communication and Consultation  
Communication and consultation occurs both during the development of continuity 
plans, and during any event where the plan is activated. Communication and 
consultation during plan development refers to how internal and external parties are 
informed of the progress of continuity management implementation, and the 
intensity of consultation on the content of the plans throughout the process. 
Communication and consultation at the development stage is particularly important, 
as these processes are required to ensure that the plans developed are effective to 
both the internal organisation and key external stakeholders, such as third party 
service providers.  
 
Communication and consultation during plan activation refers to the communication 
and consultation protocols in the times that a plan has been activated.  In the most 
effective sense these protocols would ensure that during a BCP event, information 
was being effectively disseminated to relevant internal and external stakeholders, in 
addition to consultation being utilised to inform the most effective solutions to 
unique situations.  
 
Monitoring, Review and Learning 
The generic term ‘maintenance’ is used’ to describe a number of activities designed 
to ensure continuity plans are up to date (i.e. relevant) (Elliott, Swartz and Herbane 
2002, 169).  As BCM is a continuous organisational process, plan review is an 
essential component. Within the Australian Standard (292-2006), maintenance 
contains three distinct phases: understanding, performance and assurance. Important 
to note in this context is that BCM is a continuous organisational process, with 
review being an essential component. At best, reviews should be both determined on 
a regular basis while ensuring the capacity for trigger points, such as changes to 
technology or processes (Elliott, Swartz and Herbane 2002, 169) and unexpected 
crises or the emergence of previously unforseen threats. Auditing is a major 
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component of maintenance, as audits determine if plans are appropriate (Elliott, 
Swartz and Herbane 2002, 169), with auditing ensuring that BCM remains up to date 
and reflects the organisation’s applicable BIA (Standards Australia 2006, 126).  
Monitoring is a key aspect of any continuity management process, as plans and 
strategies are a reflection of the organisational reality at the time of their 
implementation (Hiles 2011b, 439). Therefore the monitoring, review and learning 
elements are critical to ensure plans are up to date and accurate.   
 
Throughout all stages of BCM development and implementation, the organisation 
must consider relevant levels of the organisation in which BCM processes are active. 
While the process needs to be owned and driven by senior management, in order to 
effectively seek information about business processes and ensure appropriate 
implementation, all levels throughout the organisation must be engaged with. In fact, 
this must extend outside the organisation to include suppliers, regulators and the like 
to ensure the end-to-end process is understood. However, this also presents the most 
difficulties, in that it requires extensive engagement, effort and resources to achieve 
properly.  
 
When considering this approach, it is critical to compare this across other established 
models of BCM. The following table 2.5.3.1 Comparison of BCM Models compares 
the approach adopted for this research against three other models identified in 
literature. The following Table 2.5.3.1 summarises the similarities and differences 
between the four approaches. 
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Table 2.5.3.1 
Comparison of BCM Models (Developed for this Research) 
Botha and Von 
Solms (2004) 
Gibb and 
Buchanan (2006) 
Jacobsen and 
Kerr (2011) 
For this research 
(2012) 
 
Project Planning 
Phase 
Programme 
Initiation 
Programme 
Initiation and 
Management 
Commencement 
Project Initiation Risk Evaluation 
and Control 
Risk Assessment 
Business Impact 
Analysis Phase 
Risk Analysis Business Impact 
Analysis 
Business Impact 
Analysis 
Business Continuity 
Strategies Phase 
Selecting Risk 
Mitigation Strategies 
Business 
Continuity 
Strategies 
Continuity Plans 
 Monitoring and 
Control 
  
Continuity Strategies 
Implementation Phase 
Implementation Emergency 
Response and 
Operation 
 
Continuity Training 
Phase 
 Awareness and 
Training 
Programmes 
Testing and Training 
Continuity Testing 
Phase 
Testing 
  Crisis 
Communications 
 
Communication and 
Consultation Coordination with 
External Agencies 
Continuity Plan 
Maintenance Phase 
Education and 
Training 
BCP Exercise, 
Audit and 
Maintenance 
Monitoring, Review 
and Learning 
Review  
2.5.4 Continuity Management Studies in Airports 
 
While Business Continuity Management is an emerging practice, there is limited 
evidence in the extant literature of the widespread application of this process within 
the aviation industry. Thornton (2008) discussed the Business Continuity Plan in use 
in the Australian Customs Service, aimed at the continued operation of urgent 
customs clearance in the face of a full or partial loss of key information technology 
systems, Skelton (2007) examined how continuity approaches can improve logistics 
flows in airports, and Halliwell (2008) used the example of Air New Zealand to 
demonstrate how BCM can help ensure an airline’s continued survival. Studies of 
airport wide BCM have discussed broad-scale benefits of continuity in terms of 
protecting critical infrastructures that have national importance. As indicated by 
Griffiths (2008), the focus of ensuring continuity in airports is of a security nature, 
with aims to ensure airports are not destabilised by a breach of security.  
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Further studies discussing approaches to airport continuity, while not conforming to 
the same criteria seen in conventional BCM practice, share some similarities with the 
goal of ensuring continued functionality of airports during crisis situations. Smith 
(2008) for example, discusses the role of maintaining airport operation following a 
natural disaster, as airports are often used as a central location to distribute aid and 
act as a temporary shelter. Similarly Johanis (2007) discusses how Toronto Pearson 
international airport learned lessons from SARS in order to develop a pandemic 
response plan.  
 
Table 2.5.4 
Previous Studies of Airport Related Continuity 
Study Context Logistics Emergency
/Crisis 
Disasters Corporate 
Thornton 
(2008) 
BCP in Australian 
Customs Service 
✓    
Skelton 
(2007) 
Continuity in supply 
chains 
✓  ✓  
Halliwell 
(2008) 
BCM at Air New 
Zealand 
 ✓  ✓ 
Smith 
(2008) 
Continuity of operations 
post-disaster 
  ✓  
Johanis 
(2007) 
Pandemic response  ✓ ✓  
Crichton 
(2008) 
Continuity response 
following Glasgow 
airport attack 
 ✓ ✓  
Castillo 
(2004) 
Business continuity 
planning at Boeing 
✓  ✓ ✓ 
 
2.6 Gap Identification 
2.6.1 Gap 1: BCM existing as a practitioner discipline  
BCM has been a process that has developed out of practitioner solutions in response 
to the issue of managing both crises and lower-level disruptions. Whilst there have 
been a number of publications on this process from key authors (Elliott, Swartz and 
Herbane 2002; Botha and Von Solms 2004; Gibb and Buchanan 2006; Jacobsen and 
Kerr 2011) these are largely centred around the detail of what the components of 
BCM are, or their applications to different industries or organisations (as detailed in 
Table 2.5.4 Previous Studies of Airport Related Continuity). There has yet to be firm 
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linkages between the practitioner discipline of BCM and extant theory. This chapter 
has undertaken a literature review that identifies a number of theoretical approaches 
which lend understanding to the concepts related to the management of crises and 
disturbances. These include Normal Accident Theory, High Reliability Theory, 
Crisis Management and Risk Management. These theories lend some understanding 
to the issue, but do not entirely explain the phenomenon.  
2.6.2 Gap 2: Lack of means to achieve High Reliability 
 
High Reliability has been well established through empirical research (see Table 
2.2.3). These studies have been principally based on observations of organisations 
which have, through their own means, achieved high levels of reliability. There is 
insufficient explanation of what practices organisations can employ in order to 
become highly reliable. This is an area where more empirical basis is needed, in 
order to establish firm strategies to achieve high reliability. This issue is further 
complicated by the nature of the organisations from which HR was based. Many of 
these were military or quasi-military organisations, which maintained strict 
hierarchical structure and uniform adherence to procedure and rules. It is possible 
that the difference in underlying structure between military and civilian organisations 
may change the way in which high reliability principles can be applied. Therefore, 
this is a key area of distinction that requires further empirical investigation. This 
includes both identifying practical strategies that can achieve HR, and the 
applicability of these to civilian organisations.  
 
2.7 Industry Factors Relevant to this Study 
 
Before investigating the issues of business continuity management and high 
reliability, a number of industry consistent factors need to be understood. These are 
principally related to secure and safe functioning of airports, which will be recurrent 
themes in the following analysis chapters. Safety and security for aviation fall under 
the jurisdiction of two federal agencies – the Civil Aviation Safety Authority 
(CASA) and the Office of Transport Security (OTS) respectively. The role of these 
two agencies will be further explained, and the relevant legislative and compliance 
guidelines will be unpacked with regard to their impact on airport operations and 
management.  
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2.7.1 Civil Aviation Safety Authority  
CASA is an independent statutory authority with the primary function of conducting 
the safety regulation of civil air operations and the operation of Australian aircraft 
overseas (CASA 2012). CASA acts under the power of the Civil Aviation 
Regulations 1988 and the Civil Aviation Safety Regulations 1998 amongst others. 
The major instrument utilised by CASA to outline the safety regulations to airport 
operators is the Manual of Standards Part 139 – Aerodromes. This manual outlines a 
number of safety requirements for airport operators. These range from specifications 
for airfield operations, serviceability inspections, through to guidelines for 
emergency plan testing and compliance. It is through this mechanism that safety 
compliance is mandated to all airports which were a part of this study.  
 
The manual outlines the emergency planning and exercising requirements. This 
includes the amount of planning that must occur and the agencies that need to be 
included, in addition to the requirements for plan testing and training of plans. 
Further, the regulations dictate the specific scope and bounds of what the AEP must 
cover. These plans are audited by CASA to ensure that airports are meeting their 
compliance regulations as set out by MOS139. Therefore, emergency exercising and 
planning are heavily influenced by these compliance requirements and will dominate 
the emergency planning of the airports studied. This compliance is further 
compounded as critical due to the requirements of emergency planning in order to 
maintain operating as an aerodrome.  
 
2.7.2 Office of Transport Security  
The Office of Transport Security (OTS) is Australia’s preventive security regulator 
for the aviation and maritime sectors (Australian Government 2013). They are 
responsible for ensuring security is maintained at all Australian airports who receive 
regular passenger transport flights. The areas where OTS has responsibility include 
transport security intelligence; transport operations; transport security policy, 
planning and regulation; audit, compliance and security measure; ensuring a 
nationally consistent approach; and complying with international standards 
(Australian Government 2013).  
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For airports the key role of OTS plays is the auditing of security regulations. OTS 
can perform inspections which are announced or surprise. In a similar fashion to 
CASA, OTS has the power to fine or close an airport if they are in a state of non-
compliance. Security regulations, in particular the Transport Security Programme are 
a core function of OTS. The Transport Security Programme ensures that airports 
maintain a secure operating environment for aircraft and passengers.  
2.8 Conclusion  
This Chapter began by introducing the key theoretical perspectives of Normal 
Accident Theory, Disaster Incubation Theory and High Reliability Theory. This was 
followed by a discussion of the concepts of crisis. Risk was introduced, serving as a 
basis to discuss the key practitioner approach of Business Continuity Management. 
After establishing both historical and contemporary approaches to BCM, a gap 
identification was used to summarise the incomplete coverage of literature identified 
throughout this literature review.  
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3.0 Conceptual Framework                       
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3.1 Introduction  
The previous Chapter provided critical review of the relevant literature surrounding 
risk and crisis management. This resulted in the identification of two key areas of 
literature which require further investigation. This Chapter (Conceptual Framework) 
outlines the research questions in context with the overall problem area detailed in 
Chapter One. Following this, the conceptual framework is developed, in support of 
these identified questions. 
3.2 Research Questions   
Chapter Two, identified two key areas of importance (or gaps) that this study aims to 
address. The first gap related to the relative disconnect between BCM and extant risk 
and crisis theory, coupled with the infancy of the process itself contrasted to other 
management processes. Many components of business practice in regards to risk and 
crisis management have moved ahead of theoretical perspectives. This is particularly 
evident in the practice of BCM, which has largely developed within the practitioner 
space, with little link to extant risk and crisis theory. Therefore, one of the key areas 
of investigation for this study is investigating potential links between BCM and 
established risk and crisis theory.   
 
The second gap identified is that while high reliability (as defined by High 
Reliability Theory) has been observed in some organisations, there have been limited 
studies which explore processes or practices by which high reliability can be 
achieved in organisational contexts. The two following research questions address 
the under-examination of high reliability processes in the context of critical 
infrastructure environments, and in this particular study, Australian airports.   
 
The first research question seeks to examine BCM in airport environments through 
the lens of organisational reliability, and in particular, High Reliability Theory. It is 
proposed that BCM could be a means to generate high reliability, as many outcomes 
of BCM have a logical connection to high reliability traits (which is further 
illustrated within the conceptual framework). This research question addresses the 
identified gap of a lack of defined processes to engender reliability in complex 
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organisations. To reiterate, the effective implementation of continuity processes is 
likely to lead to reliable organisations.  
 
Research Question One:  
Can BCM generate reliability outcomes?  
 
The second research question addresses the issue of optimal approaches to ensuring 
continuity of airport operations. As previously discussed (see Section 1.2.1), airports 
are forms of critical infrastructure that serve an important role in connecting 
Australia both nationally and further into the international aviation network. 
Research question two examines optimal approaches to the implementation of BCM 
in order to achieve reliable aviation networks, with consideration of the unique 
contextual features and dimensions of each airport examined.  
 
Research Question Two:  
 
What are the optimal approaches for BCM implementation in a range of Australian 
airports? How can these approaches best be implemented and understood? 
 
 
Research question two contextualises the relative infancy of BCM from a practical 
perspective. This focus also allows for examination of the best approach of BCM 
implementation and practice across varying airport types. The key outcome of 
research question two will be the establishment of effective continuity measures for 
airports of varying size and market and defining a practical means of ensuring their 
continued operations. The link between the identified research gaps and research 
questions is graphically displayed in Table 3.2 Identified Gaps and Research 
Questions.  
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Table 3.2 
Identified Gaps and Research Questions 
Research Gap Research Question 
Link between BCM and extant risk and crisis 
theory 
RQ1: Can BCM generate reliability 
outcomes? 
Lack of guidance on BCM implementation 
in complex infrastructures 
RQ2: What are the optimal approaches for 
BCM implementation in a range of 
Australian airports? 
How can these approaches best be 
implemented and understood?  
3.3 Development of Conceptual Framework  
This Section (3.3) outlines the development, components and application of the 
conceptual framework which underpins this study. The wider context of this goal is 
exploration of potential links between BCM practice and HRO traits derived from an 
assumption that Business Continuity Management ensures not only the continued 
operation of organisations following a disturbance, but a means of producing HR 
traits. 
 
The conceptual framework was developed by considering a key question: Can BCM 
generate high reliability traits? The first step in this process was understanding what 
outcomes should result following an effective implementation of BCM. This was 
achieved through the documenting of BCM process components and then 
considering the arising outcomes. These outcomes were compared against HR traits, 
which were produced from extant literature, principally by de Bruijne (2006). Two 
kinds of association were considered between BCM and HR. The first of these is 
considered a strong association (Category A). This is where BCM outcomes are 
theorised as directly producing HR traits. The second category identified was that of 
a weak association, where these BCM outcomes do not directly generate HR traits, 
but assist in some manner (Category B). A number of both Category A and Category 
B items were identified, which supported the perspective that BCM within 
organisations can produce HR traits. This is graphically explained in Figure 3.1 
Conceptual links between BCM and HROs below.  
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Figure 3.3. Conceptual Links Between BCM and HROs 
 
Category A and B elements are defined in the Table below, Table 3.3 BCM Elements 
Assisting the Generation of HR Traits. Several components of BCM have been 
identified as having a direct theoretical alignment with HR characteristics (Category 
A elements). Category B elements consisted of those BCM outcomes that, while not 
directly leading to HR traits, may assist indirectly in the overall production of high 
reliability.  When discussing the nature of these relationships, it is important to note 
the inherent tension existing between the two areas of HR and BCM. BCM itself is a 
normative practitioner process, while HR can be construed itself a set of ideals or 
considerations about organisational functionality. In attempting to link these two 
concepts, a degree of tension between ‘process’ and ‘effect’ is noted.  Further 
investigation of the tension between HR and BCM is, however, outside the scope of 
this work.  
 
Further, the relationships between the theoretical approach of high reliability and the 
practitioner discipline of BCM are at this stage only theorised. The exploratory 
nature of this research allows an investigation of these theorised relationships.  At 
this stage it is proposed that effectively implemented BCM can assist in producing 
reliability traits, as identified through the category A and B associations. It is only 
following analysis that a more certain definition of the relationship between these 
two concepts can be determined. The following Table 3.3 specifically aligns BCM 
outcomes and their associated HR trait, within both Category A and Category B 
associations. The BCM components in the first column refer to the components of 
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the BCM process developed during the literature review, and detailed in Section 
2.5.3 Adopted Approach to Business Continuity Management.  
 
Table 3.3 
BCM Elements Assisting the Generation of HR Traits 
 
BCM Component BCM Activity HR Trait 
Category A 
Commencement Top management 
commitment to BCM 
 
Reliability as a top 
organisational priority 
 
Testing and Training Training and practical 
exercises 
Trigger points for BCM 
review 
Regular review of BCM 
Identification of system 
weaknesses 
Identification of critical 
business functions 
Training for worst-case 
scenarios and constant search 
for system improvement 
Communication and 
Consultation 
Communication with key 
stakeholders  
Communication outside the 
organisation 
On-going stakeholder 
communications 
Internal and external 
communications established 
Presence of external groups 
with access to timely and 
credible information 
 
Continuity Plans Continuity plans Redundancy and flexibility in 
systems and processes 
 Category B 
Business Impact 
Assessment 
Organisational awareness7 
Situational awareness8 Sustained high technical performance 
 
Continuity Plans Continuity plans Centralised decision-making 
with operator flexibility9+ 
protection built into design 
 
 
 
                                                        
7 ‘Organisational awareness’ is a term given to outcomes of the Business Impact Assessment (BIA), 
with the complete list of variables outlined in Appendix A 
8 ‘Situational awareness’ is the term given to the outcomes of the Risk Assessment stage of BCM, 
with complete list of these outcomes outlined in Appendix A 
9 When these elements are established correctly, this should be a definite outcome 
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3.3.1 Category A Elements 
 
Category A elements are those BCM processes that appear to directly result in 
reliability traits. The following section further explores each of these elements and 
the proposed relationships between BCM processes and reliability traits. The first 
identified BCM process within category A is top management commitment. Those 
organisations which prioritise BCM have identified ongoing availability of core 
functionality as a priority. Therefore, this can lead to reliability being prioritised as 
an organisational commitment.   
 
A number of BCM outcomes produce the high reliability trait of training for worst-
case scenarios and continuous search for system improvement (trait 6). A number of 
these processes are included as part of the Business Impact Assessment (BIA) 
process. The BIA process allows organisations to search for, identify and understand 
their system vulnerabilities and the detail of their critical business functions and as a 
consequence, focus on improvements (see Section 2.5.3 Business Impact 
Assessment). Testing and training of BCM, when applied correctly, can also provide 
an opportunity for training within worst-case scenarios. A full-live testing situation 
for example can prepare staff to respond to a worst-case scenario and therefore assist 
in producing this particular reliability trait. The review function of BCM further 
assists in developing this reliability trait through the identification and correction of 
systemic weaknesses.  
 
The reliability trait of external groups with access to timely and credible information 
is created through a number of communication and consultation practices established 
through BCM. In particular, this is achieved through providing these external groups 
with relevant and timely information during an incident.   
 
Continuity plans are the final BCM function that has been identified as having a 
theoretical direct link to high reliability outcomes. Continuity plans themselves detail 
response, continuity and recovery functions for each of the critical business functions 
identified during the BIA (Cornish 2007, 115). The establishment of these plans 
identifies workarounds, including areas of potential redundancy, and establishes 
flexible and alternate means of ensuring a key process is completed. These BCM 
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processes have been identified as having a direct theoretical link to high reliability 
traits. The following Section 3.3.2 identifies category B elements, those BCM 
components which have an indirect link to high reliability outcomes.   
3.3.2 Category B Elements  
Category B elements of BCM from Table 3.1 represent those which have a weaker 
influence on HR characteristics. These elements, while not directly producing HR 
outcomes, have some influence on their development. In other words, the sum of 
these BCM processes will likely have a positive relationship on the development of 
reliability traits within complex organisations.  
 
The first HR trait identified within category B is sustained high technical 
performance (trait 2). BCM processes that influence high technical performance are 
organisational awareness and situational awareness. Organisational awareness is a 
blanket term used to describe the outcomes of the BIA. The BIA, when conducted 
correctly, allows organisations to have a detailed understanding of how their critical 
business functions operate, how these are interdependent with other processes, and 
the potential for sustained high technical performance. The second area that is linked 
with sustained high technical performance is risk profile awareness. Risk profile 
awareness is produced as an outcome of the risk assessment process, and can 
facilitate the creation of high technical performance.  
 
The second area of high reliability facilitated with an indirect association by BCM 
components is centralised decision-making with operator flexibility. The presence of 
pre-determined continuity and response plans centralises a large number of decisions, 
as appropriate responses have already been discussed, documented and trained. 
However, there is also potential for operator flexibility in response situations if this is 
stipulated in the plans, as responsibility for responding to a particular critical 
business function can be assigned to the individual in the organisation with the most 
knowledge of that process.  
 
As with Category A components previously discussed, Category B elements of HR 
should only be present when BCM is appropriately implemented.  While the extant 
literature suggests there are relationships between these two concepts, is it important 
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to note that this research is nascent and there is presently insufficient evidence to 
determine the exact nature of the relationships between BCM and HR. This research 
will explore the relationships between BCM and HR systematically, while also 
allowing for alternative explanations. Such alternative explanations may include 
identifying other causes of reliability in organisations, or a lack of any relationship 
between BCM and reliability outcomes. Further, while these relationships may be 
theorised and logical in reference to extant theory, these may not be observed in the 
case studies investigated.  
 
3.3.3 Conceptual Framework 
 
Following from the identification of links between BCM practice and reliability traits, 
a means is required in order to understand and investigate these concepts. The 
following Figure 3.4 Conceptual Framework identifies links between high reliability 
and BCM practice. As identified in previous Sections, there is sufficient theoretical 
evidence to support the statement that BCM can produce HR traits. Therefore, it can 
be theorised that by applying certain levels of BCM practice, accompanying levels of 
reliability are produced. These are referred to as maturity levels, as graphically 
demonstrated in the following Figure 3.4 Conceptual Framework.  This conceptual 
framework forms the basis of investigation for this empirical work.  
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High Reliability 
Matu
rity 
Level 
BCM Practice 
Established 
M
at
ur
e 
BCM conducted as an integrated whole with RM 
BCM tools are mastered and under constant search for 
improvement 
BCM receives full top management support and it often set 
as an organisational priority 
A
dv
an
ce
d Full understanding of BCM and BCM requirements 
Emerging Mastering of basic BCM tools and techniques 
BCM receives top management support and understanding 
In
te
rm
ed
ia
te
 Rudimentary understanding of BCM exists 
Basic BCM tools are techniques implemented and in use 
Beginning Top management are aware of BCM however it remains a 
non-priority and separate function 
N
ov
ic
e Limited understanding of BCM exists 
Rudimentary tools currently in use 
Minimal support from top management 
 
Figure 3.3.3. Conceptual Framework (Camastral and Barnes 2011) 
 
During the development of the conceptual framework, the identified traits were then 
compared in order to evaluate which BCM outcomes would assist in leading to HRO 
traits with sufficient strength of association (as defined within extant literature) to 
imply that correctly implemented BCM can lead to the generation of HRO traits, and 
therefore, create reliable organisations (see Section 3.3). This proposed framework 
will be tested by examining two discrete phenomena within organisations. The first 
of these is the level of implementation of BCM in each airport. The second of these 
is the presence of high reliability traits within each of the organisations. In order to 
investigate the levels of BCM, a maturity assessment tool will be utilised. The 
maturity assessment tool will be discussed in the following Section 3.3.4.  
3.3.4 BCM Maturity Assessment Tool  
The following Figure 3.3.4 BCM Maturity Assessment Tool will be utilised during 
data collection to assess the maturity of BCM practices at each airport. The 
components of this model reflect the BCM process discussed in the literature review 
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(see Section 2.5.3). Most importantly, the Maturity Assessment Tool allows the 
conceptual framework to be investigated at each of the case study sites. By assessing 
BCM maturity and practice, in concert with understanding manifestations of high 
reliability in airports, links between these two concepts can be identified. The BCM 
Maturity Assessment Tool was developed from a review of current Australian 
standards and other relevant literature, in order to first understand what constituted a 
comprehensive BCM process. The identified BCM process for this study is discussed 
in Section 2.5.3. Once the BCM process for this study was identified, levels of 
maturity for each component were established. Levels of maturity were also derived 
from relevant literature, and allow for case study sites to be compared and contrasted 
against each other.  
 
The Maturity Model concept has been utilised previously, principally in the use of 
Capability Maturity Models (CMM) for software. Paulk (1993) published one of the 
first versions of such a framework designed to assess software implementation 
maturity in organisations. The CMM guides developers on how to assess their 
current software maturity and identifying to most critical issues to improving 
software quality and process (Paulk, Curits, Chrissis and Weber 1993, 19). It is in a 
similar vein that the Maturity Assessment Tool is designed, in that it allows 
organisations to identify their current levels of maturity, and where to allocate 
investment to improve process maturity.  
 
The framework is unique in that it allows for investigation and assessment at two 
levels – from an overall process level and the individual component level. A number 
of benefits can be accrued by investigating BCM maturity from the perspective of 
first an overall approach, and then in terms of individual components. Overall 
maturity is an average of the maturity of the entire process, which can give an 
effective initial indication of the current state of continuity management practice at 
an organisation. Then by examining individual component maturity, specific areas of 
strength and weakness can be understood, and can assist an organisation in 
effectively directing efforts to improve identified areas, and consequently overall 
maturity. It is important to view both measures, as they provide the required broad 
overview (overall maturity) and detail (component maturity) to effectively 
understand continuity practice.  
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The BCM Maturity Assessment Tool serves another important role in this study. 
Research question two seeks to investigate optimal approaches to BCM in a range of 
Australian airports. The BCM Maturity Assessment Tool allows the researcher to 
understand the current levels of BCM practice at each of the case study sites. This 
understanding serves as the basis of determining the optimal approaches to BCM, as 
current practice must be understood in order to formulate a new approach. Figure 
3.3.4 BCM Maturity Assessment Tool below is the assessment tool to be utilised.  
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Novice Intermediate Advanced Mature 
Commencement 
Process commenced 
with little guidance or 
requirements. Little top 
management support. 
 
Some guidelines and 
requirements for 
process with top 
management support.  
Guidelines and 
requirements 
established. Top 
management actively 
supports process. 
Scope, objectives and 
responsibilities clearly 
identified. 
Top management 
support and 
prioritisation. Possible 
‘BCM champions’.  
Risk Assessment 
Rudimentary risk 
assessment, little 
integration with 
existing frameworks. 
Basic risk assessment 
procedures with some 
support from existing 
frameworks. 
Good risk assessments 
conducted, based 
around and informed 
by existing approaches. 
Comprehensive risk 
assessment, informed 
and supported by 
existing approaches, 
acts to mitigate some 
risk before BCM 
implemented. 
Business Impact Assessment 
Little to no BIA 
activities present.  
Critical processes 
identified, some detail 
as to their recovery 
objectives.  
Critical processes 
identified, along with 
MAOs and RTOs.  
Critical business 
processes identified, 
MAOs and RTOS, as 
well as 
interdependencies in 
terms of recovery.  
Continuity Plans 
Basic continuity plans 
in place, documenting 
only basic information. 
Many gaps present.  
Processes documented 
along with 
workarounds. Some 
gaps present. 
Continuity plans 
document all required 
steps and reflect the 
current situation of the 
organisation. 
Comprehensive 
documentation of 
procedures and 
workarounds, 
distributed to relevant 
staff and clear and 
practical. 
Testing and Training 
Little to no testing and 
training of plans.  
Plans are tested and 
training occurs 
occasionally.  
Regular testing and 
training of plans. 
Regular testing of 
plans in a variety of 
ways, staff training 
kept current and 
awareness of 
continuity management 
is high.  
Communication and Consultation 
Basic communication 
and consultation 
procedures through 
plan development and 
activation. 
Good internal 
communication and 
consultation, external 
processes basic.  
Good internal and 
external 
communication, during 
plan development and 
activation. 
Effective internal 
communication and 
consultation, effective 
external 
communication and 
consultation, providing 
detail from external 
stakeholders. 
Monitoring, Review and Learning 
Little active 
monitoring of plans. 
No formalised review 
procedures. Minimal 
levels of learning 
Some monitoring of 
plans and review 
procedures, some 
evidence of learning.  
Review and monitoring 
procedures established, 
leading to learning.  
Review and monitoring 
procedures effectively 
facilitate learning, 
which closes the cycle 
of BCM. 
 
Figure 3.3.4. BCM Maturity Assessment Tool 
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3.4 Conclusion  
This Chapter began by identifying the research questions of this study, and 
establishing how these would assist in addressing the overarching research problem. 
Following this, identified links between BCM and reliability traits were outlined, in 
the form of both direct and indirect traits. These identified links were further 
developed into the Conceptual Framework, which connected BCM and reliability in 
one model. The Conceptual Framework forms the guiding principle for the study in 
order to address the research questions. The BCM Maturity Assessment Tool was 
then introduced, which will be utilised throughout data collection to understand 
levels of BCM current in place in Australian airports, and to action the conceptual 
framework during data collection. The following Chapter 4, Methodology, outlines 
the data collection procedures for this study.  
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4.1 Introduction  
Chapter Three identified theoretical links between the concepts of BCM and HR, and 
introduced the conceptual framework that guides this study. This chapter introduces 
the methodological paradigm used in the study and details its relevance. Following 
this, the research design is outlined, including a discussion of specific data collection 
and procedures. The discussion of data collection procedures is supplemented by 
explanation of the data collection instruments employed. Following, analytic 
procedures are outlined, along with details of quality judging criteria. The Chapter 
concludes with a discussion of the limitations and ethical considerations in relation to 
the study methodology.  
4.2 Justification of Paradigm and Methodology  
Before specific methodological choices can be discussed, the critical concepts of 
methodology, ontology, epistemology and paradigm must first be explored, as these 
concepts inform the research strategy that is most appropriate to address that 
particular research problem and questions. Ontology is concerned with what the 
nature of reality is, and what there is to observe in the world (Denzin and Lincoln 
2005, 22). The assumptions established through ontology directly influence 
epistemological and paradigmatic choices (Corbin and Strauss 2008, 6).  
 
Moving from basic assumptions of what truth there is to observe (ontology), 
epistemology concerns itself with how this ontology is viewed, in the same manner 
of using a lens to view the world (Denzin and Lincoln 2005, 22). It is often viewed 
as an analytic strategy for integrating structure with process (Corbin and Strauss 
2008, 87). As such, paradigms involve the researcher’s epistemological, ontological 
and methodological premises (Denzin and Lincoln 2005, 22). The following Table 
4.2 compares and contrasts the dominant paradigms in social science research on the 
characteristics of ontology epistemology and appropriate methodology.  
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Table 4.2 
A Comparison of Mainstream Paradigms in Social Science Research (Adapted from Guba and 
Lincoln (1994, 109) and Van de Ven (2007, 39)) 
Dimensions Logical 
positivism 
Postpositivism  Constructivism 
(Intepretivism) 
Critical Theory 
(Postmodernism) 
Ontology Naïve 
realism 
 
Reality is the 
empirical 
world (the 
world of the 
senses – 
rejection of 
the 
metaphysical
). 
Critical 
realism 
 
“real” reality 
but only 
imperfectly 
and 
probabilistic
ally 
apprehendibl
e 
Subtle realism 
 
Reality exists 
independent of 
our claims 
about it, and 
can be 
presented in 
multiple valid 
descriptions 
and 
explanations. 
 
Relativism 
 
Reality exists 
independent of 
our cognition. 
Thus, there is no 
basis to reject 
the 
metaphysical 
(epistemic 
fallacy) 
Historical 
realism 
 
Reality is 
socially 
constructed. 
Epistemology Objective: 
the 
corresponde
nce between 
our 
statements 
and reality 
through 
inductive 
verification 
or deductive 
falsification. 
Subjective 
and 
dependent 
on practical 
consequence
s. 
Inter-
subjectivist: 
Participate in 
gaining and 
presenting 
knowledge, 
however 
independence 
between 
claims and 
reality 
maintained. 
Subjectivist: 
There is no 
predefined or 
predetermined 
methodology or 
criteria to judge 
the veracity of 
our knowledge.  
Subjective: 
There is no 
privileged 
epistemology 
due to the 
incommensurabi
lity of 
discourses. 
Methodology Chiefly 
quantitative 
 
Controlled 
experiments/ 
surveys 
 
 
Qualitative 
and 
quantitative 
mix 
 
Case 
studies/struc
tural 
equation 
modelling 
 
Qualitative 
 
Instrumental 
Case studies / 
Convergent 
Interviewing; 
Focus groups 
Qualitative 
 
Hermeneutical / 
dialectical: 
Grounded 
theory; 
Intrinsic case 
studies 
Qualitative 
 
Dialogic/ 
dialectical 
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4.2.1 Introducing Subtle Realism 
 
The paradigm of subtle realism embodies three key elements. Firstly, while one can 
never be absolutely certain of the truth of a knowledge claim, we can be reasonably 
confident regarding the relative chances of the validity of truth claims. Second, true 
knowledge is true by virtue of the fact that it corresponds to the phenomena it is 
intended to represent. Finally, the aim of social research is to represent reality, which 
must be from some point of view. This allows for multiple, non-contradictory and 
valid descriptions and explanations of the same phenomena (Hammersley 1992, 51). 
In addition, it provides attractive qualities as a pragmatic compromise between 
several extremes (Seale 1999, 469). This is presented as an applicable paradigm 
within which to conduct this study. 
 
Subtle realism was created following the identification of a number of weaknesses 
within more traditional paradigms, namely naïve and critical realism. In particular, 
naïve realism assumes there is some form of direct knowledge which is available to 
researchers (Hammersley 1992, 50), and such an approach depends on artificial 
separation of values from enquiry and linear causality (Seale 1999, 468). This 
approach assumes that a clear connection can be made between observing 
phenomena and causality. Often in research such a clear link does not exist, making 
this paradigmatic approach ineffective. In response to these criticisms, Hammersley 
(1992, 50) presents subtle realism, adding that it is not necessary to only consider 
relativism as an alternative. Subtle realism is an attempt to represent the reality, other 
than to attain “the truth” (Mays and Pope 2000, 51). 
 
4.2.2 Justification of Subtle Realism 
 
As Healy and Perry (2000, 120) state, perceptions in realism research are used as 
they provide a window on to a reality beyond those perceptions, unlike under 
constructivist approaches where individual perceptions are studied for their own sake. 
This is important for this thesis, which uses information gained by key individuals to 
provide a picture of reality (of BCM and organisational reliability in a complex, 
socio-technical environment), but is not concerned with the nature of those 
individual perceptions. Concurrently, the research questions under investigation in 
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this thesis also assume an external, tangible reality, unlike interpretivist and 
postmodernist ideas that reality is contextual, and can exist in multiple forms in the 
minds of individuals (Healy and Perry 2000, 120). These stipulations present that 
both critical realist and critical theory approaches are inappropriate.  
 
Further to this, subtle realism, in contrast to critical realism, is utilised in this study 
as multiple representations of reality are valid, coupled with an acceptance that while 
the researcher participates in gaining knowledge, they do not directly shape what 
reality is. Subtle realism also recognises that knowledge is mediated by pre-existing 
ideas and values, whether this is recognised by researchers or not (Seale 1999, 470). 
This approach also allows the use of instrumental (principally qualitative) case 
studies as an appropriate research methodology. A qualitative approach is further 
justified as it focuses on how extant theory operates in particular examples 
(Eisenhardt and Graebner 2007, 28). This is of particular importance as this research 
investigates extant literature and approaches in the next context of airports.  
 
In addition, qualitative research provides illumination and understanding of complex 
issues, being most useful when answering ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions (Marshall 1996, 
522). The issues investigated in this research study are highly complex, as the nature 
of reliability in complex socio-technical organisations has many differing facets. The 
depth and rich data that results from qualitative research was required to understand 
these concepts adequately.  Subtle realism allows for the use of such methods, while 
allowing for some exploratory nature and a rich source of evidence. In fact, Riege 
(2003, 77) recommends using qualitative case studies in order to undertake subtle 
realist research.  
 
4.3 Research Design 
 
The research design for this project consisted of a multiple case study, with 
embedded units of analysis. This comprised investigations of three Australian 
airports, as individual case studies (see also Section 4.3.1 Case Study Site Selection 
Rationale, below). A multiple case study approach is warranted when different types 
of conditions are hypothesised and there is a desire to have coverage of each type 
(Yin 2009, 59). Within this study each of the three airports represented a different 
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size, market, and ownership structure, which gives credence to have representation of 
these different kinds of airports within the data collection. Multiple cases further 
create more robust outcomes as findings are more deeply grounded in varied 
empirical evidence (Eisenhardt and Graebner 2007, 27). 
 
Two stages of data collection and one stage of results review were carried out at each 
of the airport case sites. Stage one of data collection investigated high reliability 
traits at each of the same three airports. Stage two of data collection investigated the 
maturity of each airport’s BCM approach. This is graphically presented in the 
following Table 4.3 Research Stages and Outcomes 
 
Table 4.3 
Research Stages and Outcomes 
 Airport A Airport B Airport C Review 
Study One Investigation of High Reliability Traits  Combined BCM 
and reliability 
traits framework Study Two BCM Maturity Assessment  
 
4.3.1 Case Study Site Selection Rationale 
 
The three airports selected were representative of a number of types of airport 
ranging in size and regional economic context.  They included two regional airports 
with only domestic operations (these airports are differentiated by number of flights 
operating in addition to market conditions), and one large airport with international 
services.  The examination of such a selection of airports presented an opportunity to 
cover a wide variety of operational aspects against which BCM and reliability factors 
can be evaluated.  An added feature of studying multiple cases was the potential for 
scalability to cater for different airport requirements. 
 
Case study site selection was also consistent with purposes of theoretical replication 
(Yin 2009, 54). Theoretical replication occurs when each case serves as a distinct 
experiment that stands on its own as an analytic unit (Eisenhardt and Graebner 2007, 
25). The use of replication in multiple cases allows for theory to be inductively 
developed by discovering patterns of relationships within and across cases and their 
underlying logical arguments (Eisenhardt and Graebner 2007, 25). Theoretical 
replication allows for the findings of this study to be utilised in a wider range of 
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airports and other industries than could have occurred in a single case study approach. 
The following Table 4.3.1 Airport Characteristics Summary provides a brief 
comparison of the three airports along a number of criteria.   
 
Table 4.3.1 
Airport Characteristics Summary  
 Airport A  
Small 
Airport B  
Large 
Airport C  
Medium 
Industry 
Constant Factors 
CASA (Safety Regulations) 
OTS (Security and Screening Regulations) 
Passenger 
Numbers (Year 
ended Feb 2012) 
712,368 20,463,122 745,611 
Aircraft 
Movements 
(Year ended Feb 
2012) 
5365 182,931 13,331 
Ownership 
Structure 
Regional Council Privatised, non-
listed 
Regional Council 
Number of 
Destinations 
(direct) 
3 domestic 
1 international (during 
season) 
43 domestic 
29 international 
6 domestic 
0 international 
No. of Airlines 
(regular 
passenger 
transport) 
3 30 2 
Customs 
Requirement 
No# Yes No* 
Quarantine 
Requirement 
No# Yes No* 
*for regular passenger transport, not including chartered military arrivals and departures 
#outside special season flights 
 
For the purposes of analysis, these three airports were defined as small, medium or 
large. Airport B is the ‘large’ airport as it has the largest number of passengers, both 
international and domestic operations and the continuous presence of border 
protection agencies. Airport A and C have highly similar passenger numbers per year, 
although the differentiating factor in this case is the number of flight movements per 
year. Airport C has more than double the amount of aircraft movements as airport A. 
These increased number of aircraft movements creates a significant difference 
between the workloads of these two airports. Therefore, airport A is classified as a 
‘small’ airport and airport C as a ‘medium’ airport. These distinctions wee 
significant in developing final models (see Discussion chapter). The following 
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Sections (4.3.1.1-4.3.1.3) provide a case background for each of the three case study 
sites investigated.  
 
4.3.1.1 Airport A  
Airport A is a regional airport located in Queensland. This airport had total of 
712,368 passenger movements (inbound and outbound) between the period of 
November 2011-October 2012. This was complemented by 5365 aircraft movements 
in the same period. In regards to aviation infrastructure, the airport maintains two 
runways of lengths 1797m and 650m, the latter only being suitable for general 
aviation aircraft. There is one terminal operated by airport A, catering for all 
operations.  
 
Airport A is a business unit of a regional council. The council owns the airport, and 
its infrastructure. Reporting requirements also exists in a number of streams up to the 
council, including risk-related reporting. Currently airport A is predominantly a 
domestic port, currently providing services to three destinations within Australia. 
During high season, the airport operates an international flight to Auckland. During 
these flights, customs and quarantine requirements also apply. Three airlines 
currently service the airport, being Virgin Australia, Jetstar and Skytrans.  These 
components are summarised in the following Table 4.3.1.1 below.  
 
Table 4.3.1.1 
Key Data Airport A 
Runway length 1797m and 650m 
Annual passenger movements (2011-12) 712,368 
Aircraft movements (2011-12) 5365 
Ownership structure Business component of a regional council 
Number of direct destinations 3 (4 during season) 
Airlines servicing the airport Virgin Australia, Jetstar, Skytrans 
Checked baggage screening Yes 
Customs Only during season flights 
Immigration Only during season flights 
Australian Federal Police No 
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4.3.1.2 Airport B  
Airport B is an international airport located in Queensland. It has two runways of 
3500m and 1700m in length. Airport B had a total of 20,463,122 passenger 
movements between the period of November 2011-October 2012, accompanied by 
182,931 aircraft movements. The airport operates two terminals, one for international 
and one for domestic travel. These terminals provide links to 72 international and 
domestic destinations, through 26 airlines.  
 
Airport B is a privatised airport, created under the Airports Act (1999). Being 
privatised, airport B maintains a responsible board and operates mostly 
independently, although they must abide by relevant state and federal legislation. 
Airport B maintains continuous international and domestic operations, therefore 
requiring a continual presence of customs, immigration and other agencies 
responsible for processing international passengers. The following Table 4.3.1.2 
outlines the key data for airport B 
 
Table 4.3.1.2 
Key Data Airport B 
Runway length 3500m and 1700m (3,300m under 
construction) 
Annual passenger movements (2011-12) 20,463,122 
Aircraft movements (2011-12) 182,931 
Ownership structure Privatised airport with a number of 
shareholders (non-listed private company) 
Number of direct destinations 72 
Airlines servicing the airport Aeropelican/Brindabella, Air New Zealand, 
Air Niugini, Air Pacific, Air Vanuatu, 
Aircalin, Alliance Airlines, Cathay Pacific, 
China Airlines, China Southern Airlines, 
Emirates, Etihad, EVA Airways, Jetstar, 
Korean Air, Malaysia Airlines, Our Airline, 
Qantas, Qantaslink, Singapore Airlines, 
Skytrans, Solomon Airlines, Thai Airways, 
Tiger Airways, Virgin Australia, Virgin 
Samoa 
Checked baggage screening Yes 
Customs Yes 
Immigration Yes 
Australian Federal Police Yes 
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4.3.1.3 Airport C  
Airport C is a regional airport located in a regional area with a heavy mining base. It 
has two runways of 2,628m and 1,645m. During the 2011-12 period, Airport C had 
passenger movements of 745,611 and 13,331 aircraft movements. While Airport C 
had around the same number of passenger movements as Airport A, there were more 
than double the amount of aircraft movements. Airport C has six direct domestic 
destinations, and hosts foreign military exercises on a somewhat regular basis. 
Therefore, while customs and immigration are services that are not usually required, 
they can be flown in as required to service these particular charter flights.  
 
Airport C is a business unit of a regional council, similar to that of Airport A. It 
operates within the wider council structure. This means that while the airport must 
follow a number of regulations and maintains reporting requirements to the council, 
the airport still retains some measure of independent decision-making. The following 
Table 4.3.1.3 outlines key data for Airport C.  
 
Table 4.3.1.3 
Key Data Airport C 
Runway length 2,628m and 1,645m  
Annual passenger movements (2011-12) 745,611 
Aircraft movements (2011-12) 13,331 
Ownership structure Business unit of a regional council 
Number of direct destinations 6 
Airlines servicing the airport Virgin Australia, Qantaslink 
Checked baggage screening Yes 
Customs No 
Immigration No 
Australian Federal Police No 
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4.4 Research Procedures 
 
This section will provide more detail for each of the two studies conducted for this 
project, including specific data collection instruments, recruitment procedures, use of 
triangulation and the outcomes of each stage. These research procedures are 
summarised in the following Table 4.4 Research Procedures.  
 
Table 4.4 
Research Procedures 
Study One 
Can BCM generate reliability outcomes? 
Data collection 
instruments 
Sampling Recruitment Triangulation Outcomes 
Semi-structured 
Interviews 
Documentary 
Analysis 
6 participants 
per case study 
(2 staff, 2 
manager, 2 
senior manager) 
(minimum) 
Participants 
nominated and 
individually 
approached 
through email 
Data 
Triangulation 
 
Combined 
BCM and 
reliability traits 
framework 
 
Study Two 
What are the optimal approaches for BCM implementation in a range of Australian 
airports? How can these approaches best be implemented and understood? 
Data collection 
instruments 
Sampling Recruitment Triangulation Outcomes 
Semi-structured 
Interviews 
6 participants 
per case study 
(2 staff, 2 
manager, 2 
senior manager) 
(minimum) 
Participants 
nominated and 
individually 
approached 
through email 
Data 
Triangulation 
Methodological 
Triangulation 
BCM maturity 
assessment 
Maturity 
assessment 
framework 
 
4.4.1 Study One Research Procedures  
Study one addressed the first research question of this project. It examined high 
reliability traits in each of the three identified organisations. This was achieved 
through interviewing participants to ascertain the level of high reliability traits 
present, with questions developed to investigate the nine reliability traits presented in 
literature (see Section 2.2.3).  
The data collection instrument for this study was semi-structured interviews. Using 
semi-structured interviews allowed for the researcher to have flexibility when 
addressing each of the nine reliability traits. Flexibility was a key requirement for 
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study one, as set questions needed to be posed in order to understand the presence of 
the high reliability traits, however the researcher required flexibility to this line of 
inquiry, and had to be able to explore divergent topics mentioned by interview 
participants (as participants may discuss reliability traits which are different to those 
presented in literature). As noted by King (2004, 21), interviews provide the 
flexibility to address focused aspects of organisational life, and examine topics at 
different levels of meaning. Interviews most commonly form the principal data 
collection instrument in qualitative studies (King 2004, 11; Cassell 2005, 167). 
Triangulation was also present during study one. This was in the form of data 
triangulation, as more than one participant is being interviewed at each level of the 
organisation. 
 
The sampling strategy utilised for study one was ‘judgement sampling.’ Judgement 
sampling (also known as purposeful sampling) is where the researcher actively 
selects the most productive sample to answer the research questions (Marshall 1996, 
523), with samples being purposeful rather than random, and aim to select cases that 
will provide rich data (MacDougall and Fudge 2001, 120). The judgement sample for 
study one was stratified, to ensure that representatives from three organisational 
levels (staff, manager, senior manager) were included. This was critical for the study 
as the both phenomena studied (BCM and High Reliability) are present at multiple 
organisational levels and therefore, need to be investigated across the organisation. A 
minimum of two participants from each of the organisational levels were sampled, 
which ensured data triangulation. In some instances it was only possible to identify 
one participant in some levels. This was due to the smaller sample sizes at the two 
regional airports investigated. All participants were required to have some 
knowledge of the BCM process currently in place.  
 
Recruitment for study one consisted of a key contact within each of the three case 
study sites suggesting possible participants. The key contact for each of the 
organisations varied, however all these contacts had some ownership of risk 
management within the organisation. The potential participants were contacted by 
the researcher, either in person or via email, seeking their consent and willingness to 
participate in the study. Once individuals had consented to participate in the study, 
the researcher arranged a time for an interview to take place. All three airport case 
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study sites were partners in the Airports of the Future ARC Linkage project. The 
membership to the project facilitated access into each of these organisations. The 
following Table 4.4.1 Participant Matrix details each of the participants that were 
utilised for this study. 
 
Table 4.4.1 
Participant Matrix 
Airport A Airport B Airport C 
Staff 
S-APT-A-01 S-APT-B-01 S-APT-C-01 
S-APT-B-02 S-APT-C-02 
Management 
M-APT-A-01 M-APT-B-01 M-APT-C-01 
M-APT-A-02 M-APT-B-02 M-APT-C-02 
M-APT-A-03 M-APT-B-03 M-APT-C-03 
Senior Management 
SM-APT-A-01 SM-APT-B-01 SM-APT-C-01 
SM-APT-B-02 
CEO-APT-B-03 
 
4.4.2 Study Two Research Procedures 
 
Study two was concerned with establishing optimal levels of BCM implementation 
for a range of Australian airports (research question two). The first stage in 
developing this model was to understand current levels of BCM practice in each of 
the airports.  This was achieved by assessing each airport’s current continuity 
management practices against a pre-established assessment framework (Figure 3.4.1 
BCM Maturity Assessment Framework), which was introduced previously in 
Chapter 3, Conceptual Framework Development, Section 3.4. 
 
The same sample was used as in study one, with the constant base group of 
participants being interviewed. Sampling for study two followed the same judgement 
sampling approach as in study one. During study two, sampling occurred until 
saturation, which in a number of instances involved adding further participants 
during. This sample was also stratified by organisational level, as high reliability 
themes exist throughout the entire organisation (Rijpma 1997, 17). The sample for 
study two comprised of a minimum of six individuals in each organisation, spread 
over the three organisational levels. While only a small sample was utilised, findings 
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had the potential to be extended from the individual level to the structural level when 
interviews are conducted correctly (Crouch and McKenzie 2006, 490), which 
allowed a smaller sample to give a picture of the entire organisation. Semi-structured 
interviews are also a highly efficient way to gather rich, empirical data (Alam 2005, 
99; Eisenhardt and Graebner 2007, 28). Gathering of rich data is of particular 
importance to this study. The assessment framework is divided into seven sections, 
each addressing a core component of BCM. By using semi-structured interviews, the 
researcher can gain the rich data needed to effectively assess the maturity of each 
airport’s BCM process. Therefore, semi-structured interviews were an ideal data 
collection instrument to utilise in this study. 
 
Two data collection methods, semi-structured interviews and documentary analysis, 
were utilised to assess and understand current practices within the sampled sites. 
Study two involved interviewing a number of participants, first asking them to 
indicate how mature they considered each component of the BCM process. These 
responses were further interrogated using semi-structured interviews, with questions 
designed to effectively rate the maturity of each component of the BCM process. 
These questions were informed by the content of the BCM Maturity and Assessment 
Tool (Figure 3.4.1). This had the advantage of providing a means to gauge 
differences between perceived and actual maturity levels.  
 
In addition to semi-structured interviews, study two utilised documentary analysis. 
This involved examining any relevant documentation in the areas of business 
continuity management and risk management. This data collection instrument serves 
two purposes. The first of these is to assist in assessing the maturity of continuity 
plans themselves, which is a component of the overall BCM process (see Section 
2.5.3). Further, the use of documentary analysis allows for triangulation to be 
employed. Triangulation is a validity enhancing procedure where researchers search 
for convergence among multiple and different sources of information to form themes 
or categories in a study (Creswell and Miller 2000, 126; Mays and Pope 2000, 51). 
Triangulation exists in four forms, being (1) data triangulation, (2) investigator 
triangulation, (3) theory triangulation and (4) methodological triangulation (Patton 
1990, 187; 1999, 1193; Connor, Treloar and Higginbotham 2001, 252; Yin 2009, 
116). 
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Triangulation presents a number of advantages when employed in qualitative studies. 
The most prominent of these is the development of converging lines of enquiry as 
findings are based on several sources of information (Yin 2009, 115). This was 
achieved during study two in two forms of triangulation, being data triangulation and 
methodological triangulation. Data triangulation is achieved by interviewing two 
participants at each organisational level. This ensured that assertions were made by 
examining more than one individual’s opinion. Data triangulation was further 
enhanced by the examining of concepts at different organisational levels, confirming 
similarities and diversions of thought between different organisational levels. This 
process ensured the narrative account was valid as multiple points of evidence were 
understood, rather than relying on a single source of data (Creswell and Miller 2000, 
127). The second form of triangulation utilised in study one was methodological 
triangulation, which was achieved through the use of semi-structured interviews and 
documentary analysis concurrently as data collection instruments. The principal 
advantage of methodological triangulation is the ability for the weaknesses of one 
method to be balanced out by the strengths of another, creating a true test of validity 
(Seale 1999, 473; Mays and Pope 2000, 51).   
 
Recruitment for study two was conducted in a more direct manner than during study 
one. As the researcher had already established a relationship with participants from 
study one, these individuals were contacted directly by the researcher to arrange 
study two interviews. For other participants who were not included in the study one 
sample, the researcher contacted these participants through the same key contact 
used in study one.  
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4.5 Data Analysis 
4.5.1 Study One Analysis  
Study one analysis began with a transcription of relevant interview data. Interviews 
were then analysed following the themes of the nine high reliability traits identified 
during the literature review (Section 2.2.3). The analysis also had a thematic 
component, which identified consistent themes within the data which fell outside the 
reliability factors identified previously in literature. This flexibility in analysis was 
crucial as there could have been reliability-enhancing practices which had not been 
previously identified in literature.  
 
Reliability factors were be analysed using the assistance of tables. The left hand 
column of the table contains literature suggested reliability traits, the middle column 
those observed in the airport, and the right column identifying BCM processes that 
have led to the generation of these traits. An example of such an approach is 
displayed in the following Table 4.5.2 Examination of Reliability Traits.  
 
Table 4.5.2 
Examination of Reliability Traits 
Literature HR Trait Observed HR Trait BCM process  
Continuous search for 
system weaknesses 
Emergency training Business Impact Analysis 
 
This process allowed for identification of what evidence of organisational reliability 
exists, and which of these traits are produced by a component of the BCM process. 
The use of tables further assisted in identifying those reliability traits that exist but 
are not due to an outcome of the BCM process. This mapping assisted in confirming 
relationships suggested in the theoretical framework regarding BCM leading to 
organisational reliability. This analysis aided in understanding organisational 
reliability by examining both those traits produced from the BCM process, and those 
formed outside of it on order to create a true picture of airport reliability. 
 
Analysis occurred initially within each case (following the same pattern of separate 
organisational levels than entire organisations) before comparison across cases. This 
process was iterative in the sense that multiple feedback loops with the participating 
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organisations will occur (see Section 4.3 Research Design) in order to gain the 
clearest picture of BCM and organisational reliability. 
 
4.5.2 Study Two Analysis  
Analysis of study two began with the transcription of de-identified interviews. Each 
transcript was then be coded with the themes identified in the BCM Maturity 
Assessment Tool (see Section 3.4.1). These responses were then be used to ‘place’ 
each case study organisation along a certain level of maturity for each key 
component of BCM. This occurred first at each discrete organisational level (staff, 
management, senior management) and then be combined to form a view from the 
entire organisational level.  
 
Assessment of maturity from each organisational level was retained in order to 
examine any differences between level of aptitude and maturity between 
organisational levels. The final assessment of each organisation’s BCM maturity was 
also determined in conjunction with analysis of relevant documentation (Business 
Continuity Plan, Risk Management Strategy etc.) in order to supplement interview 
data and achieve triangulation goals discussed earlier.  
 
This analysis occurred for each of the three case study (airport) sites. Once this was 
completed, cross-case analyses examining differences and similarities in gauged 
BCM maturity across each organisation, at all three hierarchical levels (staff, 
management, senior management) were conducted. This assisted in identifying 
issues which were consistent across all four cases, as well as differences between 
cases, which is critical if an accurate picture of BCM requirements across all kinds of 
airports was to be achieved. This analysis assisted in the formation of an auditable 
BCM Maturity Tool (See Chapter 7 for more detail).  
 
 
 
 
 
 93 
4.6 Quality Judging Criteria  
When considering any research project, criteria must be applied which can evaluate 
the effectiveness and validity of the study. There are a number of differing criteria 
which can be utilised, depending on paradigmatic perspective adopted for the 
research. In the following Table 4.5 Comparison of Criteria by Research Approach, 
Crefitng (1991, 217) compares different approaches. For the purposes of this study, 
the following qualitative criteria of credibility, transferability, dependability and 
confirmability will be utilised to assess the quality of this study.  
 
Table 4.5 
Comparison of Criteria by Research Approach (Adapted from Crefting (1991, 217)) 
Criterion Qualitative Approach Quantitative Approach 
Truth Value Credibility Internal Validity 
Applicability Transferability External Validity 
Consistency Dependability Reliability 
Neutrality Confirmability Objectivity 
 
4.6.1 Confirmability 
 
Confirmability is a qualitative criterion similar to the notion of construct validity 
(Riege 2003, 81). It is concerned with linking assertions, findings and interpretations 
in the data themselves in readily discernible ways (Schwandt 1997, 164). To ensure 
confirmability in case studies, a number of techniques are suggested, including 
multiple interviews and triangulation (Healy and Perry 2000, 122). This research 
utilised both of these approaches, with interviews occurring both in three hierarchical 
levels in each organisation and multiple rounds of interviewing for each study. 
Triangulation was also employed in this study within both stages of data collection. 
 
4.6.2 Dependability  
Dependability aims to show indications of stability and consistency in the process of 
enquiry (Riege 2003, 81), not dissimilar to quantitative notions of reliability, where a 
different investigator following the same procedures as done in the study will 
produce the same results and findings (Yin 2009, 40). Dependability can be created 
mostly in the design process, by including adequate procedures for case selection and 
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interview procedures, in addition to during write up with relevant quotations and 
matrices that summarise qualitative data (Healy and Perry 2000, 122). All these 
procedures were undertaken in this study, with particular reference to Section 4.3.1 
Case Site Selection Rationale. This is further demonstrated during the analysis 
component, discussed in detail in Section 4.4 Analysis.  
 
4.6.3 Transferability 
 
Transferability deals with the generalisability of findings (Schwandt 1997, 164) and 
is synonymous with quantitative notions of external validity (Healy and Perry 2000, 
122). This notion of generalisability of findings is less important than in quantitative 
studies, as researchers aim to make generalisations about the area of research 
(Crefting 1991, 220). Qualitative case study approaches differ as they aim for 
analytical rather than statistical generalisability, most often achieved through 
multiple cases and replication logic (Yin 2009, 43). This occurred in this study 
through the use of three cases under examination. Further, as suggested by Healy and 
Perry (2000, 122), research issues will be identified before data collection in order to 
formulate an interview protocol, which will remain consistent throughout interviews. 
During study one occurred through the use of the auditing framework, which will 
guided the appropriate interview questions in order to gauge the maturity of BCM in 
each organisation. Study two followed in a similar pattern, with questions derived 
from examining the appropriateness of each BCM approach.  
 
4.6.4 Credibility 
 
Credibility is often viewed as the most important quality criteria in qualitative studies 
(Whittemore, Chase and Mandle 2001, 530). Credibility addresses the issue of the 
inquirer providing assurances of the fit between respondents’ views of the world and 
the researcher’s reconstruction and representation of these views (Schwandt 1997, 
164). Therefore this notion is similar to the quantitative notion of internal validity 
(Riege 2003, 81), and is achieved through the use of triangulation and the use of a 
case description for each of the case study sites in order to ensure adequate context is 
provided (Lincoln and Guba 2007, 78).  
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4.7 Ethical Considerations 
 
This project was considered low risk, in the sense it did not target vulnerable groups 
of individuals, nor did it address questions of a highly personal or sensitive nature. 
However, some of the information collected was commercially sensitive. As a 
consequence, confidentiality protocols were a requirement.  As this project was 
being completed under QUT Airports of the Future linkage project (LP0990135), the 
student was subject to confidentiality requirements as a project member. In addition, 
all publications resulting from the research must be approved by the Industry 
Advisory Committee, which consists of representatives from industry partners and 
the QUT Airports of the Future project. This process ensures that any publications 
protect the organisations involved and do not reveal any commercially sensitive 
information. In addition, this study was subject to QUT Ethics approval processes. 
For example, participants had the opportunity to withdraw at any time, and all 
recorded interviews will be destroyed once transcribed.  
 
4.8 Conclusion 
 
This Chapter began by introducing the research paradigm for this project, and then 
outlined the research design for this study. This was followed by the detailing of the 
stages of the research study, along with the specific data collection instruments used 
for this study. Analysis was then discussed, in addition to quality judging criteria. 
This Chapter concluded with an identification of ethical considerations relevant to 
the study.                 
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5.0 Analysis Study One                        
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5.1 Introduction  
The following Chapter reports the findings and analysis of the first study, as depicted 
in Table 4.3. Study One is principally responsible for investigating current levels of 
organisational reliability within each of the airports, as defined by High Reliability 
Theory. The following nine reliability traits were investigated during Study One.  
 
1. Commitment to reliable operations in mission and goals 
2. Sustained high technical performance 
3. Structural flexibility and redundancy 
4. High degrees of responsibility and accountability 
5. Flexible decision-making processes and collegial patterns of hierarchy 
6. Continual search for system improvement and training for worst-case 
scenarios 
7. Reliability not marginalisable, not fungible (cannot be traded off) 
8. Organisational culture of reliability 
9. Strong presence of external groups with access to credible and timely 
information 
 
Each of the nine reliability factors identified in the literature are discussed, first as 
observed in each of the three airports, and then compared against each other. These 
reliability traits are discussed both in terms of the degree to which they reflect 
literature-endorsed traits, and additional ways the airports achieve organisational 
reliability. Each section contains a summary table of the traits observed at each 
airport, and following this a cross-case analysis against all airport sites occurs. This 
Chapter concludes with an overall summary of table of all the reliability traits 
observed.   
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5.2 Trait 1: Commitment to Reliable Operations in Mission and Goals 
 
HROs generally set reliability as a priority from the outset in their mission statement 
and goals (LaPorte and Consolini 1991, 21; LaPorte 1996, 96; Frederickson and 
LaPorte 2002, 36). This commitment is supported by a staff understanding of the 
importance of maintaining a reliable operation, which is supported by top 
management support (LaPorte 1996, 63). The following section investigates the 
following indicators of Trait 1: 
• Reliability documented as a priority in mission and goals 
• Staff understanding of importance of reliability and management support for 
reliability 
5.2.1 Airport A  
Airport A demonstrated a documented commitment to reliability. In this case, this 
was documented in the airport charter, which was the guiding document for the 
overarching direction of airport management. While the charter did not specifically 
detail a commitment to reliability, reliability was discussed through other items. The 
first of these was a commitment to maintaining a high level of customer service, as 
explained by the following senior management participant.  
 
“Customer service certainly is and reliability is just a portion of customer service 
and is captured within our charter.” SM-APT-C-01 
 
The airport charter also discussed safety and security of the airport, which can be 
viewed as an important component of reliability. The following participant discusses 
the contents of the airport charter.  
 
“Our airport charter discusses the integrity of the safety and security of the airports 
and its users.” S-APT-C-01 
 
In addition to a documented commitment to reliability, there were a number of 
actions and attitudes throughout the organisation which further endorsed the airport’s 
commitment to reliability. The first of these was an investment into technology 
which will increase the operational reliability of the airport. This was in particular 
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reference to aviation navigation systems which will increase the capacity of the 
airport by decreasing the visibility requirements for safe operation of aircraft. This 
action was indicative of the airport’s commitment to reliability by demonstrating 
financial support of reliability-enhancing projects.    
 
“The systems that we have in place are based around providing continuity in terms 
of service and reliability…to my knowledge we’re the first airport in the country to 
have actually funded RNP for the airlines and that’s based around lowering the 
minima for the aircraft to allow them to use our airport more reliably so at the 
moment we are 880 feet, and our commitment is, and it’s the commitment of over 
$200,000 to provide a minima down to about 220 feet.” SM-APT-A-01 
 
Another level of commitment to reliability can be observed in the attitude present at 
the airport in regards to providing a reliable operation. There was evidence of this 
through the attitudes of particular staff members who gave more than they are 
required in order to maintain a continuous operation, as explained by the following 
management level participant. 
 
“It doesn’t matter what level you’re talking about, you’ll often have people doing 
stuff well outside their normal hours, doing it on weekends just because they know 
other people are depending on them and ultimately we’re there to provide a service, 
you get the job done.” M-APT-C-02 
 
Further to this, there was support for reliability throughout all upper levels of the 
organisation. As outlined in Section 4.3.1.1, Airport A is a business unit of a regional 
council. At both the council and senior management level, reliability of operations 
was a major focus and is encouraged down through all levels of the organisation. 
This is discussed by the following staff level participant.  
 
“It’s a very big focus from the General Manager right down, from council being 
right down actually from the CEO at council straight down through.” S-APT-C-01 
 
Airport A demonstrated a level of indirect documentation of a commitment to 
reliability. This was further supported by actions of the organisation which aim to 
increase reliability of operations. An attitude supporting reliable operations was also 
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present, both at the staff level and endorsed by management. These factors combined 
show evidence of a commitment to reliability at Airport A.  
5.2.2 Airport B  
Airport B had a strong understanding, embodied in their staff, of the need to ensure 
reliable operations. This need was exemplified through a number of different themes, 
ranging principally based around notions of reputational importance and commercial 
imperatives.  This was described following senior manager, who outlines the need 
for the airport to continue functionality.  
 
“If we’re not a reliable safe airport then we’re going to lose a lot of our customers 
in terms of wanting to come here, so even though they want to come to Brisbane as a 
destination, if the airport itself isn’t reliable in terms of delivering safe outcomes for 
them, then we’re in trouble.” SM-APT-B-02 
 
The need for continued operation was further grounded in the importance of the 
airport as a component of the wider transport network. As a component of critical 
infrastructure, the airport faced demands from society to be provided constantly in an 
‘always-on’ economy (de Bruijne et al. 2006, 233), as even a slight interruption to 
functionality can have significant consequences (Boin et al. 2003, 100). This 
viewpoint is confirmed by the following staff member. 
 
“Everyone here at Airport B understands that the airport has to stay open and has 
to continue running even if we’re faced with things like floods, or other emergencies, 
that we’re aware that the airport is critical infrastructure for Queensland.” S-APT-
B-01 
 
A further indicator of a commitment to reliable operations is the formalisation of a 
commitment to reliability in either the mission or goals of the organisations. This 
theme was discussed with all participants. While Airport B had not explicitly stated a 
commitment to reliability, almost all participants agreed that the organisation’s goal 
of being ‘world’s best’ encompassed the need for reliable operation. The following 
manager explained this concept further.  
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“It’s probably formalised in the mission and goals or in the values, you know, to be 
world best. You can’t be world best without, you know, having values like that, and 
if you’re not delivering then you’ll not be world best.” M-APT-B-01 
 
This viewpoint was further reinforced by the following senior manager.  
 
“We talk about things like world best, we talk about excellence, we talk about sage, 
secure efficient, so I guess we don’t use the word reliable but that’s definitely what it 
translates.” SM-APT-B-02 
 
A number of processes within Airport B were further identified as adding to the 
concept of organisational commitment to reliability, which fell outside the 
framework presented in literature. Within Airport B, this was presented in the two 
key themes of planning and process. Planning, and accompanying financial 
budgeting was identified as key to assisting in creating a reliable organisation, 
principally by identifying critical assets and ensuring their continued functionality, as 
explained by the following manager.  
 
“By the capital that we expend. By knowing that the forecast budget for the next five 
years includes capital specifically relating to ensuring that the business remains 
operational. They’ve been identified through the reporting that we’ve done over – in 
my four years that I’ve built up in recommendations and improving asset 
resilience.” M-APT-B-03 
 
Linking with the theme of planning are the various processes that gave Airport B a 
level of organisational reliability. These were identified as consisting of business 
continuity policy and emergency plans. These corporate-level planning processes 
assisted in ensuring the business could continue operating in the face of business not-
as-usual situations, as further exemplified by a management level staff member.  
 
“We have a business continuity policy that is signed off by the board and that I 
review annually and report on annually and report on annually…ensuring that we 
have an emergency management plan, and my responsibility is for the business 
continuity and resilience aspects of the business, so that’s key in recognising and 
reporting on quarterly to the board.” M-APT-B-03 
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Processes leading to reliability were particularly present in the area of asset 
management. The assets function of the organisation maintained a three-step 
approach to ensure reliability of their identified critical assets. The first step was 
during the design phase, when critical assets were identified and their inherent 
redundancy assessed. The second phase involved developing asset management 
plans which detail the long-term replacement capital plans. The third stage, 
maintenance, included all the day-to-day activities that maintain the operability of 
the asset.  The following senior manager discussed these steps in detailed manner.  
 
“At the outset we would do a risk assessment to see which assets are really critical, 
which are required for processing of passengers as well as the airlines, and then you 
look at redundancy where is the redundancy required?  So at the design stage itself, 
at the project phase itself you would look at that, then you would also look at the 
type of materials that are used for those projects, whether you are looking at 
reliability…Then the other thing we look at the asset management plans, so writing 
the long-term replacement capital plans, and at that time there is a lot of focus on 
the risk rating of the asset.  The consequence of failure, the condition of the asset. So 
that’s the second level of defence. Then the third is the actual providing of 
maintenance services. You have, when you are writing the contract, then you 
determine the level of service which is required for that particular asset.” SM-APT-
B-01 
 
Commitment to reliability was demonstrated through a number of means at Airport B. 
Commitment to reliability existed in both documented approaches and attitudes 
throughout the organisation. Documented approaches are observed within the 
airport’s objectives. A number of further processes and planning practices were 
identified as leading to reliability, including risk-based thinking during planning. 
Further, a number of corporate level policies, including business continuity, were 
identified by staff members as contributing to a commitment to reliability.   
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5.2.3 Airport C  
Airport C also demonstrated a commitment to reliable operations. As exemplified in 
Airport B, the nature of the airport environment influences this to a significant 
degree. The requirement for continual operations around the clock influenced the 
need for reliability. The following participant exemplified the need for reliability due 
to the continuous operation of the airport.  
 
“It’s probably not so easy to demonstrate, but it’s part of our overall culture and the 
way we do things is, you know, it’s perpetual - a perpetual operation. We are open 
24-7, and it’s sort of like, in our industry it’s failing if you can’t.” M-APT-C-03 
 
A further component of the need for airport reliability at Airport C was the need for 
corporate succession planning.  The link between having a reliable organisation and 
the need for continued availability of key staff is paramount. The following 
participant explains the use of succession planning as a reliability enhancing process. 
 
“I guess reliability as you know engenders a lot of different areas. One that I’ve 
been very focused on is the reliability of the succession planning and the structure of 
the business. That’s why we’re recruiting currently an assistant operations manager, 
to try and fill that gap. You know, that if one of our senior managers leaves, how do 
we continue to do that business” SM-APT-C-01 
 
Two other key themes of discussion were present when considering commitment to 
reliability were the use of asset management systems, and the requirements of 
reliability that result from being a business unit of the regional council. The asset 
management system is one of the key mechanisms by which the airport worked to 
create a reliable operation. The asset management system had a number of key 
outcomes. The first of these was an understanding of the criticality of each key asset 
that the organisation possesses, not unlike the outcomes of a business impact 
assessment (see Section 2.5.3). The following senior management participant 
discusses the evolution of the asset management system to this level.  
 
 “And then on the infrastructure side, pretty much all of the key infrastructure that 
we’re dependent upon, is being reviewed at some level to ensure there’s some level 
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of either redundancy or at least criticality review and that’s one of the things that I 
guess is an evolutionary step out of our new asset management system.” SM-APT-
C-01 
 
The asset management system was further developed to also consider the heavy use 
of third party providers in airports. This was key as in airports many critical services 
are provided by third party providers that have expertise in that particular area. The 
link between the asset management system and the use of contractors related mostly 
to scheduled maintenance. The asset management system was being changed to 
make system maintenance planned, rather than simply reactive, as explained by the 
following participant.  
 
“So soon we’ll know who’s responsible for everything and that’ll be documented 
and then we’ll all start to work on the criticality of each of those so we can start 
prioritising. In the meantime, we’ve already gone back, we’ve jumped over all of 
that work and said, righto, we need to have all these other contractual activities, like 
maintenance of the baggage system racked up in a long term maintenance 
agreement, so that we don’t have this reactive work.” SM-APT-C-01 
 
The second theme identified within commitment to reliability in Airport C was the 
role of the regional council in determining their reliability. The council, and 
associated ratepayers was a key driver of reliability, as there would be severe 
community backlash in the event of the airport becoming not operational. The 
following participant explains  
 
“I mean it’s one of those things, being local government owned, if we weren’t it’s 
got big ratepayer, you know, stakeholder repercussions. It would be very very bad 
publicity if we couldn’t keep the facility running.” M-APT-C-03 
 
 “The key one that they pushed through in the whole process has been the reliability 
and the safety and security of the airport. That’s number one. Not for council, but 
for the business, that came through. I can give you the actual reference from the 
council’s strategic plan, because its only ambiguous in our corporate plan that we 
have to have that system.” SM-APT-C-01 
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Airport C demonstrated a commitment to reliability, with several drivers present at 
both the airport and the council level. At the airport level, a perpetual operation was 
required, which promoted the need for reliability Further, the airport itself utilises a 
number of systems that act to ensure reliability. Asset management practices are 
principal within this component. The council further supports the airport in achieving 
a reliable operation  
5.2.4 Commitment to Reliable Operations Cross-Case Analysis 
 
Table 5.2.4 
Commitment to Reliable Operations Cross-Case Analysis 
Literature Trait 
 
Observed Traits Airport 
A B C 
Staff understanding of importance of reliability and management support for 
reliability 
 
   
Reliability documented as a 
priority in mission and goals 
Reliability formalised as a component of 
other goals 
 
   
Support for reliable operations from a 
municipal government level 
   
Further Identified Reliability Components 
Asset management systems    
Investment in technology    
Planning 
• Business continuity 
• Emergency planning 
  
 
 
 
Direct representation 
 Indirect representation 
 
All three airports demonstrated an understanding of the importance of providing a 
reliable operation, at both the staff and management levels. Airport A staff members 
demonstrated their understanding of reliability through their propensity to go above 
and beyond their regular duties to ensure reliable operations occurred. Airport B 
identified a number of factors that informed this understanding. The first of these 
was the severe impact a lack of reliability can have on the reputation of the airport, 
and the corresponding impact this can have on the commercial performance of the 
organisation. The second theme identified was the role of individual airports in the 
wider aviation network, and the potential for failure at one airport to spread 
throughout the system. Airport C recognises a requirement for a continuous, 24/7 
operation as a driver for the understanding of reliability. These differing observations 
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indicated that all three airports understand the importance of reliability, albeit 
through a number of different means.   
 
A formalised commitment to reliable operations was present at both Airport A and B. 
This was manifested in different ways at each of the airports. Importantly, none of 
the airports mentioned commitment to reliability in a direct sense. Moreover, goals 
were documented which, if effectively implemented, would produce reliability as an 
outcome.  Airport A maintained a documented commitment to both high levels of 
customer service and providing a safe and secure operation. Airport B used language 
of “world’s best” within their organisational goals. Both of these sets of language, 
while not explicitly mentioning reliability as an organisational goal, lead to reliability 
as a component of these commitments. Importantly, documented commitments were 
linked to reliability by participants themselves. This demonstrates that staff members 
within these organisations viewed these formalised statements as elements of 
reliability, and this impacted on their understanding of organisational priorities and 
ultimately their behaviour.  
 
The final component investigated was that of additional processes or components 
that each organisation attributed as a demonstrating a commitment to reliability. 
These consisted of the presence of asset management systems, investment in 
reliability-enhancing technology, and a number of planning processes. Both airports 
B and C identified asset management as a means of committing to reliability.   
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5.3 Trait 2: Sustained High Technical Performance  
Sustained high technical performance is another common observation of HROs. 
These are systems which are required to provide a high level of performance with 
limited downtime.  A number of means can be used to ensure continued functionality 
of systems, including quality assurance, maintenance measures and procedural 
activity (LaPorte 1996, 63).  Furthermore, often large amounts of performance-based 
data are also collected to ensure consistent performance and calculate deviation from 
set standards (LaPorte 1996, 63). The following section directly investigates the 
following indicators: 
• Critical systems which require a consistently high level of performance 
• How required levels of performance are measured and maintained 
 
5.3.1 Airport A  
Airport A possessed a number of critical systems that need to perform to certain 
standards in order to attain operational certification. Aviation safety regulations 
dictated a number of specific requirements for particular aviation systems. These 
systems required a sustained level of performance and in the most part this is assured 
through regular maintenance and testing of these systems. The following participant 
discusses these performance critical systems. 
 
“Most systems that we have in the airport are safety critical and all of those are kept 
to a very high level of performance when you can start from the things that we 
control, runways, taxiways, aprons, airfield lighting, most of those things have at 
least a redundancy built into them. The airfield lighting system for instance has a 
backup power generation system, should that fail we have a portable lighting system 
that we can disperse fairly quickly…so it’s a matter of, in terms of looking at our 
risk profile, identifying those items that are more likely to fail and building 
redundancy in terms of either duplicate systems or in terms of alternative 
procedures to be able to continue to operate.” SM-APT-C-01 
 
Maintenance is one of the key aspects by which the airport maintained operability of 
critical assets. Maintenance existed on a number of levels, with a formal asset 
management system dictating the requirements of the maintenance of each asset. The 
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maintenance system was explained further by the following senior management 
participant.  
 
“In terms of maintenance, maintenance systems, we have maintenance programs, we 
have a formal asset maintenance system, that’s administered by an asset 
maintenance team and they report monthly on their completion rate of their 
serviceability tasks…and that gets reported up through monthly reports to me.” SM-
APT-C-01 
 
“The asset maintenance plan identifies basically where it is in its useful life. Air-
conditioning for instance, it’s getting to the end of its useful life. The next part is 
okay well it’s useful life is from here to here, how do we maintain it and that’s the 
asset maintenance system. And the asset maintenance system we started that whole 
process by looking at what were our most critical aspects in terms of both customer 
service and workplace health and safety.” SM-APT-C-01 
 
While Airport A maintained its critical assets through an asset maintenance program, 
these are principally related to those systems which have a mandated level of 
performance (airside safety systems) and assets such as the terminal and air 
conditioning. What this program did not include are other support systems which, 
while not directly involved with the operation of aircraft, still support the airport 
functioning as a business operation.  
 
5.3.2 Airport B 
 
Critical to ensuring sustained high technical performance is the measurement and 
monitoring of reliable functioning. Airport B had a number of practices which aim to 
ensure awareness of reliable functioning. These consisted of programmed downtime 
to systems and retrospective recording of asset performance, as further explained by 
the following two participants. 
 
“We’ve put in certain downtime that we want but really we measure more uptime 
because we really don’t want any downtime under any of those systems…and it 
should be running at basically a 98-100% uptime...we’ve been running consistently 
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say closer to 99, something like that over the last few years, so we’re running better 
than what’s been projected.” SM-APT-B-02 
 
“Through recording of asset performance, we provide availability of assets on a 
monthly basis to the management. And any significant incidents are reported to the 
board as well” SM-APT-B-01 
 
However, the weakness of this approach was that most of the data collected provides 
a retrospective perspective of performance, not a measurement of real-time 
functionality. A lack of real-time monitoring made it difficult for the organisation to 
respond immediately to a drop in functionality, something which is required in both 
HROs and for effective BCM activation (Rijpma 1997, 17). The closest activity that 
occurred was an external audit of critical systems for the purposes of creating a more 
effective maintenance system. While this assists in understanding and improving the 
efficiency of systems, this did not establish situational awareness nor a real-time 
understanding of functionality of key systems.  
 
“What we have done with the asset management plans we have done an audit of the 
critical assets as well as the critical components of those assets by external experts. 
And based on that they have provided advice to use on replacement and when 
replacements are due.” SM-APT-B-01 
 
While Airport B does not have a real-time monitoring system for critical functions, 
there is a strong understanding of the consequences of failure of critical systems. 
This understanding can be considered in two main themes, that of operational and 
regulatory consequences. Operational consequences highlight the immense impact 
that a failure of these systems may have on the movement of passengers, as 
demonstrated by the following senior manager.   
 
“If we don’t then the consequences are chaos, because they link into all your 
critical, your most critical systems being your baggage handling system, which is 
linked to your aerobridges, which is the whole bit about how the plane connects to 
the terminal, how people get off and how they get their bags retrieved. So if they stop 
then the whole inward, outward process stops in terms of passenger facilitation.” 
SM-APT-B-02 
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Regulatory consequences were also a consistent theme discussed in relation to failure 
of technical systems. The key outcome was that the airport possessed many systems 
which, if not functioning, could threaten their ability to continue operations from 
either a security or safety perspective, as explained by the following two participants.  
 
“CCTV has the – it stops us as well because if we can’t monitor critical assets and 
secure areas…so therefore we wouldn’t be able to operate because OTS would say 
that can’t provide a secure airport so we’d have to shut down.” SM-APT-B-02 
 
“We’d have the case where we’re not compliance, we could be given a show cause 
by CASA as to why we should continue to operate the airport, our customers would 
get really cheesed off because they couldn’t land or take off, you know, there could 
be all sorts of issues, so yeah, the implication is that we could lose our certificate to 
operate an airport.” M-APT-B-01 
 
Airport B contained measures that both established the status of technical systems 
and monitored their performance. While performance monitoring existed, this was 
retrospective, and did not provide real-time view on how systems were functioning. 
Further, many of the systems that required a high-level of performance were dictated 
by legislation, with a failure having the potential to lead to regulatory action. 
5.3.3 Airport C  
Airport C demonstrated a number of processes employed that require a high level of 
sustained technical performance. The most significant of these is aeronautical 
systems associated with the safe movement of aircraft. The specific performance 
requirements are prescribed in CASA Manual of Standards, section 139. The 
following participant described how the CASA manual influenced technical 
performance of aeronautical systems.  
 
“for the aeronautical components. The aeronautical components are prescribed 
almost by CASA, from a safety perspective in the manual of standards, part 139. 
From that we developed the aerodrome manual, each section of the aerodrome 
manual calls out a respective part of the manual standards. Say a manual standards 
calls for a runway service friction testing to be done on an annual basis and the 
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aerodrome manual then documents how we could achieve that and what the 
reporting frameworks are.” SM-APT-C-01 
 
“Unfortunately is set by legislation so we have to do that to have aerodrome 
certified. So to have it certified we must have an aerodrome manual blah, blah, blah. 
So we can’t move away from that even if we wanted to. But I’m - even though its 
very prescriptive, we actually write the process so its meeting our needs at this 
point.” SM-APT-C-01 
 
Sustained technical performance of systems can also extend to other assets. This can 
be achieved through regular scheduled maintenance of assets and systems to ensure 
that these systems and functioning and therefore reliability ensured. This practice of 
active asset management and monitoring is one which was understood as important 
by Airport C, yet it was not fully implemented to all existing assets. The following 
management level participant explains the maturity of asset management and 
maintenance procedures at Airport C.  
 
“We have got some in place and we are developing a lot more as we go, because 
there wasn’t much in place before I got here. And we’ve got routine inspections and 
performance checks and those types of things happening on a regular basis. 
Typically with critical items, and any new equipment we bring on we establish that 
up front.” M-APT-B-01  
 
Sustained high technical performance can also be observed when considering service 
providers. Airport C, like many other airports, relies on third party service providers 
to deliver key services for the airport. Airport C considered the reliability of these 
service providers to provide continual operations and service for their systems. This 
was something that was considered at the outset of the business relationship, as the 
airport placed more emphasis on the ability of the contractor to provide service and 
support whenever necessary over the lowest-cost approach. The following 
management participant explains this approach.    
 
“I think one of our selection processes is that the service provider has to have the 
resilience to keep our service available. And when we do have issues around that, 
we work to improve that…even with our suppliers, if we find something that we pay 
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a fair bit of money for and it doesn’t seem to be delivering we will send it back to 
them and say “this isn’t doing what we thought it was, why not?” and talk with 
them.” M-APT-B-01 
 
“Even through to wildlife management I suppose, the systems that we supply to that. 
We go right through to identify the different bird species that are here and the ones 
that are problems and the ones that are actually getting struck by aircraft…we 
actually do DNA sampling and send it away to the Australian Museum…that helps 
us to have an understanding of what wildlife is here, and what species is moving, 
what it might be feeding on or what times it might be nesting and things like that so 
we try and avoid problems” M-APT-C-03 
 
At Airport C, there were a number of indicators of sustained high technical 
performance. The first of these was the presence of technical performance standards, 
which in this case was principally informed by CASA MOS 139. In the case of 
Airport C, this extended to third party service providers. Airport C aimed to ensure 
that key systems were sourced from suppliers that maintained higher levels of 
reliability of these systems. Asset management was also employed as a process to 
ensure the continued reliable functioning of assets, particular through the use of 
individual asset management plans.  The combination of these factors constituted 
Airport C’s approach to sustained high technical performance. 
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5.3.4 Sustained High Technical Performance Cross-Case Analysis 
 
Table 5.3.4 
Sustained High Technical Performance Cross-Case Analysis 
Literature Trait 
 
Observed Traits Airport 
A B C 
Presence of systems which require 
sustained technical performance 
Aviation safety systems    
Compliance regulated systems    
Third party service providers    
Measurement of system 
performance 
Recording of performance    
External audit of critical systems    
Maintenance of system 
performance 
Asset management systems    
Specific asset maintenance    
Direct representation 
Indirect Representation 
 
Three main areas were investigated within the trait of sustained high technical 
performance. This first of these was the presence of systems which require sustained 
technical performance. All three airports identified compliance regulated systems 
within this category. These systems were for the most part informed by CASA MOS 
139, which specifically informed the performance standards of a number of airside 
systems. This also informed the maintenance of these systems, as inspections were 
also a specified within regulations. Only Airport C identified services provided by 
third parties as systems that required a high level of performance.  
 
Secondly, measurement of system performance was investigated. Airport B 
monitored a number of key systems, as well as implementing an external audit. 
Specific measurement systems were not identified in any of the other three case 
study sites. However, Airports A and C both identified asset management systems as 
critical in ensuring continued functionality of these systems.  
 
The final indicator of Trait 2 was the maintenance of system performance. Two 
approaches were identified within this area, being the use of asset management 
systems, and maintenance of specific assets. These two approaches were used in 
order to ensure continued functionality of critical assets, with as limited downtime as 
possible.  
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5.4 Trait 3: Structural Flexibility and Redundancy  
Structural flexibility and redundancy is present in a number of forms in HROs. These 
forms exist when considering both physical assets of the organisation and tacit 
knowledge and skills. Redundancy in hard systems results in a backup being 
available, and therefore service is still maintained in the case of a unit breakdown or 
overload (Sagan 1993, 20). Staff redundancy and flexibility allows for operations to 
continue if a staff member is absent, as the skills and knowledge required for key 
functions is retained in more than one staff member.  Trait 3 is a result of a 
combination of these two factors, hard redundancy and staff redundancy and 
flexibility. The following indicators are specifically investigated during this section: 
• Redundancy in key functions (hard systems and staff skill) 
• Levels of cross-skilling of staff 
• Areas of vulnerability in terms of limited trained staff 
5.4.1 Airport A  
Flexibility and redundancy can be understood in regards to both staff and physical 
assets. Staff redundancy was a key issue at Airport A, as the staff base was small to 
begin with (30-40 staff are currently employed at the organisation). Whilst there was 
a smaller staff base than other airports, there still existed significant redundancy 
within management function. This was a result of a directed effort by management to 
ensure that management staff had a wide enough knowledge of airport operations to 
step into the airport director role. This redundancy was also present within each 
group, with the senior members of that group able to step into the top management 
position. This is explained by the following senior management participant. 
 
“We now have a structure, robust structure and that any one of my managers can 
step up and do my role comfortably. There is to a certain extent, interchangeably 
within the management team, but in fact there’s – we have a redundancy program 
really formally within each team, the senior person in the team can pretty much step 
up into the management role and that’s in finance, that’s in operations.” SM-APT-
A-01 
 
Staff flexibility and redundancy also existed for the on-the-ground operational staff. 
Much of the increase in staffing levels was due to an understanding that the 
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organisation would be vulnerable if a staff member in this area would leave. Airport 
A had also introduced training to ensure that staff with many years experience did 
not leave without their knowledge being passed onto more junior staff members. The 
following staff level participant discussed these issues.  
 
“As far as the staffing levels for redundancy, we have definitely taken a lot of moves 
to ensure that we’re covered if for example one of them retired earlier this year and 
we were able to backfill through that redundancy and training preparedness that 
we’d had.” S-APT-A-01 
 
Cross-skilling has been identified as a means of ensuring redundancy in staff 
functionality (La Porte 1996, 64). At Airport A there was no formalised system of 
staff rotation or cross-skilling.  Some informal level of cross-skilling existed as 
different teams discussed particular projects of significant at management meetings. 
The following senior management level participant explained this phenomenon. 
 
“The only cross skilling is from time to time in our staff meetings. We have monthly 
staff meetings, we will have a team basically talk about what they do, how they do it, 
particularly if it’s an interesting project.” SM-APT-A-01 
 
While there was no formalised approach to cross-skilling currently at Airport A, 
there was still some evidence of practices which can ensure staff have some 
knowledge of how to complete other tasks. As the airport was a relatively small team 
(of around 30-40 individuals), often when incidents occur all staff will get involved 
in a number of different tasks. This added to the overall knowledge of airport 
operations for each staff member, as explained by the following participant.  
 
“In a small airport everybody knows what everybody else’s job is and basically how 
it’s done. And we’ll have incidences here where, we all go out and throw bags, we’ll 
all go out and clean up. We do – we actually have to come together as a team 
because we’re a tiny little airport, and that’s what you do.” SM-APT-A-01 
 
This was reiterated by the following management level staff member, who comments 
on the particular aspect of multi-skilling in the area of airside operations.  
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“Yeah we do and again that’s just the nature of us, it’s a small team so you’ll have 
basically people that I’ve been training for example the airside things as well so 
basically if necessary I can do escorting people airside and it’s just the nature of us, 
we all have to – we all have to work across each other’s business.” M-APT-A-02 
 
As the airport was a business unit of a local council, it was reliant on the council for 
many of their basic systems, for instance information technology and human 
resources. Previously, the majority of these functions, plus others, were solely the 
responsibility of council. This produced an environment where there was not a great 
deal of specific knowledge of the unique operational requirements of an airport. In 
response to this, the airport decided to internalise a number of these critical functions. 
This allowed the airport to both expand their skilled staff base, and ensure that the 
staff working on those issues understand the airport’s operational requirements. This 
is further explained by the following participant.  
 
“There was a time when the airport was very reliant upon council for a lot of its 
systems and there was very little understanding of what our business was because 
their rates and rubbish and they don’t really understand airports. Very consciously 
over the last five years, I’ve brought a lot of that stuff in house and we’ve actually 
grown from a finance team of one part-timer, now to having five people working in 
that area.” SM-APT-A-01 
 
Airport A demonstrated flexibility and redundancy through a number of means. Staff 
redundancy was achieved at both management and staff level, with staff able to step 
into other functions. While there was no formal cross-skilling program in place, there 
was some informal level of job awareness through functions such as regular meetings 
and the small team that currently exists. Further, functions had been absorbed into 
the airport from council to ensure that there was sufficient knowledge of the unique 
operating environment of an airport.  
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5.4.2 Airport B 
 
Staff redundancy at Airport B is discussed in terms of operational areas and non-
operational components of the organisation. This is a critical distinction as there is a 
significant divergence in practice and approach in these two groups. Staff 
redundancy within the operational area did exist, particularly with the airside 
operations staff who had the principal task of maintaining the operation runways and 
taxiways in order to ensure the swift movement of aircraft. Within this function, a 
level of staff redundancy existed in order to keep this function operable, as explained 
by the following participant.  
 
“There’s 25 air side operation supervisors who we have to have someone one 
shift every day, we’ve worked out that we need to have a minimum of four to 
undertake the role to maintain the airport, the airside being safe. If we were 
to experience a loss of staff, yeah, we have identified and that’s through our 
BCP, ways to keep us operating.” S-APT-B-02 
 
However, there were some limits to the sustainability of this operation. If staff were 
unavailable for a longer time, Airport B would be required to engage external 
consultants in order to ensure the core function of airside officers is met. It was also 
noted that there was the possibility to use appropriately qualified airside officers 
from other airports. The practice of sharing of airside officers and safety-enhancing 
practices is common between Australian airports, even those which may be in 
competition. The following participant explains the kind of alternative measures the 
airport can utilise to fill staff in the airside operations function. 
 
“It’s sustainable short-term, post that, mid to long-term we would actually look at 
getting consultants in or setting up a consultancy agreement with organisations that 
actually provide aero reporting officers or work safety officers…failing that we’d 
also reach out to the Gold Coast and Sunshine Airport, only an hour in each 
direction and ask if they had any staff on their days off that might be interested in 
coming up” S-APT-B-02 
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While a level of redundancy, in terms of both multiple staff and third parties was 
observed within the operational area, this did not extend to the rest of the 
organisation.  In these other areas of the organisation, there was a well-accepted lack 
of staff redundancy in key functions. This was explained by the following staff 
member.  
 
“Across the board pretty much, there are not really redundancies for anybody. And 
even staff where several people do the same role, say the shift supervisors, air side 
officers and duty managers, there’s only enough redundancy for a short amount of 
time and then we wouldn’t, you know, they would need rest times and stuff like that.” 
S-APT-B-01 
 
A further critical area of a lack of redundancy was identified within the decision-
making component of the business. Within this area a certain level of experience is 
required, along with a global view of the organisation and how the different units 
function along with one another. BCPs have identified operational requirements and, 
where vulnerabilities exist, the strategic and planning function still requires further 
reinforcement (this is principally demonstrated within incidents that run into the days, 
after a certain time period the organisation has exhausted the capacity of those staff 
that have the ability to execute the strategic and planning functions required to return 
to business as usual). The following management level participant explained the lack 
of redundancy and the planning level.  
 
 “I think operationally, yes, I think you know, at the coalface end, when it comes to 
terminal operations and even in most of our critical maintenance functions, that 
we’ve certainly in the development of business continuity plans, identified resources 
constraints and how we can best deal with that. But I think in the decision making, 
when you take a step back then from those front-line operational areas then look at 
the decision-making area. I think that we are weak in that area and that’s been 
proven you know, when we’ve dealt with that we really run out of steam after about 
five or six days, and that’s because we just – we don’t have the depth and we don’t 
have that succession planning process.” M-APT-B-03 
 
The lack of planning and strategic thinking was also identified in the capacity of 
incident response. A lack of staff with the ability to coordinate the response to an 
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incident can represent an organisational vulnerability. Importantly, in this instance, 
this vulnerability has been recognised. The organisation has taken steps in order to 
ensure that more staff are trained in the capacity to coordinate incidents, therefore 
reducing that area of vulnerability. The following management level participant 
identified this process.  
 
“It’s a vulnerability we have identified, it’s a risk that we have identified as well, so 
it’s not as if nothing’s been done about it, but it’s definitely a risk at the moment so 
we have limited people that can conduct being in those role, all those key roles that 
come out of coordination, and you know, that side of the fence.” M-APT-B-02 
 
Cross-skilling and multi-skilling of staff occurred rarely at Airport B. Participants 
consistently outlined that there was no formal approach to cross-skilling, and any 
cross-skilling activities that did occur were informal in nature. Airport B had a 
relatively small staff base for the amount of tasks undertaken, indicating that there is 
little additional capacity for staff to rotate into different roles. The following 
participant had these observations regarding multi-skilling. 
 
“I think that’s probably an area that needs, I don’t think there is enough of it. There 
might be some, but I think again it’s internal, so if it’s within a business group, the 
internal operations there may be some cross-training within the internal operations 
side of the fence, but not outside those areas, not that I’ve seen anyway. Definitely 
not in our area, there’s just not enough of us.” M-APT-B-02 
 
Another key component of HROs in regards to redundancy is the redundancy of hard 
systems in the organisation. Airport B demonstrated redundancy in a number of their 
key hard systems, with projects currently underway in order to create redundancy in 
those systems which did not have a hard backup. The most notable of these technical 
systems was CCTV. In addition to this, the organisation was undertaking a major 
capital works project to build a second runway for the airport, thus reducing a large 
vulnerability that the organisation retained by only having one runway for aircraft 
landing and take-off. Such projects indicated that the organisation had an 
understanding of the need for redundancy, in addition to the desire to expand their 
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commercial enterprise. The level of hard redundancy is explained by the following 
senior management participant.  
 
“Yes – because we’ve got multiple servers or we’ve got multiple bag screening, x-
ray units. So we’ve got double redundancy in that, both in international we’ve got 
double redundancy in the domestic for that…We’ve pretty well got redundancy 
system wise right across the board on the critical because CCTV is probably not up 
to that yet, we’ve just got it to the point where it has, it’s got an integrated system for 
CCTV.” SM-APT-B-02 
 
Flexibility and redundancy was investigated in two components within airport B, 
staff and physical systems. At the staff level, flexibility and redundancy was 
observed, however this was not widespread. Formalised cross-skilling activities did 
not exist, and the airport maintained only enough staff redundancy to respond to a 
certain length of event. Redundancy in hard systems was more present at Airport B. 
A number of these key systems contained a redundancy function, however a number 
of existing vulnerabilities were identified, such as the current single runway setup.  
 
5.4.3 Airport C  
One of the key ways Airport C achieved a level of redundancy in staff was through 
multi-skilling of frontline operational staff. Airside officers were qualified both in 
the capacity of the safety officers, a duty mostly concerned with the safe movement 
of aircraft and other vehicles on the apron, in addition to being qualified in 
maintenance duties. This results in an increased availability of staff with the skills to 
complete all necessary roles on the airside area of the airport. The following 
participant explained the level of multi-skilling present at the airport.  
 
“We’re very much multi-skilled, we have to be. We don’t just have one person who’s 
designated as the tractor driver and mower, the work staff. We have seven trained 
and qualified safety officers, which is their primary role, but they’re also 
maintenance people as well. So if they’re not rostered on as the duty safety officer, 
whether in the morning or the afternoon shift, but if they are on a day shift cycle, 
then they will be in the maintenance role so they’ll be out mowing, line marking and 
all that. But if we need to rely on them to actually fall into a safety officer role so if a 
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duty safety officer comes on and falls sick when he’s on duty, we can all on any of 
our other staff to the duty safety officer role which is the primary role.” S-APT-C-01 
 
While staff redundancy can be observed within the operational area of the 
organisation, this is not consistent across other organisational functions. This is most 
significantly observed within management functions. Importantly, this was 
something that was recognised by the organisation, and steps are being taken in order 
to recruit staff in key areas which reduces the accompany level of vulnerability. This 
was explained in more detail by the following management level participant. 
 
“Probably not as robust as it could be. But it’s getting more robust. We understand 
there was a shortfall in there when we went, the commercial manager and I started 
about three years ago, we talked to our director about that, and we’ve been talking 
more and more about that, building inner resilience. We are looking to find some 
more people at the moment because we don’t have resilience in some areas, and 
we’re encouraging that people get involved in what other people do and so there is 
an understanding of what’s happening.” M-APT-B-01 
 
Different airports utilised different approaches to increasing redundancy and 
reducing reliability. Airport C is a business component of a regional council. As a 
component of a regional council, they were able to utilise a number of the systems 
and infrastructure which council provides. This was mostly based around finance, 
human resources and information technology systems. Airport C had sought to utilise 
the services of council to a greater extent, in order to improve efficiency and 
reliability of their functioning. This has been achieved through pushing a number of 
administration related functions to the council level, allowing the airport staff to deal 
with more immediate matters. The regional council had a greater capacity to provide 
these services, and had a larger number of staff dedicated to these areas than the 
airport itself could provide. Therefore, as these services were maintained by an 
external provider, the airport had more staff capacity to focus on their specific remit.  
The following senior management participant explained how the process has 
occurred.  
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“I took the opportunity when we lost our admin team, to push out a lot of functions 
to other parts of council that resented or didn’t want to do it before…So as a result 
people within council had to take those jobs on and over time we’re now – this is 
deliberate, I’ve moved those jobs out further and further so we don’t hold onto them. 
It allows my existing internal team to do more with less, you know what I mean. But 
at the same time, we’ve spread our risks out further in some respects but the people 
who are doing the work are now becoming competent in our business.” SM-APT-C-
01 
 
Redundancy can also be observed in a number of hard systems within Airport C. 
Areas of vulnerability had been identified where the organisation was dependent on a 
single piece of infrastructure. A number of these have been identified, including 
checked baggage screening and baggage belts. These systems have had parallel 
systems installed. These parallel systems allowed for both more efficient operations 
during business as usual, and continue operating, albeit at a reduced capacity. This 
allowed for some core functions to continue should regular service be interrupted. 
The following participant explained these services.  
 
“CBS does have redundancy, we can operate albeit at a reduced level if one of the 
CBS systems that go down. The same with the belts, we have got two belts here, if 
one belt goes down, all the baggage has to go down to one so obviously that reduces 
our efficiency or the baggage handlers to handle all the luggage.” S-APT-C-01 
 
While cross-skilling at the operational level did exist in some functions, this has been 
harder to replicate at a broader level within the organisation. Employment within the 
regional council was undertaken within the specific bounds of a position description 
(PD). This PD outlines the requirements of a particular position, and effectively only 
allows employees to take on the duties which have been previously prescribed in 
their PD. This limited the amount of cross-skilling and job rotation which can occur, 
therefore reducing the potential for reliability enhancing practices. The organisation 
had attempted to deal with this by writing broader position descriptions which allow 
for flexibility, however it was still only possible to rotate staff when people have a 
particular interest in learning about a new area. The following participant explained 
this process.  
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“So no, it’s not a formal one but I have written PDs, and I’ve pretty much written all 
of them so that their broad enough, that people can interpret them at work in 
different areas. But I think the only way I can get people to work in other areas is to 
insist that they do that, and convince them that it’s a good idea. So it’s more of a 
team ethos of it’s us versus those bastards out there, so let’s get together and do it.” 
SM-APT-C-01 
 
Elements of flexibility and redundancy were observed at Airport C. Staff redundancy 
was demonstrated within the operations area, and some level of managerial 
redundancy. Redundancy in hard systems was also present at Airport C, including 
checked baggage screening and luggage belts. A number of key systems were 
maintained by the regional council, such as IT systems and human resources 
functions. These elements are evidence of structural flexibility and redundancy at 
Airport C.  
 
5.4.4 Structural Flexibility and Redundancy Cross-Case Analysis 
 
Table 5.4.4 
Structural Flexibility and Redundancy Cross-Case Analysis 
Literature Trait 
 
Observed Traits Airport 
A B C 
Redundancy of staff functions Redundancy at operational level    
Redundancy at management level    
Ability to source operational staff from 
many areas 
   
Levels of cross-skilling of staff Informal cross-skilling    
Cross-skilling of operational staff    
Redundancy of hard systems    
Other Observed Traits 
Internalisation of key functions from municipal government    
Outsourcing of key functions to municipal government    
Direct representation 
 Indirect representation 
 
Redundancy of staff functions will be discussed in the two areas of the operational 
level and the managerial level. The operational level referred to staff who are directly 
responsible for the safe and secure movement of aircraft, namely airside officers. The 
managerial level (for the purposes of this analysis), referred to all functions outside 
those of operational. All three airports demonstrated a redundancy in the operational 
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staff function. For at least a short period of time (a few days), operations could be 
continued if there was reduced staff capacity or an increased staffing requirement. 
Airport B further identified consultants and other airports that could provide 
increased staff during such situations. This highly developed attitude to staff 
redundancy in the operations area was contrasted against that in the managerial area. 
Airport A was the only of the three airports which identified a level of redundancy in 
the management area, as not only were the senior managers able to act as the airport 
director, the senior member of each organisational function was able to step up into 
their management position if required. Airports B and C both recognised their 
vulnerability in the area of managerial redundancy. However, Airport C had a more 
concrete approach of recruiting particular staff to fill roles that required more 
urgently. Airport B had identified certain vulnerabilities, particularly in event 
coordination and is implementing training practices in order to reduce this 
vulnerability. Despite this, across the board there still existed a significant divide 
between the levels of redundancy in the operational area and the managerial area, 
representing an area of vulnerability for these airports.  
 
Cross-skilling (or multi-skilling) of staff represented the next component of analysis. 
Airports A and B only possessed informal practices towards cross-skilling of staff. 
While there may be informal cross-fertilisation of skills and knowledge, there existed 
no formalised approach to rotating staff through different components of the 
organisation. Airport C was the only of the three case studies that represented a 
formalised approach to cross-skilling, yet this was only present within the 
operational area. These staff were trained in every duty around the airfield, whether 
this be aviation related, or less specific tasks such as mowing and general repairs. 
Cross-skilling was therefore a largely underutilised reliability-enhancing process at 
all three airports, potentially encouraging silos to form within the organisation. If 
staff were more appropriately cross-skilled throughout the organisation, skills would 
be contained in more individuals, reducing the vulnerabilities associated with key 
skills within only a few individuals.  
 
Redundancy of hard systems was also a key indicator of the trait of structural 
flexibility and redundancy. Redundancy of a number of hard and soft technical 
systems was present at Airports B and C. Airport B further demonstrated a capacity 
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to install more redundancy in hard systems, such as infrastructure,  in response to 
identified vulnerabilities.  
 
In regards to other observed traits, an interesting dichotomy was observed between 
two Airports, A and C. Airports A and C fell under a similar organisational structure 
and requirements, as they were both a business unit of a regional council (although 
these are two different regional councils). Airport A internalised a number of key 
functions to the airport, such as finance and human resources. This increased the 
staff base at the airport, and gave the organisation more control over these areas. It 
also ensured that the staff responsible for these particular functions had a knowledge 
of the unique operating requirements and boundaries of the airport. This approach 
was in direct contrast to the approach undertaken at Airport C. Airport C outsourced 
a number of similar functions to the council, while not reducing their staff numbers. 
The outcome of this for Airport C was that staff had more time available to work on 
specific matters of importance to the airport, as these tasks could be completed by a 
non-specialist at the council. This also pushed the responsibility for the maintenance 
and management of these systems away from the airport organisation itself. Both of 
these approaches have increased reliability for the airports (in the opinion of their 
respective senior managers), although this has been achieved through opposing 
means.  
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5.5 Trait 4: High Degrees of Responsibility and Accountability  
HROs have a high level of responsibility and accountability, where reporting error 
(including one’s own) is encouraged and rewarded (Roberts 1990, 168; LaPorte 
1996; 64). In practical terms, staff members understand the need to report their own 
failures to management, and have a similar approach to reporting on the failures of 
their colleagues. A further component of Trait 4 is the outward rewarding of the 
discovery of error within the organisation. Within this section the following items are 
specifically investigated, as informed by high reliability literature: 
• Staff reporting their own failures 
• Staff reporting on the failures of their colleagues 
• Rewarding the discovery of error, including identifying system weaknesses 
and improving them 
 
5.5.1 Airport A  
Responsibility and accountability within airports can be considered in two streams, 
that of reporting on one’s own failures, and reporting on others (Roberts 1990, 168). 
In regards to staff reporting on their own failures, Airport A had a number of 
procedures in place to encourage reporting on incidents. The first of these was a no 
blame culture, with a structure in place to handle the reporting and investigation of 
incidents. This was explained by the following participant. 
 
“I would like to think that we have a no blame culture. This stuff happens all the 
time to all of, us and the important thing is that we recover from it and that we learn 
from it. And we have an incident reporting system, a formal incident reporting 
system that’s used.” SM-APT-A-01 
 
In addition to the structured approach to reporting and handling incidents, senior 
management encouraged an open dialogue in regards reporting incidents and staff 
failures. Management encouraged an open discussion with staff in order to talk 
through the incident and ensure that a similar failure does not occur again. This was 
explained by the following senior management participant.  
 
 127 
“I think in an airport which is such a safety security critical piece of infrastructure, 
if you don’t encourage that open dialogue, what will happen is that something will 
bite you on the backside because someone has tried to cover up…hopefully that’s the 
culture that we have and that’s reflected once again in our values and charter” SM-
APT-A-01 
 
Airport A approached incidents as an opportunity to review SOP and ensure its 
effectiveness. SOPs and regulations were consulted to ensure two things, the first 
being the currency of the SOPs in regards to regulation, and the second, the 
effectiveness of the SOP itself. From this, an amendment was put in place with the 
specific purpose of ensuring that the same failure does not occur again. Following 
this, staff were briefed on the incident and changes to operating procedure. 
Importantly, the incident is the focus, rather than the individual. This approach 
resulted in increased incident reporting to management, creating a more transparent 
approach. The following participant explained how changes to operating procedure 
are communicated to staff following a reported incident.  
 
“And then we do a briefing with the staff, we’ll bring them all in. If we can’t get 
them all at the same time we stage meetings or toolbox talks and we’ll go through 
what the problem was, we don’t focus on the individual, we focus on the incident 
and the solution and how to avoid it in the future.” S-APT-A-01 
 
A distinction can be drawn in regards to operational and non-operational issues and 
reporting. When an issue impacted on the safe and secure operation of the airport, 
there was more impetus to report these issues and deal with them. This was in 
contrast to non-operational issues that do not receive the same amount of attention, 
as explained by the following participant.  
 
“It depends, if it’s around the aviation safety thing, yeah, they follow that very 
seriously. On other matters, again, they’re probably the same as any other group. 
There are some people who see it as their duty to basically report every little thing 
and others they are quite happy to live and let live. But the only place I would say 
that there’s a definite culture of basically making things known is on the safety front.” 
M-APT-A-02 
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The second component of responsibility and accountability refers to the propensity 
of staff to report on their colleagues if they witness them acting in an improper 
manner. Reporting on others was notably not as common as reporting on oneself, but 
was nonetheless encouraged by management. In particular staff were encouraged to 
approach others on the spot if they witnessed them doing something untoward, as 
explained by the following senior manager.  
 
“I’m not sure that it’s positively encouraged but I think we promote a culture, a 
challenge culture where if somebody’s doing something, that you would say, ‘hang 
on, just explain to me why you’re doing that’.” SM-APT-A-01 
 
Management support for reporting on others is further supported by a formal, 
anonymous reporting process. This reporting process aims to ensure that incidents 
are reported, and dealt with in order to ensure that operating procedure is appropriate. 
This was conducted in a manner which deals with the incident and procedure itself, 
rather than assigning blame to particular individuals. This open discussion of 
incidents encouraged reporting from staff, as blame on individuals had been replaced 
by a group discussion on how response can be improved.  
 
“Look initially staff were a bit dubious on doing that, they didn’t want to seen as a 
dobber but once again it was understood by all staff they don’t even have to mention 
names, yeah okay witnessed an incident that has happened purely by a fall down in 
procedures or whatever, that would be reported and we address the entire group not 
individual. I mean we will speak to an individual if it’s significant enough but we’d 
rather focus on the group to ensure, and the systems to ensure that it doesn’t fall 
over again.” S-APT-A-01 
 
Airport A demonstrated a positive approach to reporting of incidents, which was 
supported by formalised procedures. An open dialogue was maintained with staff in 
regards to problems and issues, with incidents viewed as an opportunity to review 
SOP. The propensity to report incidents and conduct review was higher when 
considering safety and security incidents than others. Reporting of incidents to 
management was supported by a formalised, anonymous procedure, however 
reporting on oneself occurred at a higher rate than reporting on others.  
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5.5.2 Airport B 
 
Within Airport B there was a strong focus on error being reported for the purposes of 
improvement, rather than appointing blame to individuals. This contributed to staff 
being able to report their failures. This was further illustrated by the following two 
participants.  
 
“Though our safety management system, we’re very much I’m focused on that way. 
It’s a no blame culture and it’s to help us, you know, we say to the staff ‘look, we 
need you to tell us if something has happened so that we can put something in place 
to prevent it happening again,’ so it’s very much a reporting culture that we have, it 
has to be.” M-APT-B-01 
 
“Generally speaking I will say there is, the way Airport B has managed its staff and 
the culture which is there, and again it depends on manager to manager and person 
to person, but generally speaking its not a blame culture here. It’s a question of 
always, there is a problem, person made a mistake, how can we make sure that it 
doesn’t happen again.” SM-APT-B-01 
 
While the practice or reporting one’s own errors was well established, reporting on 
colleagues was a less mature practice at Airport B.  A formalised whistle-blower 
policy does exist, however this has not seeped through into day-to-day practice. This 
was explained by the following two participants.  
 
“I don’t think we’re quite there yet – I’d like to, we’re partially there, but sometimes 
you know, they’re probably more sorted out between themselves, but I would prefer 
that, you know, look that’s ok if it’s not serious, I think that’s okay, it’s a good 
teammate culture, and at what point turns over to, they go to the boss and say “this 
guy’s dangerous out there,”, I’d like to think that would happen eventually or it will 
happen.” M-APT-B-01 
 
“Er, no, that’s not going to happen. How that happens here is that they’ll talk to 
somebody else hoping someone else will do something about it.” M-APT-B-03 
  
Rewarding of discovery of error is also present in functioning HROs. This 
encourages staff to actively seek out error in a system and fix it. This was not an 
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established practice within Airport B, and only existed in an informal fashion, as 
presented by the following two participants.  
 
“It’s not formally rewarded. It can be rewarded. We have a, I guess we have an 
informal system where if someone does something and is aware of something and it 
has a big impact on us, that person’s boss can recommend that I give them a bonus 
or, you know, give them some sort of reward for it.” SM-APT-B-02 
 
“Again, probably not in a formal way. But obviously if you take the example of 
safety, if somebody points out that this is a problem, we address it straight away and 
it is very much appreciated, culturally, yes that you are looking around and that you 
are finding issues and you are bringing it to attention of people and you are getting 
them addressed.” SM-APT-B-01 
 
Airport B demonstrated both responsibility and accountability in their practices, 
through both reporting of own failures (which was highly encouraged) and reporting 
failures of others (which was less present). While reporting one’s own errors was 
highly encouraged, reporting on the failures of others was considerably less 
developed. Further, there was little formal rewarding of the discovery of error within 
Airport B.  
5.5.3 Airport C  
Within Airport C there was an established sense of the need for staff to report their 
failures. However, this was not a policy that was readily endorsed for all kind of 
errors. The majority of reports concerned themselves with particular matters of safety 
and security around the airfield and terminal, whereas a reluctance to report smaller 
matters which did not impact on the safe and secure operation of the terminal was 
present. This was explained by the following staff member.  
 
“I think they’re – some of the others are not reported when there’s a little dent in the 
car, those things aren’t reported enough, but I think when it involves compliance 
with airport they’re pretty good at it” S-APT-C-02 
 
Within high reliability organisations, not only is it critical for staff to report their 
own failures, but to also feel empowered to report the failures of their colleagues (La 
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Porte 1996, 64). This was not as mature as staff reporting on their own failures. The 
majority of participants noted that they were unsure whether reporting on colleagues 
would occur in a real instance, and none could recall a situation where a staff 
member has reported on another’s failure.  While this may be the case, there was a 
formalised policy for the need to report on others, within the Council Code of 
Conduct. This indicated that while a formalised policy exists, this has not been 
embedded within staff to the extent that is required in order for it to be actionable. 
However, it must also be considered that there may have not been a need for staff to 
report on another’s behaviour within the recent past. The following participant 
explained how the Code of Conduct should inform reporting of others.  
 
 “I mean within their Council’s Code of Conduct, you’re obliged to anyway so it’s 
there as a Code of Conduct obligation, so that I mean if something isn’t reported 
that’s detrimental to the Council Code of Conduct or safety or security, then that 
person is just as much in the wrong as the person who is doing the wrong.” S-APT-
C-01 
 
Another theme discussed was the reward for discovery of error within systems. A 
number of participants noted the lack of this occurring within the airport, especially 
not within any formalised system. This was particularly contrasted against what 
occurred within the greater council organisation. Within council staff members who 
make particular changes, or who have gone above and beyond their duty were 
publicly noted in the council newsletter. This currently does not occur within the 
airport, although they are a business unit of the same regional council. The following 
participant explained this situation.  
 
“I think that here at the airport, within our inner sanctum here, I don’t think enough 
of that goes on. Because people do good things here all the time I think, but they’re 
not really acknowledged, it’s only when things go wrong that they’re put in the 
spotlight I suppose.” S-APT-C-01 
 
Formalised rewarding for change did not occur within the airport organisation, as 
established above. However, there is some occurrence at lower levels within the 
organisation, particularly within the operations supervisors. When it had been 
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discovered that a particular operations staff member had observed something and 
made a positive change to improve that situation, their direct supervisors made a 
point to acknowledge their work and in some cases, reward them.  This was 
explained by the following staff level participant. 
 
“I think amongst the three of us it is. Um, I don’t think upper management has much 
involvement or much interest, to put it that way. But I certainly try and encourage 
guys if I believe somebody has done something right or out of the ordinary, they 
should be congratulated or reward them or what, but certainly acknowledged 
anyway.” S-APT-C-02 
 
While the airport itself imbued certain characteristics of responsibility and 
accountability, this does not appear to have occurred in the wider council 
organisation. Often within the organisation there was a focus on anointing blame 
rather than using failure to create a more robust and reliable system. The following 
senior management participant explained this situation.  
 
“I genuinely believe we’ve got to learn from our experiences, we’re an organisation 
as a whole that doesn’t have that ethos, unfortunately. And we’re probably more in 
an organisation that’s looking to blame someone, but I think that’s more the 
maturity of the organisation rather than anything else, but I think I’m probably more 
tolerant than most, of failure, if I can help it.” SM-APT-C-01 
 
The level of acceptability of failures depends in many cases of the cause of incident. 
In certain instances the organisation has no tolerance for failure. This mostly occurs 
in the case of incidents which breach federal regulation. In these instances, failure is 
not tolerated, compared to other areas of the organisation. The following senior 
management participant explained this situation.  
 
“We’re doing some pretty dramatic legislative and regulatory oversight, that means 
that, no, we’re not tolerant of mistakes as well. So, you know, you screw up with 
safety or security, usually is quite dramatic from either a penalty or an outcome, so 
in some areas we’re not tolerant at all.” SM-APT-C-01 
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Airport C was the only of the three airports which identified a view to encourage 
error reporting wider than their own airport organisation. Airports consist of a 
multitude of different organisations and service providers, all operating businesses in 
the same physical space with the end goal of servicing the travelling customer. 
Airport C had introduced a community culture, which aims to give all airport 
members an awareness of when they should be reporting failures, with the aim of 
producing a more reliable airport. The following management level participant 
explained these efforts.  
 
“So we’re introducing a community culture, we even had our first community 
barbeque a few months ago to try and get people to get to know each other. We want 
everyone to have their eyes looking for things, it could be you know, unattended 
bags. If there’s a problem they see something they should tell us, no matter how 
minor it is, and we’ll address it appropriately, give them some feedback and thank 
them for highlighting it. And we’re encouraging that more and more.” M-APT-C-01 
 
A number of elements of responsibility and accountability were present at Airport C. 
Staff were encouraged to report their own failures, however this was observed at a 
much more mature state than staff reporting on their colleagues. Some level of 
rewarding of discovery of error was present, however it was not actively pursued. A 
number of further interesting phenomena were also observed. First, the airport had a 
very different attitude to the assigning of blame than the other commercial entities 
operating within the airport environment. While the airport aims to use failures as 
opportunities to learn, as opposed to the council which looked for an individual to 
blame. Further, Airport C could not accept failures that would result in a breach of 
regulatory compliance.  
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5.5.4 High Degrees of Responsibility and Accountability Cross-Case Analysis 
 
Table 5.5.4 
High Degrees of Responsibility and Accountability Cross-Case Analysis 
Literature Trait 
 
Observed Traits Airport 
A B C 
Staff reporting on their own failures     
Safety and security focussed    
Staff reporting on failures of others    
Rewarding of the discovery of error    
Other Observed Traits 
No blame culture    
Difference between operational and non-operational    
Introducing reporting culture to the wider airport organisation    
Direct representation 
 Indirect representation 
 
The first component of Trait 4 was the propensity for staff to report their own 
failures. This trait was demonstrated at varying degrees and through varying means 
in each of the three case study sites. Airport A had a number of procedures in place 
to encourage reporting of incidents. This was in conjunction with an open dialogue 
utilised when discussing the outcome of incident investigation with staff members. A 
similar observation was made at Airport B, where the drive for staff reporting their 
own failures was based around the need to improve operations without apportioning 
blame. A safety and security focus for reporting incidents was also observed at 
Airport B. Airport C demonstrated a lesser level of self-reporting. It was noted that 
reporting was focused around safety and security issues around the airport, as 
observed in Airport B. Reporting around safety and security incidents can be further 
related to the regulations surrounding these two areas, in particular the need for 
formal notification of safety and security incidents (as discussed previously). This 
further endorsed the notions of safety and security and their importance at Australian 
airports. Airports A and B explicitly discussed how safety and security related 
incidents had a higher rate of reporting than others.  
 
Staff reporting on their colleagues was further investigated as an indicator of trait 4. 
Staff reporting on others occurred less frequently than staff reporting on themselves. 
All three airports demonstrated this trait, however practices of reporting on 
colleagues were not as widespread as would be ideal. Airport A management 
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encouraged staff to report on their colleagues, however there had been very few 
instances where this had occurred so it is difficult to accurately judge the 
effectiveness of this policy. Airport B maintained a formal policy in regards to 
reporting on failures of others, namely a formalised whistle-blower policy and a 
confidential reporting policy 10 . In practice, however, it seems that this has not 
become a component of day-to-day practice. Airport C also maintained a formalised 
policy which requires staff to report when they witness failures occurring, contained 
within the Council Code of Conduct. While this did exist, there was still a lack 
integration from this towards practice, similar to that observed in Airport B.  
 
A number of other practices which contributed to Trait 4 were identified at each of 
the airports. Airport A specifically named a “no blame culture” as a component of 
their operations, which aimed to encourage staff to report failures without the risk of 
blame being apportioned to them. It is important to note, however, that there is still 
no conclusive evidence to show that the “no blame culture” is influencing incident 
reporting. Airports A and C indicated that there was a difference between reporting 
attitudes when considering aviation operational activities as opposed to corporate 
activities. Reporting of incidents occurred more frequently when it was directly 
related to safety or security than in other areas. Again, this indicated these traits are 
more ingrained in the operational area than the rest of the organisation. Airport C 
aimed to further extend the idea of reporting of incidents to the wider airport 
organisation. A community barbeque has been held in order to connect airport 
management with tenants, airlines and other agencies within the airport space, with 
more planned in the future. The aim of this was to make these groups more aware of 
normal operations and what was viewed as unusual, and how failures can easily be 
reported to airport management. By encouraging a reporting culture within the wider 
airport environment, failures can be more rapidly reported. This can contribute to the 
Trait 4 of responsibility and accountability.  
 
 
 
                                                        
10Documents APTB1 and APTB2 
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5.6 Trait 5: Flexible Decision Making Process and Collegial Patterns of 
Hierarchy  
Flexible decision-making processes in this sense refers to the ability of low-level 
operators or staff members to respond to situations without management approval 
(Rijpma 1997, 17). This allows for failure to be stopped before spreading throughout 
the system. Further to this, different modes of operation for different kinds of 
situations has been previously observed in HROs. LaPorte and Consolini (1998) and 
Reason (2006, 255) outline three modes of operation in HROs, being routine mode, 
high-tempo mode and emergency response. These different modes signify significant 
changes in operating procedure and structure. This section investigates two 
components of this trait: 
• Allocation of decision-making power during an event 
• Nature of change of operating procedure during an event 
5.6.1 Airport A 
 
When an airside incident occurred at Airport A, initial decision-making power was 
given to the safety officer present, an individual who was on site but not in an 
overarching management position. This staff member then assessed if the incident 
required escalation and what resources were required.  Other senior management 
assisted in supporting decision making at multiple levels. This was explained by the 
following participant.  
 
“It pretty much relies with the safety officer out there in the field as per the AEP. If 
it’s a major incident, obviously the general manager will get involved in regards to 
his thirty something years’ experience with airside and emergencies. Predominantly 
it’s pretty much the decision making goes with the guy in the field.” S-APT-A-01 
 
Safety officers on the ground had a particular duty when responding to airside 
incidents. As with business continuity response, immediate response involved 
protecting life and property. First responders therefore were responsible for 
immediate response to the incident, protecting life and property and escalating the 
incident if necessary. These staff members were not, however, responsible for the 
long-term management of the incident. Therefore, decision-making power was 
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delegated to expert staff members at a particular level in the response. This 
progression was explained by the following management level participant.   
 
“If you’re looking airside, they’re the first person on the spot, so they’re trained to 
be a responsible person until such time until they’re relieved. So they would make 
certain decisions that they would need to make up with the first couple of minutes to 
ensure the safety of life I guess, is the primary one.” M-APT-A-01 
 
Any incident at Airport A consisted of a layered response. The first layer consisted 
of the immediate on-the-ground response to manage the incident. The middle 
response layer dealt with running the business while the incident was occurring and 
supporting the first response layer. Finally, the top response layer was concerned 
with working to recover the business to normal functionality. At these differing 
levels of response, different objectives existed. Therefore, at the response level, a 
safety officer was given decision-making power as they are expert. Once an event is 
escalated, those individuals at a higher level begin to have the decision-making 
power in regard to business recovery. This is explained by the following senior 
management participant.  
 
“So you’ve got the forward command post stuff dealing with the immediate response, 
you’ve got another level that’s looking after the business and you’ve got another 
level that’s looking after recovery processes so what happens in the next week or the 
next few days or next few hours, what’s happening next.” SM-APT-A-01 
 
It is important to remember that airports are not solely faced with operations-based 
incidents. While there was an established and practiced response procedure in 
regards to aviation incidents, this does not exist for other kinds of corporate 
emergencies. La Porte and Consolini (1998) discuss specific modes of response, 
ranging from normal operations, high tempo and emergency response. Airport A did 
not have structured modes of operation as observed in La Porte and Consolini’s 
(1998) study. At Airport A, a number of different streams to response modes were 
observed. During a minor incident, or in some cases a major non-operational incident, 
operating structure remained relatively similar to normal operations. In these 
instances the organisation followed standard protocol, and normal operations could 
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usually continue in some form. There may be minimal reassigning of staff to ensure 
a situation was dealt with. This was drastically different in the case of a major 
aviation incident, when operating procedure shifted to deal with the incident only, 
with all normal operations being suspended. The following senior management 
participant explains this in more detail.  
 
“The structural stuff kind of stays the same, we try and separate the business as 
usual from response to the crisis and that in fact may mean designating somebody to 
look after the business as usual and designating somebody else to look after the 
crisis. So the teams may actually split up slightly differently depending on what it is 
that we’re dealing with. If it’s a bang, crash, burn then quite frankly the terminal 
must cease to operate because we have to use this facility.” SM-APT-A-01 
 
Airport A demonstrated a certain level of decision decentralisation, however this 
ended when the incident escalated. Response was heavily based around operations, 
and did not have the same maturity to respond to corporate emergencies. In terms of 
changing modes of operations, at Airport A this was determinate of the type of 
incident occurring. For lower-scale incidents, normal operations could continue. For 
larger incidents, normal operations become suspended and the airport changes their 
operating procedure considerably.  
 
5.6.2 Airport B 
 
Before discussing decision-making processes at Airport B, the event management 
and escalation process should be discussed.  This can be most easily examined  in the 
context of an airside incident. When an incident first occurs, an airside operations 
officer responds, and from their perspective determines if additional assistance is 
required and if the incident should be escalated, as explained by the following 
manager.  
 
“That’s handled on the spot by the officer, if he needs backup, he’ll call the control 
room, if he needs advice he’ll call the control room, and again, as I say, if he needs 
back up, he’ll call one of the other cars to lend a hand, that could be oil spills, fuel 
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spills, it could be a traffic accident, air side, it could be damage to an aircraft, all 
sorts of things.” M-APT-B-01 
 
There was a significant amount of trust invested in the judgement of certain 
individuals as to their ability to determine the severity level of incidents. Once this 
had been escalated and a full incident was formed, a three-tier system was formed to 
deal with the incident (a full incident being a full emergency, when the crisis 
management team is formed). Further, individuals that are subject matter experts are 
not given overall power in the decision-making process. They serve more as an 
information source, with decision-making power usually sitting in the hands of 
higher-level management individuals. The following two participants detail this 
situation.  
 
“The subject matter expert might be looking very narrowly at his issue, whereas that 
issue might impact on other things which he may not be aware of. So that’s why a 
person who is a delegate level can make a decision looking at the whole picture 
rather than specifically just a narrow focus.” SM-APT-B-01 
 
“Usually the expert in the area is the one that would be called in to deal with it, but 
we put in a lot of training, because, you know, incidents can be anything, so you 
don’t need to know about chemicals for instance.” SM-APT-B-02 
 
 
This approach provided two key indications of decision-making processes in Airport 
B. The first of these was that the hierarchical process was still intact during crises, 
that decisions can be made at a particular level but permission was required once 
they affect anything outside their area of control and expertise. Therefore, subject 
matter experts provided informed opinion with management maintaining a large 
amount of decision-making control. The second indication this analysis provided was 
that staff members have an awareness of their particular area, but were limited on 
their views of how the system operated a whole. Therefore in this instance it was 
difficult to achieve operator-based decision making, as they did not have enough 
broad knowledge to make instantaneous and informed decisions, and the wider 
organisation did not support this and the hierarchical command structure remained in 
place.  
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5.6.3 Airport C  
Airport C reported different modes of operation, dependent on whether the business 
was operating in business as usual function, or had organisation moved into a crisis 
modality. This meant that staff, particularly those within operations, were principally 
concerned with the management of the immediate incident, rather than their usual 
duties involving the safe and secure movement of aircraft and passengers (these 
changes in operating procedure can have a direct impact on many frontline staff, 
however some areas of the organisation were unaffected by these changes).  The 
following participant outlined the change to emergency procedures.  
 
“Once the airport emergency plan is activated, then we bring in whatever staff we 
have, and then our role then besides the first guy who’s on the forward command 
post the rest of us are to access of facilitate the access of emergency services.” S-
APT-C-02 
 
Although the airport changed operating procedure, this was something that was well 
rehearsed and practiced to the point where initiation and adjustment to new operating 
procedure occurred relatively seamlessly. This indicates that most staff, especially 
those on the frontline, had a good understanding of when to initiate emergency 
procedures and how this had to occur. This transition was discussed by the following 
participant.  
 
“I mean here’s an example where business as usual, then all of a sudden that bomb 
incident in the last couple of weeks. That’s not something I’ve spend really any time 
thinking about to be honest. It just happens, automatically we switch into that 
process almost. It really depends on who’s on site at the time when the event 
happens.” SM-APT-C-01 
 
Another component of emergency response that must be considered is the nature of 
emergency response protocols. These consisted of a range of Standard Operating 
Procedures (SOPs) that were detailed for a number of credible scenarios that could 
occur at the airport, including aircraft crash, bomb threat and chemical spill to name 
a few. SOPs formed the backbone of operational practice at the airport. The outcome 
of this was that while the airport may be experiencing and responding to an unusual 
 141 
situation they simply switch from one SOP to another. This resulted in a changing of 
operating practice, through the use of different SOP. This was explained by the 
following participant.  
 
“We have a range of SOPs, um, so when we move into business-abnormal, and, you 
know, the bag in the terminal is a business abnormal activity, where we have a 
suspected bomb, we have a very detailed SOP on how to follow it and all of our 
security reports say, performed in accordance with the SOP, in a lot of those cases.” 
SM-APT-C-01 
 
Airport C, in the same manner as airports A and B, allowed experts to make 
decisions until the incident was escalated. Further, Airport C had a large amount of 
SOPs in place, which demonstrated a change in operating mode during a crisis.   
5.6.4 Flexible Decision Making Process Cross-Case Analysis 
 
Table 5.6.4 
Flexible Decision Making Process Cross-Case Analysis 
Literature Trait 
 
Observed Traits Airport 
A B C 
Allocation of decision-making 
power to subject experts 
Initial response to staff and incident 
escalated to management as incident 
escalates 
 
   
Operating procedure changes 
during an incident 
Different levels of operational change 
due to nature of incident 
   
Changes in operating procedure for 
operations area only  
   
 Direct representation 
 Indirect representation 
 
All three airports demonstrated a certain level of delegation of decision-making 
during an incident. Airport A, B and C allowed operational level staff to make initial 
response to the incident. However, once the incident increased and became 
significant, a management structure was imposed and initial responders are given 
instruction and boundaries in which to operate. While they were still involved with 
the incident, overall decision-making power is allocated to an individual in the 
management area. Therefore, this was consistent with literature theorised traits in 
that the decision-making power is given to lower-level operators to respond initially 
to prevent failure from spreading throughout the system (Rijpma 1997, 17). However, 
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this differed from the direct literature suggested trait in that total decision-making 
power was not granted to the staff level individual, they simply played a critical 
component in the initial response. The consistency in this response may be 
attributable to regulatory response requirements, which were the same for all airports 
investigated. AEP requirements may have directly informed the structure of 
emergency response, and this may be a plausible explanation as to the consistent 
observation regarding incident response.  
 
A change in operating procedure is a common observation among HROs. In fact, 
LaPorte and Consolini (1991, 32) identify three separate modes of operation among 
HROs, being routine mode, high-tempo mode and emergency response mode. 
Changes in operating modes were observed within the three airports studied, 
principally though the use of different SOP. Airport A noted that this shift to 
operating procedure only occurred during serious incidents, such as a full scale 
emergency which significantly impedes the normal functionality of the airport. It is 
only in these full-scale emergency situations where normal operations is significantly 
altered through new SOP. Otherwise, when dealing with incidents of a lower severity, 
operational areas dealt with these incidents without a significant change in operating 
mode. Airport C noted similar occurrences, however during a full-scale incident, 
only operational areas of the organisation changed their mode. Non-operational areas 
of the organisation continued operating as normal during these crisis incidents.  
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5.7 Trait 6: Continual Search for System Improvement and Training for 
Worst-case Scenarios 
 
HROs regularly conduct testing and training in order to prepare for worst-case 
scenarios. The impact of failure of an HRO is so severe, testing and training is 
conducted regularly conducted in order to learn from potential failures and create a 
more reliable system. As a further component, HROs are identified as having 
incident learning systems and a good ability to have effective review cycles, to 
identify any learnings that occur following a actual incident. During this section, the 
following items are investigated: 
• Does the organisation conduct testing based around a worst-case scenario 
• Nature of review cycles for SOPs and response procedures 
5.7.1 Airport A  
HROs regularly use worst-case scenarios as a basis for testing their staff and 
operational systems (Weick 1987, 113; La Porte 1996, 64). Airport A conducted 
testing which focuses on worst-case scenarios, in the form of mandatory testing of 
their airport emergency plan (AEP). The following participant explained the kinds of 
incidents regularly tested within airport emergency plan exercising.  
 
“Our yearly field exercises tend to deal with worst case scenario which is you know 
the biochemical attack on the terminal, a hostage situation, the RPT aircraft you 
know the Jetstar or the Virgin or the Tiger crashing into the ocean and we tend to 
focus on our field exercises and tabletop exercises through to the airport emergency 
committee, we focus on those.” S-APT-A-01 
 
While some level of worst-case scenario testing existed within AEP exercising, this 
was the only area in which the organisation used the worst-case scenario for training 
purposes. The majority of training (particularly in the operations area) was based 
around preparing staff for the more usual occurrences that they will encounter most 
often when at work. This was conducted to ensure that training had the most impact 
and would prepare staff to handle the most commonly occurring incidents rather than 
scenarios with a low likelihood of occurring. While this training focus prepared staff 
for commonly occurring incidents, it did not increase preparedness for large scale 
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emergencies. The training protocol is explained further by the following staff level 
participant.  
 
“With the day to day training with our guys, we try and deal with the stuff that is 
more likely to happen you know an aircraft going off a taxiway, an aircraft 
undercarriage failure and it’s skewed off the runway…I think that type of training 
for the guys in the day to day is a lot more beneficial then if we were to run through 
twenty scenarios a year of biochemical attack on the airport or you know an aircraft 
ditching into the ocean.” S-APT-A-01 
 
However, a number of drivers existed for training to be most closely focused on 
more realistic scenarios. Especially in regards to required emergency testing, there 
were a large number of groups involved with the exercise, which made coordination 
another challenge. The number of additional staff and resources further compounded 
the requirement for testing to be as effective as possible. Therefore, when the airport 
had the opportunity to conduct a full-field exercise, a realistic scenario was 
constructed in order for training to be most effective for staff. This is explained by 
the following participant.  
 
 “A likely and we do, once a year we have our airport emergency plan, now that 
could be an aircraft crash, that could be a fire in the terminal, that could be a 
security incident. In fact I think last year was a security incident. But we’re more 
likely to pick a scenario that is a realistic scenario because given the resources that 
are involved and the amount of time these things take to plan, you don’t want 
something fanciful.” SM-APT-A-01 
 
“But yeah so when we do these toolbox talks and we go and do training, we’ll take 
the SOPs or the procedure with us and we’ll edit or audit that along with the process 
of training.” S-APT-A-01 
 
Airport A demonstrated worst-case scenario training in AEP based testing. However, 
this was the only instance of worst-case scenario testing observed. The majority of 
training was focused on the more predictable incidents, and preparing staff to 
respond in the manner the SOP dictates.  
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5.7.2 Airport B  A number of testing and training practices were present at Airport B. These consisted 
of both practical exercising, and information providing and desktop-based scenarios. 
The following participant explained the two types of training in place.  
 
“There’s two types of training first of all. There’s the exercising which is based on 
the practical aspects, and there’s the information type, so where we sit down, we 
discuss a process for a procedure and making sure that everyone understands it. 
And then we’ll do the practical aspects in relation to that procedure at some stage.” 
M-APT-B-02 
 
Within this training, the worst-case scenario was regularly practiced. However, the 
frequency of this training was not high, as there were insufficient resources to design 
and conduct a more comprehensive training package. The following management 
level participant exemplifies this viewpoint.   
“We conduct regular training and we always practice worst case scenario, if that 
makes sense. And again, that training’s fairly limited because its limited to our 
resource, myself, being able to run that training.” M-APT-B-02 
 
Airport B had a formalised training and incident review system. This contained a 
number of steps. The first step occurs immediately following the incident, which was 
a hot-wash up, with the purpose of simply retaining all the information from the 
event. Following this a formal debrief occurred, which included a detailed analysis of 
the response to the incident, with particular emphasis on challenges and weaknesses 
of the utilised approach. Formal debriefs resulted in a report of the response being 
produced. This report contains both lessons identified and recommendations, with a 
recommendation being a required change to policy and procedure. The report is then 
vetted by the Compliance and Risk Management Committee, before 
recommendations are actioned.  
 
While practices regarding incident related training and testing were well established, 
this was another area where there was a significant difference between operations 
practice and the rest of the organisation. This observation can be linked to the lack of 
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testing or training of BCPs currently at Airport B, as discussed in more detail in 
Section 6.8.2. Scenario-related testing and training was much less prevalent in the 
corporate area, as demonstrated by the following manager and staff member.  
 
“I know there’s a lot of feedback that goes on and they go back and adjust 
procedures and things. But what doesn’t happen as yet and what needs to happen is 
that there’s a review of those business continuity plans for those assets and feed that 
back in and there’s a disconnect there. So we sort of update operational SOPs, but 
not a lot of time goes into the actual business continuity plans for those assets.” M-
APT-B-03 
 
“Well I know that the emergency manager does his emergency exercise, but it 
involves the frontline staff, so the people at the terminals and those kinds of people, 
often the corporate office wouldn’t even know what’s going on. So there’s nothing, 
in terms of the worst-case scenario, that would affect everybody, and so we don’t 
really do anything that effects, you know, where everybody has to be involved in the 
exercise. So I would say no training.” S-APT-B-01 
 
This identified disparity between operational and other staff presented a weakness in 
the organisation’s approach to incidents and crises. Whilst there may have been 
significant understanding existing in the operational area, with effective training and 
review cycles, the organisation faced a wider range of crises than simply the 
operations area. The relative maturity of crisis understanding in the operational area 
was particularly prevalent when considering the vast causes and sources of corporate 
crises (See Chapter 2, Section 2.3.1). Further, as identified earlier in this chapter, 
there were a number of key processes which were vital to the overall functionality of 
the organisation (including operational requirements), that still existed outside the 
operations function (see Trait 2: Sustained High Technical Performance). 
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5.7.3 Airport C  
Airport C demonstrated a level of scenario-based testing and training, predominantly 
in the area of AEP exercising. As observed in Airport A, the AEP was the only major 
test conducted from a worst-case scenario standpoint, as explained by the following 
senior management participant.  
 
“Really from a major catastrophe point of view, or a major operational program, 
the AEP exercise is probably our only major test of all those activities at once.” SM-
APT-C-01 
 
The organisation also used the exercise as an opportunity to train the newer and less-
experienced staff members in emergency response protocols. This usually involved 
appointing one of the newer safety officers to control the incident from a forward 
command perspective. By positioning these newer staff members in roles of 
responsibility they are exposed to a level of decision-making that will not usually be 
present in business as usual operations. The result of this was that training was more 
effectively utilised to raise the competency of all staff members to be able to respond 
during a crisis event. This was explained by the following manager.  
 
“And deliberately put – actually on the day we’ll appoint a safety officer on, using 
my greenest and newest safety officer for that, so he actually gets to learn from it. 
Not like that, but um, giving a situation and an awareness, I don’t think on a day-to-
day basis, much smaller issues he’ll probably feel more comfortable in dealing with.” 
M-APT-C-03 
 
In addition to the scenario-based testing that occurs at Airport C, there were three 
different ways in which response protocols are tested to ensure they were appropriate. 
The first of these was the post-incident review following any incident. This allows 
the organisation to both review the effectiveness of the response and adjust protocol 
if necessary. Secondly, during the induction process all employees are informed of 
the incident management process. This provides for another review of response 
procedure. Finally, all SOPs and crisis management documentation were reviewed 
and audited on a regular basis to ensure that there was not discrepancy between the 
detail contained in the plans and organisational reality. This was in contrast to BCM 
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related documents and processes, which do not currently receive the same level of 
scrutiny. In fact, when the BCP was reviewed it did not contain the full detail of the 
current functions of the organisation. This presented a significant gap in the airport’s 
overall preparedness. The following participant explained the review cycle in more 
detail.  
 
“There’s probably three different streams to it. One is we have the incidents, 
whether minor or major, that we test out our processes against. The second is our 
induction processes allowed us to review what we believe is the norm. And the third 
is that our SOPs as well as our major policy documents to do with crisis 
management are audited on a regular basis.” SM-APT-C-01 
 
In order to more fully appreciate the role of post-incident review, it should be 
examined more closely. While these protocols were developed following aviation 
incidents, they had been applied to other kinds of incidents that occur at the airport. 
Following any incident, a debrief was conducted in order to capture the response. 
The outcomes of the debrief usually included a list of recommendations as to how 
response can be conducted. These recommendations were then implemented into the 
process, allowing for a learning cycle to occur. This learning cycle allowed for 
response procedures to remain accurate and reflect best possible practice. This was 
further explained by the following participant.   
 
“The same with when we had our first serious power outage. We changed the 
documentation, highlighted the issues. Probably not disciplined, in some areas 
we’re very disciplined, like in the aeronautical activity, probably not as much in 
other areas as we would be, but I think we’re improving at it. So we have a bit of a 
talk about it, when we’ve done a major activity and worked out how we can do it 
better next time, and then we implement that into our standard procedures.” M-
APT-C-01 
 
“So I think you really have to look at the worst case scenario and then see what you 
have available and then depending on information that’s coming in, then you’re able 
to engage if you can scale it back or maintain that level, depending on the incident.” 
S-APT-C-01 
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5.7.4 Continual Search for System Improvement Cross-Case Analysis 
 
Table 5.7.4 
Continual Search for System Improvement Cross-Case Analysis 
Literature Trait 
 
Observed Traits Airport 
A B C 
Worst-case scenario testing and 
training 
 
Airport Emergency Planning testing 
 
   
Regular review of SOPs and 
response procedures 
Formalised training and incident 
response system 
   
Other Observed Traits 
Training based around most regular occurrences    
Worst-case scenario testing limited to operations    
Incident based testing and training utilised within operations but not in other 
components of the organisation 
   
Direct representation 
 Indirect representation 
 
Worst-case scenario testing occurred in each of the three airports, identified as AEP 
testing. This form of full exercise testing and training simulation was the closest to a 
full worst-case scenario exercise that the organisation employs. As detailed in 
Section 2.7 (CASA MOS139) outlined the compliance requirements of emergency 
testing for Australian airports. These compliance obligations dictated the content of 
testing and training and its frequency. Outside the mandated AEP testing and training, 
none of the airports demonstrated any other worst-case scenario testing. This 
indicates that worst-case testing was siloed within the operational area and not 
extended to other components of the airport. Further, none of the airports had 
conducted a full scenario-based test of their business continuity plan (see Section 
6.8). This was one means that could be utilised in order to conduct worst-case 
scenario testing within wider functions of the organisation than operations.  
 
A number of other traits in regards to Trait 6 were observed in the three case study 
airports. Airport A directed their operational training towards the most commonly 
occurring scenarios. This was conducted in order to train staff to have a good 
response to the incidents that they are most likely to encounter on a day-to-day basis, 
rather than the less frequently occurring worst-case scenario type events. This 
approach had both advantages and disadvantages.  The advantage of this approach 
was that staff are well trained in the most common circumstances, meaning that in 
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most cases response will be practiced and effective, leading to a positive outcome. 
However, worst-case scenario testing is not merely about training staff to be 
prepared for such events. It has the added benefit of testing the adequacy of response 
when resources are stretched in unusual situations. Further, it has the ability to 
identify system weaknesses and therefore initiate plans to rectify these. By 
implementing BCM full scale exercising, the airports can increase worst-case 
scenario testing to other components of the organisation and therefore increase the 
search for system weaknesses.  
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5.8 Trait 7: Reliability not Marginalisable, not Fungible (Cannot be Traded 
off)  
HROs not only place reliability as a priority (as discussed in Trait 1), in these 
organisations reliability cannot be traded off. As a result, there is a strong internal 
prioritising of reliability within staff and management. In conjunction with the 
internal prioritising, a strong understanding of the consequences of not maintaining 
reliability is present. Within this section, the following indicators are investigated: 
• Reliability as the top priority 
• Understanding of consequences from not maintaining reliability 
5.8.1 Airport A  
Within HROs reliability is viewed as a principle which cannot be traded off for 
anything else. While reliability was a key focus, Airport A also had a focus on the 
safety and security of airport operations. Safety and security set the tone of 
operations, and were key considerations before any task was undertaken. It can be 
argued that much of this influence was due to the regulation of safety and security 
practices in Australian aviation, as discussed in Section 2.7.  The following 
participant discussed how a safe and secure airport can assist in achieving reliability. 
 
“I think they prioritise safety over everything else. That’s the critical thing and if 
you’ve got safety right, usually you’ll find that you’re reliability comes into play as 
well, certainly on an operational front. I have to say that safety in the aviation game 
is a key driver.” M-APT-A-02 
 
Further, it was observed that at Airport A reliability was not discussed as a singular 
concept. Reliability was discussed as a result, or a component of other airport 
practices. It was an understanding that views reliability as a result of safe and secure 
practices around the airport. Therefore, safety and security became a focus as the 
outcome is seen as reliable operations. This is explained by the following participant.  
 
“I think the focus is on safety but reliability just stems off that as well, reliability 
equals safety, safety equals reliability cause both of them lead to safety essentially. 
So it means that you’ve got a business or within the airport you’ve got a facility that 
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works, is safe to use and is safe to use at all times. So they both sort of need the same 
thing.” M-APT-A-01 
 
In addition to the discussion of safety, security and reliability, staff understood the 
consequences of an airport not operating on the business as a whole. The first 
component of this is based around the impacts to the business itself, as outlined by 
the following participant.  
 
“That would be fatal to the airport as a business because if the airlines can’t be 
guaranteed that we’re available, they will put their plane somewhere else. They’re 
not going to hold a schedule that they can’t fly.” M-APT-A-02 
 
Not only did lack of reliable airport operations have the potential to impact on the 
ability of the airport to operate as a successful business, there was also the potential 
for a severe impact on the reputation of the Airport. A lack of reliable service 
impacted on the reputation of the airport, as there was a negative impact on customer 
service to airlines. Therefore, redundancy was built into the system to ensure that 
operations are continued and reputation not damaged. 
 
“In terms of the effect on the business is lack of or loss of reputation, is very 
important to us. The impact on customers and customer service, once again that 
flows onto reputation. And the ability to do our job, if we don’t build in 
redundancies, we don’t build into everyday business stuff breaks.” SM-APT-A-01 
 
Further to the impact of reliability on the business itself, a lack of reliability can have 
vast impacts on the surrounding region. As Airport A was within a regional area, the 
airport was a major driver and facilitator of the local economy. As outlined by 
Hakfoort, Poot and Rietveld (2001, 596), when considering regional environments, 
airports are both transport nodes and economic stimulators. Therefore, reliable 
operations are important, not only for the business but the wider economic area.  
 
“Yeah absolutely, the airport’s a major economic driver of the region with regards 
to the business that it brings, the businesses that operate at the airports. So from that 
perspective you see definite issues with the local economy if the airport isn’t 
operating reliably because people lose confidence in it, they drive to Brisbane so it 
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means less business here, less business opportunities, less dollars being spent in the 
local economy.” M-APT-A-01 
 
Literature suggests that HROs also prioritise reliability above other internal goals. 
Within Airport A, reliability was not identified as the overarching construct by which 
the airport operates. This was due to a number of factors, particularly the commercial 
nature of contemporary airport operations, with the ability to operate with a profit 
being the most paramount. Therefore, reliability was again viewed as a means by 
which to achieve a profitable operation, not the overarching goal of the organisation. 
The following management participant further exemplifies this attitude.  
 
“No, I wouldn’t say that that’s a conscious thing, I don’t know any business that 
does, most of them prioritise being able to make a dollar because if you can’t be 
profitable you generally don’t have a business. I think reliability just segues into 
that.” M-APT-A-01 
 
While reliability was not the overarching priority for the organisation, the need for a 
reliable operation was still fundamentally understood by members of the organisation. 
There were particular areas that were a focus of reliable operations, principally the 
key assets of the organisation that make the airport unique. The following participant 
discussed the role of reliability of the runway to airport operations.  
 
“So you know you need to have that reliability built in and needs to be a priority, if 
an airport doesn’t exist without it’s runway then you’ve got to have that reliability of 
keeping that runway open and its aircraft safe. So everyone’s very aware of that 
otherwise you’ve got a car park and a shopping mall.” S-APT-A-01 
 
Reliability was noted as an important organisational goal at Airport A, however 
safety and security were regarded amongst most organisational members as the most 
important organisational goals. The impacts of un-reliability were also understood by 
the organisation, with reliability also being viewed as the result of a number of other 
processes employed at the organisation, such as safe and secure operational practices.  
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5.8.2 Airport B  
In addition to setting reliability as priority in the organisation’s mission and goals, 
reliability is viewed as not marginalisable, and cannot be traded off (LaPorte 1996, 
64). Airport B, viewed reliability as an important principle; however there were 
certain priorities that supersede reliability. The first of these was the issue of 
profitability. However, as demonstrated by the following senior manager, ensuring 
reliable operations can go hand in hand with good returns for shareholders.  
 
“Because the number one thing for us is to make money. So it’s shareholder value, 
so reliability goes hand in hand with that, so yeah absolutely, it’s prioritised 
because if we don’t have that, we can’t deliver value to the shareholder.” SM-APT-
B-02 
 
While reliability may not be placed as the highest priority within the organisation, it 
was still viewed as an important one. There was an understanding within both the 
operational and corporate areas of the organisation of the importance of a reliable 
operation. The following participant explained that while there is an understanding of 
the need of staff to do their jobs effectively, the push for profits supersedes the 
priority of reliability.  
 
“I think certainly, it’s certainly essential everybody knows, you know, if we, if we 
don’t do our jobs properly then, you know, the airport as a whole is you know, going 
to suffer, but I’ll be cynical and say I think money is usually the priority.” S-APT-B-
01 
 
In addition to the internal prioritising of reliability within Airport B, safety was 
further demonstrated as a critical organisational priority. Safety in many instances 
was the overriding priority. This was particularly evident in operations areas, where a 
number of activities carry a higher degree of risk as they are around sensitive areas 
such as aircraft and high voltage electricity.  
 
 “Safety is number one, safety’s absolutely number one. No doubt, I think if you ask 
anyone in the business, even the accountants they’ll tell you safety – I hope they’ll 
tell you that, but I know if you ask anyone in operations, they’ll tell you that safety is 
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number one, and that’s above security, security and safety morph, to be honest, you 
can use them interchangeably, um, yes, there are specific security type things and 
specific safety type things, but they’re the same.” SM-APT-B-02 
 
“I mean reliability from a commercial perspective is important, but then so is 
reliability from an operational perspective, but the two shall never – the two don’t 
compete, because it depends on what becomes more important, so resourcing. If 
you’re a revenue raising or part of the business resources aren’t an issue, but if 
you’re an operational or non-revenue, you’re a spender, then you struggle. Hence 
the reason why we struggle to get resources, but everything eventually impacts on 
our, on the operational side of the fence, at some stage whether it’s putting a 
building up, whether it’s a tenant going into that building, it still impacts on the 
operation side.” M-APT-B-02 
 
The notion of resilience was one that featured from numerous participants. This 
focused predominantly on the nature of resilience-related activities within the 
organisation. Participants explained that the organisation must maintain some level 
of resilience in order to maintain a reliable operation for other stakeholders. The 
following participant outlines the difference in approaches to resilience and 
reliability from the previous practice of heavy person-power, to a focus on ensuring 
continued operations of the critical systems that are most heavily linked to the 
financial performance of the business.  
 
“I mean financially the world is a different place than it was ten years ago, okay, 
and that’s why I believe we need to be creative about how we find solutions to 
maintain our resilience. I think the whole, you know, throw lots of people at it type – 
I think those days are dead and gone, you’ll never have that again. And that’s why I 
believe that doing this exercise and relating it back to the financial performance of 
the business is where we need to be.” M-APT-B-03 
 
In addition to discussions of resilience, the nature of resilience-related failure was a 
key topic. This strongly linked back to the idea that regular maintenance and upkeep 
of critical systems and infrastructure was key to ensuring reliability. Without proper 
maintenance these assets will decay and then slowly lead to failure. This links 
strongly with notions of Disaster Incubation Theory (see Section 2.2.2), where 
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disasters can propagate within systems and some of the key causes of an event may 
originate several years prior to it occurring (Turner 1994, 216; Pidgeon 1997, 2). The 
following participant discusses the role of maintenance and resilience.  
 
“You’re not going to get a sudden catastrophic failure, so it’ll be a slow decay in the 
ability to deliver the outcomes. So because there’s a certain amount of resilience 
been built in to the performance of every asset that we have, but if you fail to 
maintain then the outputs are just going to decay over time.” M-APT-B-03 
 
Priority of reliability was observed at Airport B. However, reliability did compete 
with other organisational priorities, including profitability and safety. Resilience was 
also a key theme of discussion, with many of the organisation’s activities 
contributing to the overall notion of providing a continuous and reliable operation. 
5.8.3 Airport C 
 
Reliability was an important component of operations at Airport C. The theme of 
reliability from a safety and security perspective was present. This attitude was 
present at both the management and staff level.  
 
“I guess from a safety and security sense it is paramount for us, the reliability of the 
safety and security, it is very, very, front of mind. In the facilities, like the 
infrastructure that we provide aeronautical outcomes with, it is also front of mind, 
you know, it is a very high priority, it is the maintenance of those facilities.” SM-
APT-C-01 
 
In regards to the prioritising of reliability above all other outcomes, reliability was 
not prioritised highest of all objectives. Reliability was one of the top priorities of the 
organisation, shared with safety and security. Safety, security and reliability form the 
most important components of any decision making at the management level. These 
considerations feature in decision making, often above financial or other concerns, as 
explained by the following management level participant.  
 
“Its up there with safety and security and consequently we have quite a few 
discussions around when we are going to do something or when we are going to 
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embark on doing something at the management level about all of those topics.” M-
APT-C-01 
 
The importance of safety and security in planning was also understood at the staff 
level. This was evident as management have made explicit efforts to communicate to 
staff the importance of safety and security at the airport to staff members. This was 
explained by the following staff member.  
 
“I have been made very aware of the importance of safety and security at the airport 
and they understand it’s one of their main assets, just how important maintaining the 
integrity of leadership planning and the security aspect is very much a culture of the 
airport.” S-APT-C-01 
 
A further component following from the discussion of safety and security was the 
commercial and reputational impacts of the lack of reliability on the airport. If the 
airport could not maintain a reliable operation, there were severe impacts on the 
reputation of the organisation. Further, this can have an impact on the attractiveness 
of the airport as a destination for airlines, therefore affecting the commercial success 
of the organisation, as explained by the following staff member, and reiterated by a 
member of senior management.  
 
“I think if we’re not reliable we’re not safe, we’re not effective, we’re not efficient. 
And you lose. I think we lose credibility as well, so credibility is very important in 
the aviation industry. If we’re not credible, yeah, go somewhere else.” S-APT-C-01 
 
“I guess our reputation is one, which leads to loss of confidence in our business as 
well.” SM-APT-C-01 
 
The following participant further outlined the impact that a lack of reliability would 
have on an airport. A failure to provide a continuous and reliable operation not only 
impacted on the reputation of the airport, but can indicate a lack of serviceability.  
 
“If we’re forever closing the runways down because of continued power failures or 
anything like that or, you know, we can’t maintain our runway lighting system then 
 158
the airlines will see that we’re unreliable, and possibly unsafe and they won’t take 
their aircraft in here if they’re unsafe due to unreliability.” S-APT-C-01 
 
“Business as normal is a hell of a lot cheaper than business abnormal, mainly in the 
recovery phase. And depending on how long it’s been out of service for, obviously it 
almost goes exponentially from there if you’ve got an airline that’s missed two 
flights versus five flights.” SM-APT-C-01 
 
Safety and security were prioritised above reliability in Airport C, although 
reliability remained an important consideration. Further, impacts of a lack of 
reliability was understood by staff, in terms of reputation and impacts on the broader 
region.    
5.8.4 Reliability not Marginalisable Cross-Case Analysis 
 
Table 5.8.4 
Reliability not Marginalisable Cross-Case Analysis 
Literature Trait 
 
Observed Traits Airport 
A B C 
Reliability as the top priority Safety and security priority 
 
   
Profitability priority    
Understanding of the consequences 
of not maintaining reliability 
Commercial imperatives    
Impact on the region    
Reputational impact    
 Direct representation 
 Indirect representation 
 
In all three airports reliability was not named as the overarching priority, it was 
identified as one of the upper priorities. Two other themes were consistently 
mentioned when discussing organisational priorities, being safety and security. 
Safety and security were promoted above reliability as the overarching drivers of the 
airports. Airport A used safety and security to set the tone of operations, and these 
were key considerations before any task is undertaken. Further, Airport A viewed 
reliability as the result, or outcome of functioning security and safety practices, 
identifying a relationship between these items. Airport B also identified safety and 
security as the most critical factors to consider other than reliability. This sentiment 
was further endorsed at Airport C. While reliability may not be the driving factor, it 
was still in an upper mindset of all three airports. Safety and security were 
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overarching organisational priorities, which could be a result of the two regulatory 
forces of CASA and OTS.  
 
Each of the three airports demonstrated a means of understanding the consequences 
of not maintaining a reliable operation, albeit in a unique manner. Airport A and 
Airport C noted the commercial imperatives of maintaining a reliable operation, as 
without reliability airlines will not continue their routes at that particular port. The 
result of this can be an operation that is difficult to maintain from a commercial 
standpoint. Airport A further identified an impact on the surrounding region as a key 
contributor to maintaining reliability. As Airport A was in a regional area and 
therefore, the airport provided not only a key transport node but a regional economic 
driver. Airport C noted reputation as a factor in providing a continuous operation. 
The impact of intermittent operation can damage the reputation of the reliability of 
the airport, which can impact on the number of airlines and flights that are 
committed to that port. Airport B discussed reliability both in terms of importance in 
regards to safety and security, however explicitly identified profitability as a driving 
goal of the organisation which often took precedence over other goals.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 160
5.9 Trait 8: Organisational Culture of Reliability  
An organisational culture of reliability aims to achieve centralisation and 
decentralisation of decision making simultaneously (Weick 1987, 214). 
Decentralisation is critical as operators require the ability to act in response to failure 
in an efficient manner to avoid the failure spreading throughout the system (Rijpma 
1997, 17). Centralisation is achieved as an organisational culture of reliability 
provides a higher-level collective knowledge (or mind) that can guide the decision-
making of individuals when they are under pressure (Bierly and Spender 1995, 643).  
Within trait 8, the investigated items are: 
• Staff understanding and prioritising of reliable operations 
• Situational awareness of staff, i.e. a tacit understanding of when operations 
change from business as usual to business not as usual 
• Attitude towards adherence to safety and standard operating procedures 
 
5.9.1 Airport A  
Airport A staff members had an understanding of the need of maintaining a reliable 
operation. While this was often not at the forefront of their minds reliability was still 
an important part of the mindset of the organisation. This was explained by the 
following senior manager.  
 
 “I think they do, I don’t think they actually think about it in those terms though…I 
think it’s part of the cultural part of the nature of the organisation.” SM-APT-A-01 
 
This organisation had a relatively small staff base. Therefore, staff were often 
required to fill in and complete roles that may be outside their primary responsibility 
in order to deal with a situation. Airport A gained a culture of reliability through the 
propensity of their staff to work as a team to achieve a goal. The following 
participant explained how the team works to deal with situations and therefore ensure 
reliability.  
 
“There’s really that culture of you know basically pitching in and getting things 
done. There’s a pretty good bunch of people in terms of that they can see something 
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that needs doing, see that other people need help on something and they’ll pitch in, 
generally they’re pretty good.” M-APT-A-02 
 
Another aspect of an organisational culture of reliability is the presence of situational 
awareness and knowledge of when situations begin to deviate from normal 
operations. This was most significantly demonstrated during a recent incident with a 
light aircraft upon landing. This incident occurred during a time of high traffic at the 
airport, with a number of large passenger jets on approach. Staff had a good 
understanding of what the current situation was, with the impending arriving of busy 
traffic and the need to quickly clear the situation to avoid further delays. This was 
particularly important as one of the airlines had recently commenced international 
services to the port, and ensuring a reliable operation was key to the continued 
commitment of the airline to Airport A. The following management level participant 
explains the event.  
 
“When we had a plane run off the runway when Air New Zealand was due to fly in 
an hour and a half later, the second time it was due to fly in and everyone was very 
much focused on recovering that aircraft and getting that out of the flight strip so 
that we could maintain our operations in regards to our new client.” M-APT-A-01 
 
An organisational culture of reliability was observed in a number of ways at Airport 
A. Staff often thought about the need to ensure continued operations, and this was 
often achieved through the flexibility of small teams. Operations staff in particular 
had an awareness of when operations changes from normal to abnormal, as observed 
by a particular airfield incident.  
5.9.2 Airport B 
 
An organisational culture of reliability was observed to be present within Airport B. 
Staff had an agreed approach that ensuring reliability of operations was something 
that was often considered during day-to-day activities. As with a number of the 
reliability traits discussed in this chapter, this approach was particularly strong within 
the area of operations, as explained by the following two participants. 
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“I’d say that people do work in that operation phase, whether it be work health and 
safety or operations, security, yeah, are very much focused on terminals, very much 
focused on maintaining a serviceable airport and something for our customers to 
use.” S-APT-B-02 
 
“I know in operations we talk about it weekly, we have a Monday meeting where we 
talk about all those sorts of issues on an ongoing basis, we have a monthly safety 
and compliance type discussion where we’re talking about, how is everything going, 
are we meeting our KPIs, are we – is the capability out there, are we achieving what 
we’re supposed to be achieving, yeah.” SM-APT-B-02 
 
The relative strength of a reliability culture within the operations area was contrasted 
against the more nascent and disconnected approach seen within other areas of the 
business. While other areas had a general understanding that the correct functioning 
of their roles is required for continued functionality of the airport, this was not as 
acutely felt as in the operations field of the business. A number of explanations can 
exist for this, the strongest being that there was not a constant pressure to ensure the 
safe movement of aircraft, and therefore a strong link between reliability and the 
performance of the organisation as a whole is not seen. The following participant 
explains this phenomenon.   
 
“I guess for people, you know, in the corporate office, its sort of assumed that when 
you do your job, it’ll mean that the airport will keep running, you know, there’s not 
that kind of pressure that there is on the people who, you know, if the lights aren’t 
working we can’t land the plane so you know, its obviously a bigger part of their job, 
so yeah I think definitely for operation people it’s a massive priority.” S-APT-B-01 
 
Another key component of an organisational culture of reliability is the ability for 
staff to understand when normal operations turn into an unusual situation. This 
ability was demonstrated in keenly in the operational staff, who had an awareness of 
aircraft noises and an acute ability to detect abnormalities. As demonstrated in a 
number of other reliability traits, there was a maturity within the operations area that 
was not present in other components of the business. The following manager gave an 
example as to how operations staff notice changes in their operating environment and 
respond to them.  
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“Normal is day to day, generally you get a bit of notification, if there’s a local 
standby, but they’re very aware of the aircraft sounds. We had an incident about two 
months ago where an engine failed on take-off, it blew up and the officers out in the 
field heard the difference and the change of the sound of the aircraft and they 
actually called it in to the supervisor who was just receiving notification through the 
VHF radio from the pilot that something had failed. He didn’t know, he said he’d 
heard and engine failure but didn’t know what had happened, but then we picked up 
over 700 bits off the side of the runway from a turbine that had failed. So he flew out 
over the bay, got to a safe height, came around and landed on one engine, so yeah, 
they’re aware of something that happened there, there’s something wrong.” M-
APT-B-01 
 
The presence of well-understood and comprehensive Standard Operating Procedures 
(SOPs) assists in establishing an organisational culture of reliability (LaPorte and 
Consolini 1991, 32).  SOPs formed the basis for practice in airside operations as they 
ensure that tasks are completed in a safe an efficient manner. While SOPs were the 
guiding document when it comes to procedure and response, they must maintain a 
certain flexibility when an unusual situation is presented to staff. This notion 
complemented the reliability trait that decision-making is decentralised to the 
individual responsible. The following participant outlined the role that SOPs play 
within the organisation and the flexibility they must maintain.  
 
“Every event is not going to be exactly the same, so you’ve got to be able to give 
somebody the ability to be that little bit more flexible, or the ability to move in a 
little bit of a different direction should they require to, you know, as long as there’s 
a justification as to why they did that.” M-APT-B-02 
 
Airport B contained a well-established culture of reliability within operations, which 
was contrasted against a much less developed approach in corporate areas. 
Situational awareness was also present within operations, as noted by the example 
discussed. SOPs also formed a component of a reliability culture in Airport B, which 
contained an element of flexibility to respond to unique situations.  
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5.9.3 Airport C  
The focus on reliability was present within staff of Airport C. As observed in other 
case studies, this existed most predominantly within operational areas. This was 
often in significant contrast to other components of the organisation, and this was 
consistent in Airport C. Operational staff were fundamentally concerned with 
providing a continuous operations for airlines and understand the consequences of 
not providing this service. The same focus could not be seen with non-operational 
staff, which is explained by the following senior management participant.   
 
“I think with our operations staff, yes, that’s front of mind. With our facilities staff, I 
would say that’s probably their overriding concern. And for the remainder, it’s not 
front of mind from the administrative point of view, I don’t think because it, the 
results aren’t that dramatic, you know what I mean. I think it scales to how severe 
the outcome is.” SM-APT-C-01 
 
Adherence to standard operating procedure was further identified as an important 
component of HROs. From a reporting perspective adherence with SOP occurred 
fairly regularly. While this may only have been a component of reporting, it does 
suggest that staff still had the understanding that adhering to the SOP was important. 
The following participant explains adherence to SOPs at Airport C.  
 
“Very clear. Yeah, yeah. Wherever we have them, and we have quite a lot in safety 
and security. I just, when I’m reading the reports quite frequently that says it was 
performed in accordance with the SOP. Now, you could argue that yeah, that’s what 
they’re just writing, but impression is that they are following a lot of the SOPs.” 
SM-APT-C-01 
 
Consequences of a failure in reliability were well acknowledged and understood 
throughout Airport C. Similar themes existed as in airports A and B, including loss 
of reputation and financial loss. Another present theme in Airport C was the impacts 
due to their position as a business unit of the council. The airport was not only a 
prominent component of the council, but a key component of the regional economy. 
The impact on both the reputation of the council and the viability of the local 
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economy were key reasons that inform the attitude or reliability, as explained by the 
following management participant.  
 
“Financial loss. Loss of reputation. And being local government owned, it’s the 
ratepayers who actually own the airport, they are going to feel that they have been 
let down basically. That they can’t come and fly and they want to fly. And it reflects 
on the whole economy you know, people can’t fly for business, they can’t get 
consultants in, they can’t get their air freight in when they want to…it really gets 
demonstrated like when we do get closed down for almost a month due to the floods 
and everybody became very aware of the implications.” M-APT-C-03 
 
 “I mean you know, a lot of places will have their slack days like whatever else but I 
think when they’re airside you’ve got to have that mindset that you’ve got to be safe 
and you’ve got to be doing the right thing at all times. So yeah, I think generally 
they’re pretty good.” S-APT-C-01 
 
An awareness of normal operations and when situations begin to deviate is a key 
component of reliable operations. At Airport C on the ground operational staff had a 
good awareness of small changes to their operating environment and what this may 
mean. Further, there was the understanding that this was a fundamental requirement 
of operational staff, and staff whom do not possess these qualities should not be in 
this role. The following staff level participant further explains the role of on the 
ground operational staff (also known as safety officers).  
 
“Absolutely they do. And as safety officers I mean it’s their – it’s pretty much, 
they’re the guys who are out there all the time, and they’re doing an eight hour shift 
out there and if they notice that there’s something changing or is something isn’t 
right then they’ll let us know. Because they’re out there on the ground, they’re 
always out there and you know, if they’re not really astute enough to pick up on 
what things are changing or to boosting the radio then they probably shouldn’t be 
out there. I mean they really have to have their eyes and ears wide open, I mean 
things are just altering, changing, they have to be aware of those things and notify 
and generally they are and so they do a pretty good job I think.” S-APT-C-01 
 
Situational awareness was not only present on the ground, management in the 
operational area also concerned themselves with the current state of the airport, even 
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if their role was not directly concerned with ground operation. This allows 
management to have a good understanding of what the current status of the airport is, 
and if more resources need to be deployed in order to adequately address operational 
requirements. These enquiries further allowed management to know what was 
occurring at the airport even if they are not on site, as explained by the following 
management level participant. 
 
“I make a habit particularly that the safety officers every morning that I’m here and 
I often even from home or if I’m away talking to them every morning and just asking 
them general questions so that they’ve got an understanding of what I want to know 
about, what’s normal, what is flagging my interest that I could be concerned about. 
On the outside it might look like a general chat but I’m trying to find those things 
out.” M-APT-C-03 
 
A focus on reliability and situational awareness were present within the operational 
areas of Airport C, but not within the corporate area. This was an observation 
consistent with the other two case studies. Consequences of a lack of reliability are 
well understood within Airport C.  
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5.9.4 Organisational Culture of Reliability Cross-Case Analysis 
 
Table 5.9.4 
Organisational Culture of Reliability Cross-Case Analysis 
Literature Trait 
 
Observed Traits Airport 
A B C 
Staff understanding and prioritising 
of reliable operations 
 
Small staff base    
Strongly established in aviation 
operations 
   
Situational awareness of staff Exists within aviation operations    
Management level situational awareness    
Attitude towards adherence to 
safety and SOPs 
Adherence to SOP    
Some flexibility allowed in response    
 Direct representation 
 Indirect representation 
 
The first component of Trait 8 identifies a staff understanding and prioritisation of 
reliability. At Airports B and C both demonstrated this attitude within their 
operational areas. Aviation operations were driven by the need to ensure a reliable 
and safe operation, which dictated how these individuals undertake their daily 
activities. A similar attitude was observed at Airport A, although in a slightly 
different interpretation. Airport A contained a small staff base, therefore requiring 
staff to be skilled in multiple areas and have an awareness of other components of 
the organisation. Staff had a more thorough understanding of the needs of other 
departments, and could act to ensure that the most crucial areas of the organisation 
could function effectively.  
 
A further discussion of situational awareness levels in staff was conducted as a 
component of Trait 8. A similar theme was observed at all three case study sites. 
Aviation operations staff maintained situational awareness of the operating 
environment. Operations staff had both an intimate understanding of what normal 
operations are, and when these started to deviate, even slightly, from the norm. At 
Airports B and C there was evidence of the same level of sensitivity to operations 
present at the management level. This was exemplified by the manager in the 
operations area (Airport B) taking explicit efforts to have an understanding of the 
current demands of the airport and potential sources of disturbance. While 
demonstrated in a different manner, the information-gathering exercise still indicated 
a level of situational awareness present. At Airport C, the operations manager made 
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specific efforts to speak to ground-level staff and ascertain what was occurring, to 
gain a more informed understanding of current operational requirements.  At none of 
the airports was situational awareness present in any area of the organisation other 
than operations, similar to that of another Trait 8 indicator, staff understanding and 
prioritising of reliable operations.  
 
The final indicator of trait 8 gauges the level of adherence with safety and SOPs. 
Airport C indicated that SOPs were regularly followed and adhered to. This was 
measured through the number of reports which indicated that staff had followed a 
particular SOP. It must be noted that this only indicated what is reported, it was still 
and indicator of SOP awareness and adherence. Airport B also demonstrated  
adherence with safety and SOP. However, Airport B also noted that a level of 
flexibility was instilled within staff to not follow the SOP if required. This indicated 
a level of decentralisation of decision-making, while individuals were centralised 
under an organisational culture of reliability, a core component of HROs (Weick 
1987, 123).   
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5.10 Trait 9: Strong Presence of External Groups with Access to Credible and 
Timely Information 
 
HROs have external groups present which have strong oversight powers over the 
organisation. These external groups have access to credible and timely information, 
as well as far reaching powers to impose penalties on the organisation. The following 
indicators were considered in this section: 
• External groups that have power over the organisation 
• Kinds of action these groups can take 
• Means of communication used with these groups 
 
5.10.1 Airport A  
A number of external regulators were present at Airport A, many of these concerning 
safety and security matters. The most active regulators in regards to the airport were 
the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA), responsible for aviation safety, and the 
Office of Transport Security (OTS), which was the authority for policing aviation 
security. The following participant explained the roles of these organisations and 
their auditing function.  
 
“They all do, Civil Aviation Safety Authority audits us from a safety aspect and they 
issues us with noncompliance’s against our manuals and procedures and they have 
the power to withdraw our certification. The Office of Transport Security once again 
do an external audit, they audit us against our security management system, they 
have the power to direct us and have the power to withdraw our security 
accreditation.” SM-APT-A-01 
 
Regulators provided certification to airports, which allowed them to operate for 
passenger transport. CASA required that airports reach certain safety standards, to 
ensure that airport operations were conducted safely and that airports had the ability 
to respond to airfield accidents. The following participant explained the CASA 
requirements for the airport.  
 
“We can’t continue to operate as an aerodrome for regular public transport unless 
it’s a registered aerodrome, so we have to achieve a level of certification that 
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satisfies CASA that we have not only the infrastructure of suitable design and 
they’re maintained but we got the operating procedures to cover all operating 
possibilities.” M-APT-A-02 
 
In the case that the airport did not meet any of its prescribed regulations, there can be 
severe consequences. These ranged from the airport receiving a citation or fine, 
through to ceasing operations. For an airport like Airport A, this can have an impact 
on the overall business viability. If operations were to stop at Airport A, regular 
public transport traffic would be lost, which represents a significant amount of 
revenue, as only general aviation would be able to use the airfield. What made this 
situation more critical was other airports within the nearby area who already operate 
heavily in the general aviation space. The following participant explained the role of 
noncompliance citations and potential outcomes. 
 
“They can simply close your airport, take away your license to operate as a 
regulated airport which means you no longer get – you basically become a general 
aviation airport like Caloundra, you can’t accept regular RPT services…you can get 
issued with a noncompliance which you only get three days to fix which we don’t 
like getting noncompliance’s and we rarely do.” S-APT-A-01 
 
Airport A contained two key regulators, CASA and OTS, which could influence the 
organisation and act to stop the business operating in cases on non-compliance. 
5.10.2 Airport B  
Airport B has a number of external agencies and stakeholders which can access 
organisational information and place penalties on the airport for instances of non-
compliance. The principal agencies which had power over the airport were CASA 
and OTS. CASA was responsible for monitoring air safety practices, which OTS 
maintained responsibility for aviation security at a national level. CASA had 
overarching powers, up to and including closing the airport, as illustrated by the 
following participant.  
 
“They can ask us to show cause, they can take our certificate off us. So I hold the 
most important document in the company and that’s our certificate to operate an 
airport. If we lose that, we don’t have a business.” M-APT-B-01 
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Both agencies had an ability to access information about each of the airports policies 
and procedures. One example that can be readily utilised is that of reporting 
requirements in the event of a safety or security incident occurring. There were a 
number of differences present between the two agencies, particularly in the areas of 
notification and audit, as explained by the following participant. 
 
“They have, with CASA, we’ve got no obligations at all to notify CASA of any 
incidents. However they do, they can audit us in the way that we manage incidents, 
and demonstrate that we’re capturing things on lessons learned. OTS are different, 
so in OTS we’ve got to provide a notification on a form that they provide. So 
realistically we provide them with the information that’s detailed on the form and 
probably no more at the time, because we really don’t know.” M-APT-B-02 
 
Both agencies had the ability to impose penalties in instances of non-compliance 
from airports. The other component of compliance-related failures was the potential 
for reputational damage to occur. As airports were media-worthy components of 
infrastructure, any compliance related issues would receive heightened media 
scrutiny, as well as that of internal groups such as the board. The following 
participant explained some of the penalties that can be imposed, along with 
reputational issues that failures of this nature may lead to.  
 
“The CASA side of the fence is important for us to stay as airport operators, to be 
certified as the airport operator. If we don’t meet their requirements to, you know, 
under their legislation, then we’re risking losing our certification as an airport 
operator, therefore not being able to run an airport operation to business, you know. 
It’s the risk that you’re taking with, you gamble with, okay so we don’t want that. 
But from an OTS perspective it’s about the penalties that can be imposed upon the 
organisation or not meeting the security requirements. And then there’s the 
reputational side of the fence that’s associated to that because then that’s 
demonstrating the failure to meet the federal security requirements and then how 
can we guarantee that the people are flying in a safe environment, so you know, then 
there’s the business risk on top of that.” M-APT-B-02 
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A key component of maintaining high reliability is the ways that airports 
communicate with these regulatory groups. These consisted of a number of formal 
and informal measures, including committees and forums, auditing, inspections and 
individual communication. The following participant explained some of the 
communications mediums that are utilised with these agencies. 
 
“There are some national forums and I’m on all those, so I’m in the high level 
security passenger facilitation and safety forums which run regularly. And then 
there are, the other way tends to be though the normal interaction that will happen, 
on the weekly, fortnightly, monthly and then that could be audit or it might be them 
coming to talk about specific issues or it might just be them meeting with us. Yep, so 
there’s quite a lot of interaction at various levels. Probably the major ones would be 
those forums and then there’s working groups under the forums, so we’re constantly 
getting feedback on various aspects of the system.” SM-APT-B-02 
 
Airport B was faced with the same regulatory groups as Airport A. Communication 
with these external regulators was conducted through a number of means, including 
direct communication, forums and inspections. 
 
5.10.3 Airport C 
 
Airport C sat under the same regulatory model as Airport B and A, and was therefore 
also subject to the same conditions regarding aviation safety and security. CASA and 
OTS conducted regular audits of safety and security at the airport to ensure that their 
processes remained compliant with current legislation. 
 
“We have CASA, they do an annual audit. That’s on your structure, your policies 
your processes, and physical things as well. And they audit certain components of 
those each year…Then you’ve got security, Office of Transport Security, they do a 
number of audits each year based on your processes and so forth, based on your 
security, your key register and how you maintain this and a whole bunch of other 
stuff.” M-APT-C-02 
 
The consequences of non-compliance were extreme, in addition to the penalties that 
can be imposed by either of these agencies. These can range from infringement 
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notices and fines to a complete shutdown of the airport. The following participant 
explains the impact of a withdrawal of an aviation certificate. 
 
“If we don’t have a certificate to operate planes can’t fly, they can’t land because 
they wouldn’t be certified, and that type of thing, the same thing with the regulator, 
the Office of Transport Security.” M-APT-C-03 
 
CASA and OTS acted in the same regulatory capacity at Airport C, as with the other 
case study sites. These external groups had access to organisational information and 
the ability to take action against the airport. 
5.10.4 Strong Presence of External Groups Cross-Case Analysis 
 
Table 5.10.4 
Strong Presence of External Groups Cross-Case Analysis 
Literature Trait 
 
Observed Traits Airport 
A B C 
External groups that have power 
over the organisation 
CASA 
 
   
OTS    
Kinds of action these groups can 
take 
Notice of non-compliance    
Fines    
Airport Closure    
Means of communication used with 
these groups 
Inspections    
Committees/Forums     
Individual Communication    
 Direct representation 
 Indirect representation 
 
Two main external groups were identified which have regulatory authority over all 
three airports. These consist of CASA and OTS who had responsibilities for safety 
and security respectively. Section 2.7 detailed the specific roles of CASA and OTS 
in more detail. These regulatory authorities have a number of actions which they can 
utilise if the airports are not meeting compliance requirements, which include notices 
of non-compliance, fines, and the most extreme, closure of an airport.  
 
A number of means were identified by which the airport communicates with these 
regulatory authorities. The most common was inspections, which occurred at all 
three airports. Airport B further identified the use of committees and forums, as well 
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as individual communication to keep in contact and provide information to these 
groups. 
 
5.11 Analysis Summary  
The following Table 5.1.1 Analysis Summary graphically represents an overview of 
the key findings of Study One. A number of key conclusions can be drawn at this 
point. The first of these is the high presence of a different representation of high 
reliability traits than in literature. While traits were in fact represented, they did not 
manifest themselves in the exact manner described in existing literature. Further, a 
number of additional indicators of reliability were observed during Study One which 
were not seen in literature. These additional traits added depth to the understanding 
of organisational reliability within the context of Australian airports.  
 
Lastly, there was a strong presence of reliability within core operational functions of 
the airport. Reliability was demonstrated at a much higher level of practice than in 
other organisational functions. The maturity of reliability within operations is an 
important observation within this study, and will be discussed further in Chapter 7 
Discussion and Conclusions.  
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Table 5.11 
Analysis Summary 
Literature Trait Observed Traits Airport 
A B C 
Trait 1: Commitment to Reliable Operations in Mission and Goals 
 
Understanding the need for reliability    
Formalised commitment to 
reliability in mission and goals 
Reliability formalised as a 
component of other goals 
   
Support for reliable operations 
from a municipal government 
level 
   
Further Identified Reliability Components 
Asset management systems    
Investment in technology    
Planning 
• Business continuity 
• Emergency planning 
  
 
 
 
Trait 2: Sustained High Technical Performance 
 
Presence of systems which 
require sustained technical 
performance 
Aviation safety systems    
Compliance regulated systems    
Third party service providers    
Measurement of system 
performance 
Recording of performance    
External audit of critical systems    
Maintenance of system 
performance 
Asset management systems    
Specific asset maintenance    
Trait 3: Structural Flexibility and Redundancy 
 
Redundancy of staff functions Redundancy at operational level    
Redundancy at managerial level    
Ability to source operational staff 
from many areas 
   
Levels of cross-skilling of 
staff 
Informal cross-skilling    
Cross-skilling of operational staff    
Redundancy of hard systems    
Other Observed Traits 
Internalisation of key functions from municipal government    
Outsourcing of key functions to municipal government    
Trait 4: High Degrees of Responsibility and Accountability 
 
Staff reporting of their own 
failures 
    
Safety and security focussed    
Staff reporting on failures of others    
Rewarding the discovery of error    
Other Observed Traits 
No blame culture    
Difference between operational and non-operational    
 176
Introducing reporting culture to the wider airport organisation    
Trait 5: Flexible Decision-making Process and Collegial Patterns of Hierarchy 
 
Allocation of decision-making 
power to experts 
Initial response to staff and 
incident escalated to management 
as incident escalates 
   
Operating procedure changes 
during an incident 
Different levels of operational 
change due to nature of incident 
   
Changes in operating procedure 
for operations area only 
   
Trait 6: Continual Search for System Improvement and Training for Worst-
case Scenarios 
Worst-case scenario testing 
and training 
Airport Emergency Planning 
testing 
   
Regular review of SOPs and 
response procedures 
Formalised training and incident 
response system 
   
Other Observed Traits 
Training based around most regular occurrences    
Worst-case scenario testing limited to operations    
Incident based testing and training utilised within operations but 
not in other components of the organisation 
   
Trait 7: Reliability not Marginalisable 
 
Reliability as the top priority Safety and security priority    
Profitability priority    
Understanding of the 
consequences of not 
maintaining reliability 
Commercial imperatives    
Impact on the region    
Reputational impact    
Trait 8: Organisational Culture of Reliability 
 
Staff understanding and 
prioritising of reliable 
operations  
Small staff base    
Strongly established in aviation 
operations 
   
Situational awareness of staff Exists within aviation operations    
Management level situational 
awareness 
   
Attitude towards adherence to 
safety and SOPs 
Adherence to SOP    
Some flexibility allowed in 
response 
   
Trait 9: Strong Presence of External Groups with Access to Credible and 
Timely Information 
External groups that have 
power over the organisation 
CASA    
OTS    
Kinds of action these groups 
can take 
Notice of non-compliance    
Fines    
Airport closure    
Means of communication used 
with these groups 
Inspections    
Committee/forums    
Individual communication    
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5.12 Conclusion  
This Chapter outlined the findings from study one, of the presence of reliability 
factors at each of the airports. Findings were presented first as individual case results, 
followed by a cross-case analysis of each reliability trait.  A number of key findings 
can be discussed at this time. To begin, there was evidence of both literature 
suggested reliability traits, and traits which were unique to the airport environment. 
Some reliability traits were observed as direct representations of literature, others in 
an indirect interpretation. Secondly, reliability as a discipline was far more 
established within the operational aspect of the airport than in other areas. Often, 
reliability factors (both literature suggested and observed) were only found within 
the operational areas of the airport. Further conclusions are drawn during chapter 
seven, as the results of both studies one and two are required in order to answer the 
posed research questions.                              
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6.0 Analysis Study Two                       
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6.1 Introduction  
Phase two of this research centred on examining and representing current levels of 
continuity management practice were in each of the three case study sites (see Table 
4.3). This was undertaken using the BCM Maturity Assessment Tool (see Section 
3.4.1) to assess the maturity of each organisation’s BCM practice. A multiple-
method approach was utilised, consisting of both semi-structured interviews with key 
informants and documentary analysis (where relevant), providing for triangulation. 
Findings are presented by component of the BCM process (according to the maturity 
model), with individual airport case study sites discussed first, before cross-case 
conclusions are examined. This Chapter concludes with an overview of the key 
findings from the overall analysis.  
 
6.2 BCM Case Background  
The following Section provides the background to BCM implementation at each of 
the case study sites. The background consists of a brief summary of the historical 
development of BCM within each airport, as well as current levels of overall process 
implementation. This is followed by a more detailed examination of current BCM 
maturity by component, within and cross-case, from Sections 6.3 to 6.10.  The 
following Figure 6.2 Analysis Outline illustrates this approach.   
 
1: Stage of BCM Implementation 
(per Airport case study) 
Commencement 
 
Risk 
Assessment 
 
Business 
Impact 
Assessment 
Continuity  
Plans 
 
Testing  
& 
Training 
 
Communication 
& Consultation 
Monitoring, 
Review  
& Learning 
 
2: Level of BCM Component Maturity (per Airport case study) 
Novice Intermediate Advanced Mature 
 
Figure 6.2.Study Two Analysis Outline   
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6.2.1 Airport A Case Background 
 
Airport A is a regional airport with a small number of domestic destinations (three at 
the time of research). As a regional airport, Airport A operates as a business unit of 
its parent regional council. At the time of research, Airport A was at the very 
beginning of implementing a continuity management process. The need for 
continuity management had been identified as part of a council-wide program to 
develop BCM within their associated business units. Following this internal decision, 
the council engaged an external consultant to assist with the creation of relevant 
business continuity plans. At the time of research, there was limited progress towards 
the creation of a business continuity plan, both in terms of the airport specifically and 
throughout the wider council business portfolio. While preliminary information 
gathering meetings had occurred between the airport and consultancy, this had only 
culminated in the development of preliminary documentation. The current stage of 
BCM implementation at Airport A is depicted in the Figure below:  
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Figure 6.2.1. Airport A BCM Implementation Timeline  
6.2.2 Airport B Case Background  
Airport B is a capital city airport, operating domestic and international services. As a 
privatised airport, Airport B operates with a responsible board and has a number of 
shareholder groups. The process towards continuity management has a history of 
more than three years within Airport B. As of 2008, the organisation had not 
undertaken any formalised continuity management procedures and therefore did not 
possess any continuity plans. When the current Risk and Compliance manager 
commenced working with the organisation, he undertook the responsibility of 
developing a business continuity program. Therefore, an education process was 
required at multiple senior levels within the organisation, as detailed by the 
following participant.  
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“So first there was an education program for the board, and the executive which was 
what I pushed through and most of the first 8 months once I started was really educating 
people about why we need to do it and then agreement on how to proceed and pushing 
forward.” M-APT-B-02 
 
Airport B at the time, and still maintains, a relative strength in emergency response 
procedures. The strength in emergency response added another layer of complexity 
to this issue, as emergency response is one very narrow component of continuity 
planning. However, emergency response alone is not enough to substantiate a BCP. 
A BCP must contain not only emergency response, but the capability for continuity 
and recovery procedures (Meng 1996, 13). The former attitude was previously 
accepted in the organisation, as they viewed their emergency response plan as 
adequate to ensure business continuity, as explained by the following management 
level participant.  
 
“When I came here there was nothing and in that time we’ve managed to run 
through the process of actually establishing BCP. The organisation thought they had 
a business continuity program, but that really just consisted of an airside emergency 
management plan.” M-APT-B-02  
 
This effort towards a business continuity plan progressed to the tenure of a 
consultant for the purposes of developing a comprehensive business continuity plan, 
which occurred in 2010. The result of the in-depth activities of the consultant was the 
creation of documented business continuity plans for all business units within the 
airport. Specific processes undertaken during this development project included the 
identification of critical business functions, the development of BIAs for the 
identified critical business functions, and the creation of business continuity plans to 
ensure the continued functionality of the identified critical business functions. What 
was not included within the consultant tenure was the development or 
implementation of testing and training procedures, or likewise for monitoring, review 
and learning. The current stage of BCM implementation at Airport B is depicted in 
the Figure below:  
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Figure 6.2.2. Airport B BCM Implementation Timeline 
6.2.3 Airport C Case Background  
As outlined in Section 4.3.1.3, Airport C is an airport that is owned by and operated 
as part of a regional council (in a similar fashion to Airport A). Continuity 
management was declared an issue of importance at the council level, and council 
CEO instructed all the business units (including the airport) to begin developing their 
own BCPs. The push towards BCP development had a mixed range of success, with 
the airport having made the most inroads in this area out of all the business units.  
 
Throughout the time period when continuity plan development was made a priority, 
Airport C operated in a state of frequent change. However, before BCP activities 
could be completed, a restructure occurred due to Council amalgamations, and the 
CEO role no longer existed. Therefore the key individual who was driving the BCP 
process was no longer employed, and significant traction on this process was lost. 
Further, from a previous 48 functional managers before the amalgamation, this was 
reduced to 12. The operating environment has made the advancement of business 
continuity and risk management approaches quite difficult, as exemplified by the 
following participant.  
 
“Its just a massive change, so unfortunately our organisation hasn’t really has 
responsible managers in most positions. We started off with 48 senior managers 
we’re down to 12. So guys who were building up ideas about risk management or 
whatever it might have been, have disappeared.” SM-APT-C-01 
 
“We’ve had 3 CEOs in 4 years. I’ve had 3 GMs, my title’s changed 4 times, my 
responsibilities for reporting have changed, all the people that I was working with 
previously have kind of left or have been sacked or have been relocated, so as a 
result it’s really hard to get anything done other than build relationships which 
changes again.” SM-APT-C-01 
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Within Airport C the responsibility and knowledge of BCM resided mostly within 
one individual. Awareness of detail of the process amongst other staff members was 
limited (as discussed in further detail throughout this Chapter). BCM knowledge was 
particularly prevalent in lower level staff, including one participant who was not 
aware that the organisation even conducted business continuity management, or 
awareness of what the process consisted of. The current stage of BCM 
implementation at Airport C is depicted in the Figure below:  
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Figure 6.2.3. Airport C BCM Implementation Timeline 
*these stages have been reached but not implemented in a complete form 
 
6.3 Overall Maturity  
Overall maturity is a rating given to an airport after averaging out the maturity 
ratings of each BCM component (see BCM Maturity and Assessment Tool Figure 
3.4.1). However, this rating is only a rough indication of BCM maturity, as it does 
not have the granularity of the full model. Therefore, both ratings should be taken 
into consideration when assessing BCM maturity. The following Sections (6.3.1-
6.3.4) discuss the overall maturity of the three airport case studies.  
 
6.3.1 Overall Maturity Airport A  
 
Novice 
 
 
Intermediate 
 
Advanced 
 
Mature  
As detailed previously, Airport A was beginning a process towards BCM 
development and implementation. As a complete process of implementation had not 
been undertaken, this decreases the organisation’s overall maturity simply due to the 
non-completion of key stages, in this case consisting of all stages beyond the 
commencement stage. The following assessment discusses areas where relevant 
BCM skills are visible, and analyses their applicability to crossover to a relevant 
continuity management approach. Risk management, being one of the closest 
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disciplines to continuity management (reference) can serve as an indicator of the 
potential for BCM to be successfully adopted. As discussed by the following senior 
management participant, Airport A had an effective risk management approach, 
however there had been a lack of complete progression to formalised BCM 
components.  
 
“I don’t think we’re mature enough or sophisticated enough to have gone through 
that whole business continuity planning looking at your major risks and going okay 
well we’ve identified this major risk, what are we going to do about it and to do that 
“what if” planning. That’s the exercise that we’re actually starting now.” SM-APT-
A-01 
 
The following participant further endorsed the viewpoint that BCM is not a complete 
departure from current practice at the airport. As previously stated, the airport had a 
number of risk management components currently in practice. Therefore the addition 
of BCM was considered as the next step in risk-related practice at the airport.  
 
 “I think it’s a value add, it’s definitely not creating something new for us. In fact the 
reason we were put down the priority list as it were, was because the consultant saw 
our risk register, I think and saw that we had a few things you know, we had been in 
this space, where other areas of council, it might have just been more knowledge, 
not being documented anywhere.” M-APT-B-03 
 
While BCM was only in the early development stage at Airport A, a number of BCM 
components existed within other areas of airport organisation. The organisation has 
the ability to utilise these existing strengths in order to develop and implement BCM. 
These areas are identified throughout the following analysis.  However, the presence 
of some continuity plan elements does not negate the need for dedicated continuity 
plans. The following Figure 6.3.1 Overall Maturity Airport A graphically indicates 
the levels of overall maturity at Airport A, with the black horizontal line indicating 
the average (and therefore overall level) of maturity.  
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Figure 6.3.1. Overall Maturity Airport A  
6.3.2 Overall Maturity Airport B 
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While the overall BCM process at Airport B contained levels of advanced practice, 
this was contrasted against non-completion of stages such as testing and training, and 
monitoring, review and learning. This resulted in the lower score of intermediate for 
overall maturity. The following response illustrated the weakness resulting from the 
lack of a complete implementation.  
 
“ There’s still a strategic level risk because until we integrate BCP into the business 
and test and until we’ve gone through a full lifecycle like a full cycle of testing and 
monitoring and that risk stays on the radar, because its, you can’t take it off yet, it’s 
a long way off.” M-APT-B-01 
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Further, the lack of a full implementation resulted in staff being unfamiliar with the 
BCM process, especially when it came to knowledge of the continuity plans 
themselves. As testing and training had not occurred at Airport B, few opportunities 
existed for staff to gain knowledge and experience of continuity plans. This reality is 
exemplified by the following senior management participant.  
 
“Even though it’s intuitively known, it’s not still ingrained in people and I think until 
we’ve practiced it a fair but and start to get more natural. It’s gotta be natural, and 
people have to know, actually understand that these are the sorts of avenues I can 
take and actually go to a physical document that helps them and guides them as 
well.” SM-APT-B-02 
 
At the time of data collection, this airport had completed the first round of written 
BCP documentation for all of its business groups. This followed a yearlong 
engagement with an external consultant to assist with this process. While BCPs 
existed, they had not been tested or trained, and at the time of data collection a 
testing and training protocol was being developed.  The following Figure 6.3.2 
Overall Maturity Airport B illustrates the maturity of the BCM components, with the 
black horizontal line indicating overall maturity.   
 
Figure 6.3.2. Overall Maturity Airport B 
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6.3.3 Overall Maturity Airport C  
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Airport C demonstrated an overall level of Novice maturity for their BCM function. 
In contrast to the intermediate ranking observed in Airport B, Airport C had a 
consistent level of intermediate and novice assessments for each of the seven 
components of the continuity management process. The following quote from a 
senior manager at the airport explained his view of the current levels of BCP.  
 
“We don’t have what I would consider a BCP. What we have is a half-finished 
document that describes our vulnerabilities and criticalities almost, but we haven’t 
actually instituted it and linked it to other continuity plans or crisis management 
plans that we currently have” SM-APT-C-01 
 
Some explanation as to the lack of progression in this area can also be attributed to 
the lack of top management support, in this case the overarching council organisation. 
Literature has identified top management support as a key component of BCM 
success (Howe 2007, 119). This lack of support was further exacerbated by the lack 
of fit of BCP within the council organisational structure. This situation was 
explained by the following participant.  
 
“A lack of prioritisation at the corporate level. Because if I say to them that I’ve 
done my BCP, they will say “fantastic” but I need people to do it, hang on, we’ve 
got business to do here. And the other thing is where does this BCP fit? There is no 
structure within council for BCPs. We’re the only ones with one, that I’m aware of. 
Maybe the water business has one…our BCP actually talks about IT dependence 
and other governance, government services or council services that we buy or use, it 
actually says refer to their BCP, but they don’t have one.” SM-APT-C-01 
 
Airport C, while having an overall maturity of novice, is in stark contrast to the 
wider council organisation that they are a part of. The airport had a more advanced 
approach to continuity management than any of the other council business units 
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(although, it is important to note that the maturity of other council continuity 
management processes was not investigated, therefore this cannot be definitively 
stated). Figure 5.2.3 Overall Maturity of Airport C, below, indicates the levels of 
process maturity at Airport C. 
 
 
Figure 6.3.3. Overall Maturity Airport C  
6.3.4 Overall Maturity Cross-Case Comparison 
 
Maturity Level Airport A Airport B Airport C 
Novice    
Intermediate    
Advanced    
Mature    
 
Overall maturity at the three airports studied was remarkably similar. Much of the 
lower scores noted can be explained by non-completion of important latter stages of 
the BCM process. It is simply that these stages do not exist which causes overall 
lower rankings. The following Chapter will discuss each BCM component, to give a 
more detailed explanation of BCM maturity. 
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6.4 Commencement  
Commencement is the first stage of the BCM process and involves setting the scope, 
boundaries, aims and personnel responsible for BCM (Standards Australia, 2010). 
Senior management endorsement allows for the required staff and resources to be 
applied to ensure that BCM can be effectively implemented in the organisation.  The 
following Sections 6.4.1-6.4.3 investigate and discuss commencement activities at 
the three airport case study sites. 
 
6.4.1 Commencement Airport A  
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Mature  
Commencement at Airport A was assessed at the novice level. This was due, in most 
respects, to the relative infancy of the process. While formalised commencement 
activities existed at the overarching council level, including appointment of 
responsible officers and outlining the scope and bounds of the project, this had not 
occurred for the airport level as of yet. Therefore, little guidance in terms of both top 
management support and formalised requirements had been established. The 
following participant explained the status of the business continuity planning process.  
 
“At the moment we’re at the beginnings of developing a formal business continuity 
plan under the umbrella of a council business continuity plan. Ours will be a subset 
of that and be tailored for our business but will fall within the broader guidelines of 
the council.” SM-APT-A-01 
 
In order to correctly achieve commencement, the airport must establish firm 
boundaries and scope to inform the aims of the BCP. This would include 
documenting who the responsible officers are, and the timeframes that are applicable 
to the BCP, as well as the scope and the aims of the project. This will ensuring that 
going forward, the BCP is conducted in a timely manner, and ensures that it 
addresses the key components of the organisation which are highlighted as needing 
continuity measures.  
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6.4.2 Commencement Airport B  
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Commencement activities for Airport B were classified in the advanced category. 
Continuity management was undertaken through a project management approach, 
which allocated timeframes, a budget and responsible officers. This management 
level staff member explains how a need for BCM was embedded within the 
organisation, by framing this in the context of a project management approach.  
 
“I took a project management approach to delivering this because I just saw that’s how 
the business actually responds, it actually responds to projects, so by structuring it in a 
project management format, defining scope and direction, costs and timeframes, 
deliverables and milestones they actually understood” M-ABT-B-02 
 
Understanding of commencement activities was also observed outside the team with 
immediate BCM responsibility. This senior management level individual reported in 
a similar fashion how the process was initiated, and how board support was attainted.  
 
“We have set the scope, priorities, purpose, the guidelines for out BCM processes, so 
we’ve got responsible officers for that. It also has gone to our senior management team 
which has been approved and it has also gone to the board and been approved so we’ve 
got top level support for it” SM-APT-B-01 
 
The combination of ground-level understanding and senior support gave 
commencement a high rating. However, there was a lack of evidence that the process 
was one of the organisation’s key priorities, reflected in the fact that BCM had not 
been completed in its entirety. This detracted from overall maturity, as if the process 
was of a mature state the need for good continuity management practice would be 
understood and this would be translated into priority status being given to the 
program.      
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6.4.3 Commencement Airport C  
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As for a number of organisations, the need for BCM at Airport C was highlighted by 
a serious disturbance which affected other, similar organisations. This event was the 
2004 SARS crisis, which impacted upon global air travel. This resulted in a decision 
between the airport director and CEO of council to develop a BCP and appropriate 
response.  This decision making is explained by the following senior management 
participant.  
 
“My involvement came about in 2004 when we had the SARS crisis, and our CEO, 
reporting directly to the CEO at that point, we made a decision as the leadership 
team for the business, that it was really, really important that we understood how 
our business would react to this crisis if it came to Australia.” SM-APT-C-01 
 
This responsibility fell onto, in this case, the airport director. While the move to 
initiate BCM was well established at the council level, the necessary follow-up was 
not in place to ensure each business unit, including the airport, produced adequate 
plans. Further, there was no assistance offered to the business units in order to 
produce continuity plans. Therefore, insufficient senior management support existed 
to ensure that continuity management was both developed and implemented. The 
following participant outlines this gap between intention and outcome.  
 
“We had an intent to do it, and we had a really strong intent, but, it was given to the 
individual managers to deliver it with no support” SM-APT-C-01  
This resulted in many of the business units of the council having no form of 
complete BCP, or in fact any form of BCP. In this respect, the airport was one of the 
better performing organisations, as they had some form of BCP, albeit an incomplete 
one. The following senior management participant explained the level of BCM 
implementation at Airport C.  
 
“…because realistically we’re the only ones that produced one, and ours was used 
as “well this is how you could use it”, but we didn’t really produce a BCP either, we 
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produced 60 or 70% of a BCP. So the fact that we were held up as a model almost, 
and we hadn’t completed a lot tells you a lot.” SM-APT-C-01 
 
Airport C levels of commencement are intermediate, due to the partial nature of 
approaches currently present. As previously stated, although the intent exists towards 
outlining a program for continuity management, this intent did not translate into a 
documented approach for a continuity management program. Further, there was 
limited documentation which establishes and outlines commencement, resulting in an 
intermediate score for this criterion.  
 
6.4.4 Commencement Cross-Case Comparison 
 
Maturity Level Airport A Airport B Airport C 
Novice    
Intermediate    
Advanced    
Mature    
 
Commencement activities were relatively diverse amongst the three airports. The 
common similarity was that all approaches provided an impetus to create a continuity 
plan, fulfilling the base requirement of the commencement phase. The most 
advanced of the three airports is Airport B, which contained a number of documented 
components of commencement and further board support for the process. Airport C 
maintained an intermediate level of commencement maturity. This was informed by 
the implementation of a number of commencement-type measures although there 
was a limited amount of documentation to outline these measures. Airport A was in 
the most nascent stage of commencement, with formal strategies not existing at the 
airport level. Development of BCM strategy in the case of Airport A was driven by 
the council, and there was not yet specific formalised commencement goals for the 
airport.  
 
The case study site with the most mature level of commencement was Airport B. 
Airport B had top management support for the process, coupled with a formalised 
project management approach to BCM. These components, along with fulfilling a 
number of other criteria of the commencement process gave Airport B the highest 
score amongst the three airports.  
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6.5 Risk Assessment  
Risk assessment involves an organisation-wide assessment of threats, from both 
internal and external sources, to the organisation’s physical infrastructure as well as 
threats to continued operations (Elliott 2006, 401; Griffiths 2008, 48; Charters 2011, 
157).  Through a four-step process, the organisation can identify potential threats and 
current vulnerabilities. In the best-case scenario, risk assessment should be linked to 
continuity management to ensure that the areas of greatest vulnerability are 
addressed by the plan. The following Sections (6.5.1-6.5.3) discuss risk assessment 
activities at the three case study sites.  
6.5.1 Risk Assessment Airport A  
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Mature  
Risk assessment practices at Airport A are assessed at the intermediate level. The 
airport’s risk management system existed as a subset of the broader council 
enterprise risk management framework. The airport had adopted the council’s risk 
management approach to a significant degree, as explained by the following 
participant.  
 
“In terms of risk assessment, we have fairly detailed risk assessment program 
policies. So once again council has a risk assessment framework, we fit underneath 
the risk assessment framework. We have identified the risks associated with this 
business, we’re a business unit of the council. The risk table we’ve had to adopted, is 
council’s one.” SM-APT-A-01 
 
However, the council risk framework was not blindly adopted by the organisation 
without any consideration. A number of internal workshops were conducted to 
ensure that the airport could effectively marry the pre-existing council approach with 
their specific needs. A key consideration of any risk management approach is its 
application to individual requirements of each different organisation (Standards 
Australia 2009, 8). This resulted in the airport having their approach align with the 
new council framework. The following participant explains how this occurred.  
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“Council has an enterprise risk management framework that we conducted  a series 
of workshops on early this year to align ourselves from a risk assessment and 
management perspective to council requirements because we’ve already had a risk 
assessment done and mitigations in place as part of the requirement for a safety 
management system.” M-APT-B-01 
 
Whilst the council risk management strategy was followed for the most part, the 
airport had modified the approach in order to account for their particular needs. This 
was in particular reference to the parameters for calculation of likelihood and 
consequence for identified events. The following participant described the steps 
undertaken by the airport to change these parameters and some of the reasoning 
behind this move.  
 
“We’ve had to modify the materiality to suit our business in terms of, particularly 
financial risk because the financial risk of the council, as we discussed, you know a 
ten million dollar loss for them is a problem, for us, it’s a much, much bigger 
problem as we’re quite a small business.” SM-APT-A-01 
 
While the risk assessment procedures are established and well executed, there was no 
established link between risk management outcomes and business continuity 
planning. This affected the maturity rating, as risk management did not inform 
continuity planning activities, a key component of the higher levels of BCM maturity. 
Further, there were no plans to use the risk assessment information as the base for 
continuity management.  In order to achieve strengthened continuity planning going 
forward, the risk assessment process must be more directly linked to BCP in order to 
ensure that continuity plans reflect the current level of organisational vulnerability.            
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6.5.2 Risk Assessment Airport B  
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Airport B had a formalised risk management system, which defined how risk was 
dealt with in various forms throughout the business. It also outlined how risk needs 
to be reported up to either senior management or through to the board, as explained 
by this management level staff member.  
 
“There’s an enterprise risk management framework, which defines how risk 
management is applied across the business. That defines how it is reported through 
the executive and the board. It also defines how we make decision, that system has a 
subsystem specifically for projects.” M-APT-B-02 
 
This attitude was supported in the Airport B’s Risk Management System11 document. 
This document outlined the organisation’s Aims and Objectives of the Risk 
Management System, Risk Management Methodology, Roles and Responsibilities, 
Risk Registers, Risk Management Reporting, Audit and Assurance and Training and 
Communication. All these practices were compliant with the most current 
international standard for Risk Management ISO31000. The existence of the 
document and the comprehensiveness of the approach provided further evidence of 
an advanced approach to risk management within the organisation.  
 
In some ways the risk management approach had ingrained deeper down into the 
organisation, for example, beginning with design, risk assessment principles were 
applied, which had the potential to proactively mitigate against some amount of 
external threats in order to decrease vulnerability. This can be understood when 
considering how risk-related thinking influenced terminal design, explained by the 
following participant. 
 
“To some extent some of the BCPs are actually ingrained in the way we design things as 
well, for example the reason why the airport was not affected actually so much (during 
                                                        
11Document APTB03 
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the flood) as the city as there were much higher design standards to allow for these 
crises to happen and the airport still functions.”  SM-APT-B-02 
 
However, when considering continuity management, there was not a strong link 
between the outcomes of risk assessment practices within the organisation, and 
continuity management processes. This participant explained that while there was the 
knowledge that these processes should be linked, this was not the case and perhaps 
never will be.  
 
“The risk assessment process is used and continued to be used to assess priority 
within the business continuity framework itself, so by ranking and assessing 
something we determine its importance based on a risk assessment and then that 
helps determine the priority within the business continuity framework. But are they 
linked? No they’re not. Should they be? In an ideal world yes.” M-APT-B-02 
 
The knowledge that risk assessment and business continuity indicated that risk 
management processes are themselves advanced, but their maturity could be 
advanced by ensuring an increased connection to processes such as continuity 
management. By linking risk management more closely to continuity management, 
the Airport B would ensure that their continuity approaches most accurately reflect 
the current risk profile of the organisation, and would increase their rating in this 
category to advanced.  
 
6.5.3 Risk Assessment Airport C  
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Risk assessment processes at Airport C were at the higher level of intermediate 
practice. Particularly in the operations component of the business, risk assessments 
were conducted as a matter of day-to-day business. A completed and updated risk 
register was required by the regional council, and the outcomes of this were reported 
back into council regularly. This also existed in a documented form, in both a risk 
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and vulnerability analysis and a risk register12. This was outlined by the following 
participant.  
 
“We do a number of risk assessments for technical security, as is a requirement of 
our Transport Security Programme, quite a few security risks detailed there…the 
airport director also has got quite a few other business risks documented as far as a 
council business, he is required through council to complete.” M-APT-C-02 
 
Accompanying the formal risk management process was a series of day-to-day risk 
management activities. The most common of these were regularly occurring risk 
assessments. The following staff member explains how operations staff members 
conducted risk assessments on day-to-day matters. 
 
“Risk assessment is a day-to-day, I guess, its something which we do on a day-to-
day basis, all day, every day. Risk assessments, whether it just be parking aircraft, 
whether it be monitoring the apron to make sure that passengers are safe, whether 
we’re doing any works airside, its really just something which you do all the time. 
Whether formally or informally.” S-APT-C-01 
 
Whilst there was a normalised component of this process, a documented formal risk 
register also exists. A number of separate documents and processes also existed in 
parallel to each other to give the airport an understanding of risk and hazards 
involved. These included the formal risk register, incident reports and hazard reports. 
However, there can often be a lag with the currency of the risk register, as it was not 
regularly updated. The following participant explained in more detail the review 
function of the risk registers.   
 
“…once a year I sit with the management team and we go through every single one 
and it’s a year since I’ve done that last, more than that now, 16 months, go through 
every single risk one by one, are we still on the level here? I wouldn’t suggest it’s an 
ideal structure, but its at least documenting what our concerns are and testing our 
resolve on whether there’s any more to add. That’s pretty much where we’re at.” 
SM-APT-C-01 
                                                         
12 Documents APTC2 and APTC4 
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As previously mentioned, a hazard reporting structure and an incident reporting 
structure also existed. However, these were not currently linked to the risk registers, 
and in addition, there was no link between any of these functions to the BCPs. It was 
in this instance that the risk assessment component loses its maturity, as there was no 
direct reference to the BCP framework. The following participant explains this more 
fully. 
 
“The risk registers, I don’t think inform the BCP at this point. And they don’t inform 
it enough. They are more sort of an overall vibe” SM-APT-C-01.  
 
The lack of linkages between risk assessment practices (including risk registers, 
hazard reporting and hazard registers) and continuity management was the principal 
reason for the lack of maturity in this area. While risk assessment itself was 
reasonably sound, few ways were identified where the outcomes informed the scope 
and boundaries of continuity planning.  
 
6.5.4 Risk Assessment Cross-Case Comparison 
 
Maturity Level Airport A Airport B Airport C 
Novice    
Intermediate    
Advanced    
Mature    
 
A consistent theme observed during risk assessment was that of a lack of linkages 
between pre-existing risk registers and risk assessments to business continuity 
procedures. As discussed throughout Section 6.5, the lack of integration between 
established risk management practice and continuity management was a significant 
hindrance in achieving maturity. This could be attributed to the attitude within 
airports that view these processes as separate, and the links between are not yet well 
understood. All three case study sites needed to strengthen links between their risk 
management processes and business continuity management to ensure that the 
continuity management addresses the key vulnerabilities of the organisation. By 
effectively implementing these changes, the maturity of the risk assessment 
component of the continuity management process can easily be improved.  
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In contrast, all three airports contained a formalised risk management approach. 
Airport A utilised a framework developed from council, and adjusted this further to 
suit their particular organisational needs. This indicated an intermediate level 
approach, through the understanding that standardised approaches can only serve as a 
starting point and highlighted the need for unique risk management approaches. 
Airport B had a number of well-implemented and practiced risk management 
strategies. These existed as formalised documents, with risk principles being 
considered even during the design phase for new infrastructure. Finally, Airport C 
also had a formalised risk management system which was borrowed from their 
overarching council organisation. A level of maturity in risk thinking was 
demonstrated as it was utilised on a day-to-day basis, in an informal manner as 
decisions are made.  
 
6.6 Business Impact Assessment  
The BIA is viewed as the most fundamental component of the business continuity 
lifecycle (Barnes 2007, 145; 2011, 166). The BIA establishes the critical business 
functions of the organisation, the maximum time these functions can be unavailable 
and the objective for recovering these services to normal functionality. Further, the 
BIA provides for a rigorous examination of system interdependency, allowing the 
organisation to restore services in the correct order. As continuity is examined from 
the perspective of critical functions to the organisation, plans are not bound by a 
particular scenario (Cornish 2011, 122). This gives the organisation the flexibility to 
be prepared for scenarios not previously envisioned by the organisation. The 
following Sections 6.6.1-6.6.3 discuss BIA maturity at each of the three airports.  
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6.6.1 Business Impact Assessment Airport A  
 
Novice 
 
 
Intermediate 
 
Advanced 
 
Mature  
At the time of research no BIA activities had been completed or were underway at 
Airport A. BIA activities were planned to be completed as a component of the 
upcoming continuity management implementation. At the time of research, a draft 
BIA framework had been created 13 , however this had not been filled with any 
relevant information or undergone a workshop scenario to completed. Therefore, this 
component of the BCM process is ranked at the novice level.  
6.6.2 Business Impact Assessment Airport B  
 
Novice 
 
 
Intermediate 
 
Advanced 
 
Mature  
Airport B had undertaken significant Business Impact Assessments (BIAs), also 
under the tenure of an external consultant. This was a component of an overall 
consultant engagement to deliver the Business Continuity program.  This resulted in 
26 BIAs, as present in documents14. Outages were discussed under the main areas of 
loss of building, loss of staff, loss of technology, loss of equipment or loss of a third 
party. The BIAs contained an identification of critical business functions, 
interdependencies and workarounds. The only component missing from these BIAs 
was an identification of RTOs. This process had given the organisation a higher 
degree of knowledge as to what can occur when any kind of interruption occurs, as 
explained by the following staff member. 
 
“I actually think that we do know what will be affected when there’s an interruption. I 
think that people have got a pretty good idea of what the issues are.”  S-APT-C-01 
 
The process also provided education for the organisation, as to where vulnerabilities 
exist and how these could be reduced or eliminated by making changes to their 
current practice. As a result, the organisation could proactively reduce both the                                                         
13Document APTA1 
14Documents APTB4, APTB5, APTB6, APTB7, APTB8, APTB9, APTB10, APTB11, APTB12, APTB13, APTB14, APTB15, 
APTB16, APTB17, APTB18, APTB19, APT20, APTB21, APTB22, APTB23, APTB24, APTB25, APTB26, APTB27, 
APTB28, APTB29, APTB30. 
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likelihood of an incident occurring, and the consequences should an incident occur. 
This knowledge was apparent in both those with a familiarity with BCM, as 
explained by the first two quotes, and as an educative tool for those without previous 
knowledge, as explained by the final quote.  
 
“The difficult part was that it was an education process to understand why you needed 
to do a BIA and what is a BIA and what it means... having done them in other 
organisation, it’s a really useful process to go through.”  M-APT-B-02 
 
“And actually we learned a bit from it as well. So it was a good process to go through 
because it helped us think about which were the critical items, whether it be staff, 
whether it be infrastructure. It educated us as well.”  M-APT-B-01 
 
“The electrical guys were a bit sceptical about the whole thing, but by the end of it you 
could see they had actually been thinking of what we had discussed and putting in place 
workarounds themselves and that they didn’t have all their tools in one area and things 
like that.’  S-APT-C-01 
 
Therefore, BIAs had been completed for all the business units, along with acceptable 
outage times. The process of conducting BIAs had also educated staff who 
previously were unaware of the process and gave them a good knowledge of the 
importance of continuity management.                   
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6.6.3 Business Impact Assessment Airport C  
 
Novice 
 
 
Intermediate 
 
Advanced 
 
Mature  
Business Impact Assessments at Airport C were classified at the intermediate level. 
The airport had some level of documented impact assessments15, which identified 
the critical business process, the financial impact of disruption, and recovery times. 
These critical business processes were also linked to shared common resources 
required, such as electricity, servers and water. While this document had been 
created, it had not been regularly updated and therefore in a number of areas did not 
reflect the current reality of the organisation.  
 
“I was really happy with the amount of work I had done on actually what an 
acceptable outage was, and what parts of the business would be affected. But it 
hadn’t been translated into a living document, so therefore when I look at it in 2011 
I go ‘wow, we must have missed a whole heap of really critical elements in the 
business.’” SM-APT-C-01 
 
The BIA did not reflect the current situation of the organisation, and did not contain 
sufficient detail to build effective continuity plans. Two business components had 
been identified which were not included within the BIA. This was because the BIA 
had not been updated since it was created, and therefore had not captured these new 
business components. Secondly, there was insufficient data to effectively build 
continuity plans, as detail including MAOs and RTOs had not been established. The 
following management level participant identified the current level of MAOs and 
RTOs present at Airport C.  
 
“We certainly wouldn’t have the maximum allowable outage time or recovery time. 
We probably wouldn’t have that type of thing down here. Some of the allowable 
outage times like compliance issues like serviceability for some of our movement 
area, at times we would have that…but as far as every part of the business goes, no.” 
M-APT-C-02 
                                                         
15Document APTC1 
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In order to improve the maturity of BIAs, they must become a living document that 
accurately reflects the business structure of the organisation. Detail of MAOs and 
RTOs must be established in order to give a fuller understanding of the criticalities of 
each business function.  There also needs to be a stronger link between BIAs and any 
continuity plans in place, as any recovery actions need to be created with the 
information outlined in the BIA in mind. 
6.6.4 Business Impact Assessment Cross-Case Comparison  
Maturity Level Airport A Airport B Airport C 
Novice    
Intermediate    
Advanced    
Mature    
 
Across the three case study sites there was significant difference in levels of BIA 
maturity. This, in turn was accompanied by little similarity in approaches. Airport B 
represented the most advanced approach to the BIA. Airport B’s approach comprised 
a comprehensive identification of critical business functions, accompanied by their 
relevant maximum acceptable outage times and interdependencies. Whilst this 
approach was reasonably mature, a number of elements could have been added in 
order to increase maturity further. These include a firm establishment of 
interdependencies between systems and a suggested order by which the systems 
should be restored. Airport C demonstrated the next highest level of maturity. 
Airport C had documented critical business functions and identified some level of 
interdependencies. Airport C required further development of formal MAOs and 
RTOs in order to increase maturity. Airport A has yet to complete any BIAs and 
therefore, is at the very bottom of the scale in terms of process maturity.  
 
Two significant observations can be made regarding BIA maturity. The first of these 
is that the airport which was the most mature, airport B, by a significant extent, had 
engaged a consultant with the specific task of producing BIAs. This maturity 
indicates that applying an effort directly at BIAs significantly increases their 
maturity. The second observation can be made regarding the stage of implementation 
of each of the airports. Generally, the further along the implementation scale airports 
were, the more developed their BIAs. These observations indicate the importance of 
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specific attention to continuity management development, as mature BIAs assist in 
further implementing continuity processes.  
 
6.7 Continuity Plans  
Continuity plans are the main stage of documentation resulting from the business 
continuity process. They contain detailed response plans for each of the critical 
business functions. While there is no set format for continuity plans, there are a 
number of core components that they should address. Plans should contain response, 
continuity and recovery strategies to address the continued operation of the critical 
business functions identified during the BIA. The following Sections (6.7.1-6.7.3) 
discuss continuity plans currently present at the three airport case study sites.   
 
6.7.1 Continuity Plans Airport A  
 
Novice 
 
 
Intermediate 
 
Advanced 
 
Mature  
Airport A had not completed a business continuity program, and therefore had no 
specific continuity plans in place. A number of response and recovery protocols are 
contained within the aerodrome emergency plan (AEP). However, AEP protocols 
were centred around disruptions to aviation operations, principally crash on airport 
scenarios. As detailed in Section 2.7, legislative requirements inform the content of 
the AEP. This means that the organisation had only developed response and recovery 
procedures for a specific type of incidents. This did not extend to other kinds of 
corporate emergencies which can affect the organisation. Further, as it was not 
developed off a comprehensive business impact analysis, these plans did not take 
into account established MAOs and RTOs.  
 
“Response plans that we have within the airport emergency program, we have 
detailed responses to aircraft incidents, to structural fires, to natural disasters in 
terms of cyclone, we have a specific cyclone plan, earthquake that type of thing and 
then another group over here that have kind of integrated for any security incident 
that happen here, detailed response plan of who the combat authority is, who the 
support agencies are, what is the hierarchy for the response in terms of from the 
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airport through to council and through to all levels of government and responding 
agencies. That’s quite formalised.” SM-APT-A-01 
 
In regards to continuity plan documentation, at the time of research no 
documentation existed. This was principally due to the stage of BCM 
implementation of the organisation, as they were a number of stages away from 
continuity plans. While some level of response and recovery planning existed within 
AEPs, this did not negate from the lack of any continuity plans.  
 
6.7.2 Continuity Plans Airport B  
 
Novice 
 
 
Intermediate 
 
Advanced 
 
Mature  
Airport B had formalised continuity plans for each group of the organisation, for 
example airside operations, finance, and risk management. These continuity plans16 
contained the critical business functions, their maximum acceptable outage time, 
appropriate workaround strategies and appropriate recovery strategies. There were a 
number of important observations regarding these continuity plans. The first of these 
were that the plans themselves were incomplete. Not all of the sections had been 
completed, and therefore had not been developed into approved plans. For example, 
contact lists were incomplete, as were testing and training details. Therefore, at the 
time of research, the plans were not able to be activated during an event. Secondly, 
plans had not undergone either a test or review cycle. This is further discussed in 
Sections 6.8.2 and 6.10.2. The following management level participant indicated that 
the outcome of the continuity planning process had been the development of 
satisfactory continuity plans. 
 
“I think they’re good, I think we know what’s come out of it has been a good result.” M-
APT-B-02 
 
However, there were some areas identified for improvement by the participants 
themselves. This indicates that organisational members themselves understand the                                                         
16 Documents APTB31, APTB32, APTB33, APTB34, APTB35, APTB36, APTB37, APTB38, APTB39, APTB40, APTB41, 
APTB42, APTB43, APTB44, APTB45, APTB46, APTB47, APTB48, APTB49, APTB50 
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current limitations existing plans. The plans, while documented, may not be in the 
user-friendliest format, as the instructions and options could be clearer. The 
following two participants explained how the documents could be in a more usable 
format, and that this would reduce the need for specific training of staff in their use.  
 
“Its not as user friendly as it should be and one of the things we’ve learnt in rolling out 
other business processes is that it needs to be quite simple…my aim would be, whenever 
time permits to use the same data but structure it in such a way that people can actually 
use it so its more user friendly.” M-APT-B-01 
 
“It needs to be more intuitive, I don’t think you should need a lot of training in how to 
actually use it, you should be able to pick it up and know exactly what you need to do.” 
S-APT-B-01 
 
There was also the potential for responders to act on previous experiential and tacit 
knowledge during an incident, rather than referring to established, documented 
procedures. Staff often reacted to business not as usual situations from experience 
and instinct. While often this experience resulted in responses which were mostly 
similar to those documented, in some cases they did not match up. This difference 
between planned response and actual response is illustrated by the following senior 
manager. 
 
“I think people still act intuitively and in the sense, they don’t realise there is a plan, 
actually, that they’ve helped develop, so a lot of the time it will match up, but that’s sort 
of a bit, you know, rolling the dice a bit. So I want them to be able to say ‘right, ok, yep, 
we’ve got a plan, what is it, lets go to the plan, ok, lets follow through these steps.’ Now 
until they can do that naturally, I don’t think we’re at a high level yet.” SM-APT-B-01 
 
This was often due to the nature of airport operations – the staff at the forefront of 
day-to-day business often adapt to minor deviations to business as usual. The 
drawback of this was that it makes implementation of a documented procedure more 
difficult, and to ensure that staff follow this rather than acting purely on their 
experience. Therefore, there was still a tendency to act on experience, rather than 
follow a documented procedure. The organisation did not yet have the mature 
capability within the plans as they have not yet been tested and trained, and are not 
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yet imbedded enough within the organisation that they override the pre-existing 
ingrained response notions. This resulted in the assessment of continuity plans at 
Airport B at the level of Advanced.   
6.7.3 Continuity Plans Airport C  
 
Novice 
 
 
Intermediate 
 
Advanced 
 
Mature  
Continuity plans themselves at Airport C were in the novice range. This is due to the 
fact that formalised continuity plans to deal with each of the critical business 
functions at this stage, did not exist. Many response procedures were contained in 
other organisational documents, such as the aerodrome emergency plan, however no 
such similar detailed plan existed for BCP. This is explained by the following 
participant. 
 
“Well the problem is our aerodrome manual has a whole heap of documentation 
that almost takes care of a lot of this. Our aerodrome emergency plan is quite 
comprehensive, its exercised regularly, and that has stand up and stand down 
procedures of recovery, so I’m not sure why I haven’t linked our BCP much more 
heavily to that document, why I was looking to develop my own, probably through 
my lack of understanding of what a BCP really constituted, so I guess what I was 
looking at I that we do have some continuity plans, but they’re not considered in the 
BCP frame…so I’m not saying that we don’t have any, but at the same time our 
understanding of the linkages doesn’t exist, and its all very low-level.” SM-APT-C-
01 
 
The comparative maturity of the aerodrome emergency plan compared to continuity 
plans was identified by a number of participants. This is further illustrated by the 
following staff level participant.  
 
“I think a lot of our plans are very formally placed in our, like for instance our 
aerodrome manual, our emergency planning. They’re all formalised, I think there’s 
no real grey areas I guess. If we have an incident our response is fairly much the 
same, to whatever incident may occur here at the airport. So there’s no real, I guess 
it doesn’t really leave much for people to try and, if its in there and laid out in the 
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aerodrome manual the AEP that’s how we respond, and we respond accordingly.” 
S-APT-C-01 
 
Continuity plans at Airport C are in the novice range, due to the lack of documented 
continuity plans. A range of critical functions were identified during the BIA, 
however these were not translated into plans which detail appropriate response, 
continuity and recovery actions for each. Airport C contained sufficient emergency 
response protocols, which can address some response issues but does not cover 
strategies to continue reduced operations and restoration to business as usual. Further, 
these response scenarios only addressed operational disturbances, not the wider 
range of threats which the organisation may face.   
 
6.7.4 Continuity Plans Cross-Case Comparison  
Maturity Level Airport A Airport B Airport C 
Novice    
Intermediate    
Advanced    
Mature    
 
Continuity plans are one of the components that was less mature than others within 
all three airports investigated. A common theme among Airports A and C was the 
lack of a current documented continuity management specific plan. In these instances, 
there was a tendency to rely on existing emergency response documentation, 
principally the Aerodrome Emergency Plan (AEP). There were a number of 
limitations that accompany this approach. To begin, there was limited detail within 
these plans to adequately provide for a continuity-based response. Although plans do 
contain some level of the core components of continuity plans, being emergency 
response, continuity and recovery (Standards Australia 2006, 93), this was in specific 
reference to aviation emergency incidents. AEPs do not address the wide array of 
other organisational failures that could occur. As noted by Elliott, Swartz and 
Herbane (2002, 11), BCM has the ability to address many types of organisational 
failure.  
 
However, there are a number of considerations that influence this reality. As outlined 
in Section 2.7, Australian airports are bound by CASA MOS 139, which outlines 
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compliance obligations from a safety perspective. As the consequences for non-
compliance are severe, airports must dedicate a large amount of resources to 
conducting these activities. Therefore, there are fewer resources available for 
activities which are non-mandated such as BCM. Mandated responses are also well-
practiced, which may lead to airports believing that further response protocols are 
not required. 
 
Airport B demonstrated a more mature approach to continuity plans than the other 
airports. Airport B has developed documented plans which are based off their 
completed BIAs. Whilst these plans contained specific response procedures and 
guidelines, they still required some adjustment in order to be effectively 
implemented. As discussed previously in Section 6.6.2, participants outlined that the 
lack of embedded response and potential inadequacies of the format as some of the 
drawbacks of the current approach.   
 
6.8 Testing and Training  
Testing and training occurs in the latter stages of BCM implementation. Testing of 
plans serves to ensure plans are effective and workable, in addition to testing their 
currency against current organisational requirements.  Further, training ensures that 
staff who will be required to activate plans have a knowledge of what they will be 
required to do in that event. Testing and training can occur in many forms, from 
desktop exercises through to full live exercising. The following Sections 6.8.1-6.8.3 
discuss testing and training at each airport.  
6.8.1 Testing and Training Airport A  
 
Novice 
 
 
Intermediate 
 
Advanced 
 
Mature  
At the time of data collection, business continuity specific testing and training did 
not exist at Airport A. There were a number of other areas where testing and training 
of response protocols was present. As with continuity plan documentation itself, this 
can be more significantly observed within the AEP. Much of this was driven by 
compliance requirements, as detailed in Section 2.7. The following participant 
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explained the emergency plan testing compliance regulations Airport A must adhere 
to. 
 
“We are mandated to test on an annual basis either by alternate years, tabletop 
exercise or a full field exercise.” M-APT-A-01 
 
Further testing and training did exist, however this is predominantly based around 
operational requirements. This resulted in operational protocols being highly tested 
and trained, with less of this rigour being present within other aspects of the 
organisation. Further, testing and training of response protocols is heavily influenced 
by the requirements for safety and security compliance with relevant legislation. This 
perspective is further detailed by the following senior management participant.  
 
“In terms of testing and training, it’s all based on the operational aspects of the 
airport, in terms of exercising of the airport emergency plan and the airport security 
program. Both of those are tested regularly by a field exercise at least once a year 
and a tabletop exercise – all those exercises involve outside stakeholders. And once 
again that’s a mandatory requirement.” SM-APT-A-01 
 
Therefore, when considering the maturity of continuity management specific testing 
and training, this can be considered at the novice level. Contrastingly, within other 
areas of the organisation there were rather developed components of testing and 
training. There was significant potential for the organisation to utilise testing and 
training components developed within other areas for the purposes of BCM. This 
notion is further discussed in Section 6.8.4.    
6.8.2 Testing and Training Airport B  
 
Novice 
 
 
Intermediate 
 
Advanced 
 
Mature  
Testing and training of BCPs had not been undertaken in Airport B. This was due to 
the stage of the continuity management process the organisation was in, as the plans 
themselves had just been completed, and were due to be implemented in the coming 
months. This was well known throughout the organisation and reflected from the 
following two participants.  
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“There hasn’t been any training, not that I’m aware of…just when we were reviewing 
the documents, you know we went through it again, we made a few changes but that is 
all.” M-APT-B-02 
 
“Well we haven’t done any yet, we just haven’t got to that stage of the process.” S-APT-
B-01 
 
Interestingly, some practices which could be beneficial to continuity management 
practice already existed in the organisation, within the operational focus of the 
business. This primarily consisted of testing and training procedures, as well those 
addressing  monitoring, review and learning. Testing and training was conducted 
regularly for response procedures, both internally and externally, as illustrated by the 
following response of a senior management participant.  
 
“Because we do our own in house training, so the emergency manager in his role 
continually he has a whole series of internal desktops or training things that he’ll do 
with the key player because we have two groups which are here 24/7, they’re the 
major responsible officers because with the rest of us being dayworkers we could be 
at home, so they’re here on weekends. So they get quite a lot of training in terms of 
what is their responsibility, what they are supposed to do, how do we deal with an 
issue, how do we problem solve, how do we workaround, all those things are done 
quite regularly.” SM-APT-B-01 
 
Testing and training was lacking within Airport B’s continuity management 
programme. It had not yet been undertaken or planned, which is a key area of 
capacity the airport must address in order to improve their continuity management 
maturity. Airport B could seek to increase maturity in this area by using the training 
frameworks already in use in other areas of the airport for business continuity 
training.    
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6.8.3 Testing and Training Airport C  
 
Novice 
 
 
Intermediate 
 
Advanced 
 
Mature  
At the time of data collection there was no testing or training of BCP in place at 
Airport C, nor were there any concrete plans to introduce this. A consistent theme 
was that of more maturity existing in testing and training of airport emergency 
procedures, a similar notion observed in the two previous case study sites. While this 
indicated that continuity planning based testing and training was low, there was 
scope to incorporate existing mature testing and training protocols into continuity 
management practice. The following participant outlines this approach.  
 
“In the context of BCP testing and training, low. In the context of testing and 
training in other emergency procedures that could be integrated into a BCP, we’re 
medium to high.” SM-APT-C-01 
 
As observed in the other two airports, there was a high level of testing and training in 
the organisation. This was predominantly based around AEP emergency exercising. 
Airport C demonstrated a reasonable level of maturity and fluency in this area, as 
explained by the following participant.  
 
“We do a full emergency exercise this year, we did a tabletop this year with all the 
emergency services, which I facilitated. Everyone knew what their jobs were, and so 
that went well. That gave me the confidence that if it did get tough that these people 
would just come and do their jobs” M-APT-C-01 
 
Business continuity management based testing and training ranges from desktop 
walkthroughs to full live exercising (Armit 2007, 328-336). These skills were 
already present in Airport C, as they were completed as a component of AEP testing 
requirements. Further, a component of response dealt with the possibility that 
airports may be entirely shut down with the airport having little to no control over 
restoring operations. This was another example of skills and expertise that can be 
transferred from different functional areas into business continuity practice. This was 
explained below by the following participant.  
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“This year’s AEP exercise which was a desktop, that’s more of an emergency 
response not a business continuity thing. As a part of the response you will deal with 
how you can keep operating if you can, but you also recognise that you might be 
shut down completely” M-APT-C-02 
 
However, it was also indicated that there was room for more growth in emergency 
response training and procedures. This was due to the fact that often only the 
minimum levels required to achieve safety compliance are undertaken (as directed by 
CAS regulation MOS 139). This was explained by the following participant, who 
comments on the minimum requirements set forth for testing, and how these could be 
improved.  
 
“I think the training area is something we could improve upon. We certainly do our 
desktop scenario exercises, but I think that’s an area we could certainly improve 
upon. The AEP we have to have, we have at least our minimum exercise there, 
whether it be desktops or full on exercise.” M-APT-C-02 
 
While Airport C had testing and training procedures in place, the lack of any specific 
testing and training for continuity management gives this a novice ranking. For this 
airport to mature their overall continuity management approach, testing and training 
procedures that include continuity management must commence. As observed with 
both other airports, existing testing and training procedures have the potential to be 
utilised for the purposes of continuity management.    
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6.8.4 Testing and Training Cross-Case Comparison 
 
Maturity Level Airport A Airport B Airport C 
Novice    
Intermediate    
Advanced    
Mature    
 
Commonly observed in all three case studies was a lack of continuity planning 
specific testing and training. None of the three airports identified had undertaken any 
testing and training at the time of research. Testing and training is a key component 
of ensuring that plans are not only effective and practical in meeting their goals, but 
that staff are aware of what they need to do in the event of a plan activation (Hiles 
2011b, 414). All of the three case studies further mentioned the developed level of 
AEP testing and training that currently is in place. While the AEP was practiced and 
exercised, this did not serve as an adequate substitute for effective business 
continuity testing and training. This is principally due to the limited scope of AEP 
based testing and training, as it does not cover the full range of crises or disturbances 
which may affect the organisation.  
 
Another consistent theme throughout the three case studies was the presence of 
advanced testing and training policy and procedure elsewhere. This was most 
commonly observed in the operations component of the organisation, particularly in 
regards to the AEP. This advanced level of testing and training practices can serve as 
a bridge for the organisation to increase their level of testing and training maturity. 
This can be achieved through two different means. The first is to borrow the same 
testing and training protocols and then adjust the content to address business 
continuity testing and training. The second is to add a business continuity component 
to testing and training that occurs. For example, this could include considering a 
business continuity failure during an AEP full live exercise. These are two ways that 
testing and training could be improved in all three case study airports.  
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6.9 Communication and Consultation  
Communication and consultation includes a number of activities, both during plan 
development and plan activation. Their main purpose is to ensure both adequate 
input from relevant stakeholders during plan development and activation, and 
relevant communication strategies to each type of stakeholder in the event of 
continuity plan activation. Communication and consultation can exist in many forms, 
although it is important to note that the format should be appropriate to each kind of 
stakeholder. The following Sections (6.9.1-6.9.3) detail communication and 
consultation activities at the three case study sites.   
6.9.1 Communication and Consultation Airport A  
 
Novice 
 
 
Intermediate 
 
Advanced 
 
Mature  
Communication and consultation was present throughout a number of areas within 
Airport A, ranging from emergency response protocols and development, 
environmental assessment and future developments. The overarching council 
organisation had a range of guidelines as to how to engage with the community 
through consultation. The airport took this a step further and considers the council as 
another external stakeholder. This allowed for the airport to ensure sufficient focus is 
given to all stakeholders, including the airport. Therefore Airport A had a vast level 
of experience with implementing consultation practices on a number of different 
levels, with particular reference to external consultation. The following participant 
gives more detail to consultation practices.  
 
“Council has guidelines for community consultation and we operate within the 
broader guidelines of that community consultant. But we take, I guess a further – 
they talk about the – community consultation program talks about council engaging 
with the community and stakeholders. Our view is that the council is another 
stakeholder so we try and exact ourselves a little bit further away and we ensure that 
we engage with council and the other parts of council as vigorously as we do with 
other stakeholders.” SM-APT-A-01 
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Communication protocols were also present within Airport A, with particular 
reference to emergency response procedures. Detailed communication protocols 
existed for different roles and responsibilities within airport emergency response. 
Airport A provided further detailed documentation which specifically outlines 
specific roles and responsibilities during an incident. The following participant 
further explains staff roles during a crisis.  
 
“We break ours down even further as to say you know the role of the operations 
manager is this and there will be a page and a half on what their responsibilities are. 
There will be a page and a half on what the reporting officer’s duties are, a page 
and a half of what my responsibilities are and even down to receptionist and clerical 
staff who virtually jump to the role of scribes.” S-APT-C-01  
Moreover, there were some specific continuity management communication and 
consultation activities observed during the data collection engagement. During the 
continuity management development process a number of consultative meetings 
occurred between the consultant responsible and airport management. 
Communication and consultation practices were highly evident at Airport A. These 
consist of both consultation outside the airport during protocol development and 
planning, through to communication protocols established for emergencies. While 
these strategies were effective, there was no link between these and continuity 
planning. These strategies should be effectively implemented when business 
continuity planning has reached this phase. Due to the limited amount of 
communication and consultation which was specific to BCM, a ranking of novice 
was achieved.  
 
6.9.2 Communication and Consultation Airport B  
 
Novice 
 
 
Intermediate 
 
Advanced 
 
Mature  
Communication and consultation was observed at a high level within Airport B, 
particularly within the development phase. Each continuity plan was developed in 
direct consultation with the functional group responsible, ensuring the applicability 
of workaround solutions. This level of engagement was discussed by a number of 
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respondents, who identified that the communication and consultation process 
involved all important members and had produced an accurate representation of each 
group’s operational requirements.  The following participants outline the 
communication and consultation process that was undertaken.  
 
“its not something that we have developed the plan for them and then going to force it 
upon them, you know, the whole thing was done in consultation with them to work our 
their own BCP. That’s fair.” S-APT-B-01 
 
“It was an all-inclusive consultative process to get to the outcome of delivering the BCP. 
And I do believe that they, in most cases they would say they know and understand and 
own the BCP. Ok, because it’s theirs.” M-APT-B-01 
 
“Communication is great, communicated what it was all about, obviously the 
consultation was very strong because we worked with them (consultants) to develop 
them, and it was their expertise that asked all the right questions to get all the right 
information out of us, so yeah it was very good….its definitely been a team effort.” M-
APT-B-02.  
 
This level of consultation, however, had not extended outside the organisation. This 
was critical for the organisation as they rely on a number of 3rd parties to deliver 
essential services, including key functions to ensure the continued operation of the 
airport. As the following manager explains, the level of consultation was minimal 
and only extended to assessing whether key suppliers who delivered essential 
services had some form of continuity practices in place.  
 
“There was preliminary, and during the BIA to understand mainly those, like 
airservices, and the order agencies but it only related to one off conversations…once we 
have identified our key stakeholders, this is where I want to make sure that those 3rd 
parties, the BCP owner establishes that relationship and they actually sell the BCPs, you 
know, message to those third parties.” M-APT-B-01 
 
Communication during incidents, while difficult to assess by the researcher, as these 
plans have not yet been activated, has been indicated as reasonably high. Much of 
this maturity in during incident communication stems from other incident response 
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practices within the organisation, which involve a large amount of formalised and 
practiced communications procedure. While this is not explicitly contained in BCP 
documentation, it is of high likelihood that these communication channels would be 
used during BCP activation. This is outlined by the following management level 
participant.  
 
“If you include, it depends on what your view of BCP is, because it’s a complete system 
and part of that system is the incident management processes and the crisis management 
processes and the crisis management team, then I think there are established 
communication protocols in place, but I don’t believe that we are well enough advanced 
yet that you can really rely on them totally, I still think there’s a fair bit for us to go, 
others may think differently but that’s ok.” M-APT-B-01 
 
Overall communication strategies were ranked as advanced due to the mature 
practices identified during plan development, and the strength of existing in-incident 
communication protocols. The area where Airport B could have further developed 
their maturity was through more effectively engaging with external stakeholders for 
continuity management practices. Lower levels of maturity were observed where 
during incident communication protocols have not yet officially been absorbed into 
the BCP program, nor tested or trained in that context.   
6.9.3 Communication and Consultation Airport C  
 
Novice 
 
 
Intermediate 
 
Advanced 
 
Mature  
At Airport C, during plan development, communication and consultation with critical 
functions of the business was limited. This was undertaken by the one individual, the 
same staff member who was responsible for the continuity management process. 
However, much of this was informal and no documentation was produced which 
detailed these specific interactions. The following participant explains how 
communication and consultation occurred during plan development.    
“I did spend a lot of time talking to different people, but I didn’t communicate what 
the outcomes of that were. So I did ask a lot of people what they thought about 
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things being broken or our of service, or what they would do I spoke to IT and 
different sort of interactions with all the different people, but there was never any 
feedback after saying what the outcomes were” SM-APT-C-01 
 
However, as observed in a number of BCM components, similar processes occurred 
for different needs at a higher level of maturity than within continuity management. 
Generally, when conducting emergency planning development there was a high level 
of consultation between important groups internally and key external parties. The 
following participant explains how this occurred, and the need for good external 
engagement.  
 
“Certainly in here I don’t do anything like that without talking to the key people like 
air traffic control, ground handlers downstairs, even if its something they don’t need 
to decide on, if its going to effect them you have to talk to them or its very difficult to 
get it done otherwise.” M-APT-C-02 
 
As previously discussed, Airport C, while having not enacted their business 
continuity plans, did experience a disruptive event, namely a flood. This provided an 
excellent example of how the airport communicated with others during a crisis event. 
One tangible feature of this was daily SITREPS (Situation Reports), which were 
provided to external parties and other members of the wider community (such as 
council). This amounted to 27 SITREPS, detailing the current situation at the airport, 
including damage to the terminal and runways, operation of surrounding 
infrastructure (such as the control tower) and estimated times for reopening.  The 
following participant explains how communication during the incident occurred. 
 
“I thought the communication during the floods was excellent, flow of information, 
internal and external. And between the external parties it was good.” M-APT-C-01 
 
In a similar vein to a number of other observed factors, mature communication and 
consultation practices existed in emergency response procedures, contrasted against 
less mature communication and consultation during plan development. In order for 
these practices to further mature, it will be necessary for the airport to more formally 
document the outcomes and detail of during plan communication and consultation.   
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6.9.4 Communication and Consultation Cross-Case Comparison 
 
Maturity Level Airport A Airport B Airport C 
Novice    
Intermediate    
Advanced    
Mature    
 
Varied levels of communication and consultation practice existed within the three 
airport case studies. Airport B demonstrated a high level of communication and 
consultation during plan development. In many ways this can be attributed to the 
manner in which the continuity plan was developed. As an external consultant was 
utilised, there was a high level of meetings and interaction in order to extract the 
information needed to construct a BCP. While during plan activation communication 
is difficult to assess, Airport B demonstrated high levels of communication through 
other practices in the organisation.  
 
The collaborative approach undertaken was in contrast to that of Airport C. At 
Airport C business continuity was undertaken by one individual and limited 
consultation was undertaken with other parties. In a similar fashion to Airport B, 
there was strength in communication response, as demonstrated by their response to 
a recent large-scale natural disaster.  
 
Airport A was in the process of developing a business continuity plan, which offers a 
unique perspective when discussing communication and consultation. Like Airport B, 
Airport A engaged an external consultant to develop their continuity plan. The 
consultancy worked with the airport to ensure that the plan developed is effective 
and accurate. Similarly to Airports B and C, Airport A had strong communication 
and consultation protocols established, with particular reference to the strong role the 
local community plays in council-owned businesses. However, this had not yet been 
integrated into the continuity planning documentation, resulting in a lower level of 
maturity for this criterion.  
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6.10 Monitoring, Review and Learning  
Monitoring, review and learning is the final stage of the BCM process, and is 
concerned with ensuring that plans remain current and fit for purpose. Monitoring is 
the ongoing process of moderating plans to ensure they remain current with the 
organisation’s objectives. Review is a more formalised process where plans are 
reviewed and updated on either a calendar basis or because a trigger point indicating 
a significant change has occurred. Learning specifically refers to taking the outcomes 
of review procedures or real incidents and incorporating these changes back into the 
relevant plans. The following Sections 6.10.1-6.10.3 discuss monitoring, review and 
learning procedures at each of the three airports.  
6.10.1 Monitoring, Review and Learning Airport A  
 
Novice 
 
 
Intermediate 
 
Advanced 
 
Mature  
Currently there were no monitoring, review and learning procedures in place at 
Airport A. Similarly to other components of the business continuity management 
process, there was evidence of these processes existing within other operational 
parameters. The following participant explained the review process which occurred 
for AEP amendments and changes.   
“Any changes to the AEP have to be approved by the committee, so any changes are 
flagged, given to the committee just for dissection, they come back with any 
questions or queries and if there are none, we raise a motion that the AEP changes 
are accepted and seconded. So we do that to maintain transparency, but also to 
maintain I guess control of the document, that it’s not just changed willy-nilly and 
copies go out flying everywhere that aren’t controlled.” M-APT-A-01 
 
The preceding observation suggests a number of points. First, the organisation had 
first hand experience with review processes, especially within the context of 
emergency response-type protocols. The outcome of this was an understanding of the 
practical aspects of plan review. As airport A had undergone a review process, they 
understood the skills required and steps of the process. While Airport A had not 
conducted monitoring, review and learning for BCM, requisite skilled were present 
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and the airport was experienced in this field. Therefore, the organisation can utilise 
these skills in the case of BCM monitoring, review and learning.  
6.10.2 Monitoring, Review and Learning Airport B  
 
Novice 
 
 
Intermediate 
 
Advanced 
 
Mature  
Monitoring, review and learning strategies had similarly not yet been developed in 
the business continuity area at Airport B. The following staff level participant 
explained how the plans themselves still needed to be finalised, with review practices 
still far in the future.  
 
“We sort of haven’t even thought about it yet, have we? We’ve sort of got to the stage 
were we’ve got the plans in a draft form and they’re not finalised completely because 
we’ve still got to chase up those contact details and things like that, so then you know 
the training and how they’re going to be reviewed and updated and everything, we 
haven’t got to that yet.” S-APT-B-01 
 
However, as observed in other components of BCM, such as testing and training and 
communication and consultation, many of the relevant strategies for monitoring, 
review and learning had been observed in other areas of the organisation. Observed 
predominantly in the operations function, these procedures were mostly in relation to 
incidents, where post-incident reviews were employed in order to discover potential 
weaknesses, and to find potential areas for improvement for future response. This 
was explained by an operations manager in regards to how the organisation used 
review in both day-to-day and outside of the ordinary circumstances.  
 
“Monitoring is ongoing. We have an internal quality audit system here, which we 
use. We have a safety systems manager here who is constantly monitoring the day-
to-day thing, incidents, as I am, and the ops manager too. In terms of review and 
learning, at the end of every shift we do debriefs, and at the start of shift we have a 
brief, but if there’s incidents we have what’s worked, what didn’t work, what we just 
did with the floods. A number of reviews and debriefs, what worked and what could 
be worked better, you know what didn’t work.” M-APT-B-02 
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As Airport B had no established or proposed measures for monitoring, review and 
learning, they were ranked at the novice level. However, as observed in areas such as 
communication and testing and training, advanced practices existed in other areas of 
the organisation, which could be borrowed in some form for continuity management 
purposes.  
6.10.3 Monitoring, Review and Learning Airport C  
 
Novice 
 
 
Intermediate 
 
Advanced 
 
Mature  
There were no formal review procedures for continuity planning at Airport C. 
Reviews were undertaken in a cursory nature and by one individual. The lack of 
progress in this area is demonstrated by the BIAs (discussed in Section 6.6.3), that 
had not yet been updated to reflect the current business structure. The relative 
immaturity of this process was reflected in the limited testing and training protocol 
currently in place. The following participant explained the level of review in place.  
 
“(in reference to frequency of BCP review) at least once a year we review that 
document in a very cursory, in a cursory nature because the state government 
requires us to renew it from a critical infrastructure perspective, but we’ve yet to 
allocate the sort of time it needs to turn it into a living document.” SM-APT-C-01 
 
Review of incidents themselves did occur, however this was mostly from a response 
perspective, and was at times more ad-hoc than formalised. This was more fully 
explained by the following staff level participant.  
 
“With any incidents we do, we endeavour to have a hot-wash up basically after the 
incident while its still fresh in everyone’s mind.” S-APT-C-01 
 
A similar level of reviewing exists regarding AEP protocols. These protocols were 
only reviewed formally on an annual basis, which takes into account all other 
organisational changes that may have occurred. The following participant explained 
how annual review of AEP acts to capture organisational changes.  
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“I guess it’s a matter of just whenever you get the opportunity you might pick up the 
aerodrome manual, have a flick through, get the AEP, have a flick through. Again, 
the AEP is tested annually, but its really only the annual period when we find out 
that a person isn’t on the phone list here, or that person’s moved on, or that 
organisation doesn’t exist anymore, and it isn’t until you review the AEP that those 
things are discovered and found out. So unless people are willing to feed back into 
our organisation’s emergency planning or whatever else its going to be difficult to 
keep all that up to date unless people are being proactive and feeding all that back 
in.” S-APT-C-01 
 
Much of this effort towards review of emergency response documents was 
compliance driven, as with mandatory testing. This assists in explaining why, in 
many cases, there was more maturity seen in emergency response procedures than in 
continuity management, as emergency response contains a legislative requirement to 
be tested and reviewed. The same conditions did not exist for continuity management. 
This is further exemplified by the following participant.  
 
“We are mainly driven by compliance, you sort of fall into that routine of doing it 
though. Probably in the transport security program….we have a spreadsheet that 
shows all our compliance issues and shows, this is an annual go-through etc.” M-
APT-C-02 
 
Airport C requires formalised review and learning procedures for their BCP, which 
did not exist. Some of these procedures exist within other areas of the organisation, 
these procedures were still not as formalised and mature as they could have been. 
More work could be done in these areas to ensure further maturity in these processes.             
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6.10.4 Monitoring, Review and Learning Cross-Case Comparison  
Maturity Level Airport A Airport B Airport C 
Novice    
Intermediate    
Advanced    
Mature     
As observed within testing and training, none of the three airports studied had formal 
monitoring, review and learning strategies established for BCM. Therefore, all three 
airports were rated at a similar novice level of maturity for this BCM component. 
However, as observed during communication and consultation and testing and 
training, the core skills required exist in other areas in the organisation. Much of this 
is found within mandated emergency response procedures in the form of the AEP.  
Airports could gain from utilising existing review procedures and adapting them to 
the specific needs of BCM protocols.  
 
6.11 Conclusion  
Chapter 6 discussed the level of BCM maturity at each of the three airport case study 
sites, from both an overall process perspective, and by investigating individual 
process components. A number of key findings can be determined from the 
preceding analysis. First, one airport (Airport B) had the most mature continuity 
management procedure by a significant level. This may be in some respect 
attributable to the fact that Airport B had historically been longer engaged in 
continuity management than the other two case study sites. Second, a number of 
continuity management components were not established, however these skills were 
present within the organisation, albeit for other purposes or within other functional 
areas. This was consistently observed within all three airports. The following 
Chapter 7, Discussion and Conclusions, explains how the identified BCM practices 
assist in answering the identified research questions, and address the overarching 
research problem.        
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7.0 Discussion and Conclusions                      
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7.1 Introduction  
Chapters 5 and 6 discussed the findings of the two studies - the former investigating 
the presence of reliability traits and the latter levels of maturity for implemented 
BCM. This chapter (Discussion and Conclusions) discusses the findings of both 
studies with respect to the broader research questions posed in Chapter 3. The 
chapter further discusses organisational reliability can best be conceptualised in an 
airport context, as well as outlining effective means of both assessing and 
implementing effective levels of BCM in Australian airports. The Chapter concludes 
by discussing broader implications of this study, in both a scholarly and practical 
context, along with outlining future research directions in this field.  
7.2 Findings Regarding the Research Questions  
Airports are critical infrastructures, which serve a key purpose in the movement of 
goods and people throughout the nation and abroad. The critical requirement for 
airports is further compounded by the nature of Australian geography and 
environment, as aviation is required to connect remote communities, and make travel 
between major centres possible in a timely manner. Current trends, including the 
surge in fly-in fly-out workers to regional centres provides a further layer of 
complexity to the unique and important role airports play in national and regional 
economies. Not only has the growth in fly-in-fly out workers affected regional and 
urban centres, airports have experienced unprecedented growth in this new market. 
In particular, regional airports have been exposed to a significant amount of this 
growth, and an entirely different travel product. This change in traveller 
demographics adds further to the existing role of airports as tourism and transport 
hubs. 
 
As discussed in detail, airports are subject to a wide range of disturbances. These can 
range from operational disturbances to terrorist attacks, inclement weather and other 
organisational crises. It follows that airports must possess strategies that allow for the 
continuation of operations in the event of a disturbance. Without reliability, airports 
are not able to effectively continue functioning, and these failures will lead to further 
disruption of the wider aviation network.  
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The wider context of this thesis is the examination of approaches to continuity 
management, and evaluating the levels of implementation in selected airports. In 
order to carry out this goal a conceptual framework connecting the theoretical 
construct of high reliability with the practitioner process of BCM was developed. 
HRT argues that complex organisations can imbue certain practices that assist them 
in achieving near error-free operation through the production of certain 
managerial/operational traits. While these traits have been identified and documented, 
this has been through observation-based studies, and little empirical work has 
reported on how an organisation can actively create high reliability practices 
(discussed in Chapter 2). An important sub-goal of this work is to explore the gap 
between established, empirical theory, and a means of achieving highly reliable 
processes. As discussed in Section 3.3, BCM is identified as a potential means of 
achieving high reliability.   
 
A core assumption of the conceptual framework for this study was the alignment of 
levels of BCM practice with levels of reliability outcomes. It proposed that certain 
levels of BCM implementation will result in some level of HR outcomes. This 
framework was based on what seemed to be a clear conceptual relationship between 
the outcomes of BCM implementation and high reliability traits. This relationship 
was established by mapping capability outcomes resulting from BCM against HR 
traits identified in literature. The general relationship of BCM and HR, in 
conjunction with the conceptual framework informed the design of data collection 
and wider engagement with airport informants. Data was collected in relation to both 
the current levels of BCM implementation, and the reliability capabilities observed in 
each of the airport case study sites. Following this, efforts were made to link the 
outcomes of both BCM and HR traits in order to address the research problem. This 
investigation is more specifically addressed in the following Section 7.2.1. Detailed 
discussion of findings and analysis for each research question is presented in the 
following Sections. 
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7.2.1 BCM and High Reliability Relationship  
Research question one was principally concerned with investigating high reliability 
practices in airports, and therefore examining the potential relationship between 
effectively implemented BCM and organisational reliability. However, this does not 
represent the whole research problem. Airports must apply effective strategies in 
order to maintain a reliable level of functionality. The Conceptual Framework used 
in this thesis, (see Section 3.4), proposed that effectively implemented BCM could 
generate reliability characteristics, which would therefore increase organisational 
reliability. BCM was purported as a principal agent in order to ensure the continued 
functionality of airport infrastructure, in addition to potentially generating reliability 
traits. Research Question One stated the following: 
 
Can BCM generate reliability outcomes?  
 
Examination of this research question sought a better understanding of the potential 
for BCM to result the generation of reliability outcomes, using High Reliability as 
the underlying theoretical construct. Initially, the theoretical framework (Section 3.4) 
proposed a potential link between certain levels of BCM implementation and 
reliability outcomes. This was developed in order to link with the BCM assessment 
protocol, which audited current processes against an external framework. The 
investigation identified a number of components which contributed to an overarching 
understanding of reliability at airports. In fact, reliability in airports resulted from the 
combined effect of a range of components, from many different functional areas, 
working in concert to ensure continued functionality. BCM as a process was a piece 
of the larger picture of airport reliability. This was more significant when 
considering the range of BCM-type processes and policies that existed within other 
functions of the organisation, which, interestingly, were not labelled as BCM.  
Reliability at airports must be understood in its detailed complexity, and the many 
factors that assist and influence its existence.  
 
A number of core conclusions can be made regarding the nature of reliability in 
airport infrastructure, are unpacked in more detail in the following Sections (7.2.1.1 
– 7.2.1.4).  The first Section (7.2.1.1) identifies the generic factors which inform the 
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complete picture of reliability in airports. Following this, comparison is made 
between these reliability factors and the traits suggested in literature, discussing their 
similarities and divergences (Section 7.2.1.2). Of particular note was the relative 
strength of reliability observed in operational functions compared to others, such as 
testing and training for worst-case scenarios. These are detailed in greater detail in 
Section 7.2.1.3. The final conclusion regarding research question one, taking into 
account the results of findings from each of the three case study sites, and discussing 
suggested links between BCM and HR are detailed in Section 7.2.1.4.  
 
7.2.1.1 Generic Factors Impacting Airport Reliability  
As discussed previously, some elements of BCM were identified as assisting in 
generating reliability outcomes. However, these linkages between BCM and 
reliability were identified as only one component of the complete picture of 
reliability at airports.  The identified factors worked in concert to ensure reliability 
and continued functionality of airport infrastructure. The following Table 7.2.1.1 and 
accompanying paragraphs discuss the generic factors impacting on airport reliability. 
These factors are classified in the four areas of Industry factors, Business processes, 
Management and Staff (see Table 7.2.1.1 below). This Section (7.2.1.1) discusses the 
nature of each of these areas and how their subcomponents assist in creating the 
broader notion of reliability in airports.  
 
Table 7.2.1.1 
Generic Factors Impacting Airport Reliability 
Industry Factors Business Processes Management Practices Staff Roles 
OTS Design Processes Corporate Board 
Support 
Commitment to 
Reliable Operations 
CASA MOS 139 Compliance Council Support Flexibility in Small 
Teams 
 Emergency Response 
Incident Review 
Senior Management 
Support 
Focus on Safety and 
Security 
BCM Understanding of 
Need for Reliability 
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Industry factors 
Industry factors refer to industry consistent structural features that contribute to 
reliability, which are also components of operating legislation. Two key industry 
factors were identified that affected the airport, these being the role of CASA MOS 
139 and of OTS regulations. CASA MOS 139 details the safety procedures airports 
must undertake in order to maintain their airport operating certificate. These range 
from airfield lighting, line markings and maintenance, through to emergency 
response protocols. Regulated emergency response planning and protocols are of 
particular significance when considering reliability. As regulations dictate certain 
levels of emergency planning and response, airports must invest a large amount of 
resources into ensuring that these regulations are adhered to. These safety regulations 
often detail parameters in specific terms, such as the distance between lights and the 
intervals between inspections for certain pieces of equipment. Therefore, MOS 139 
contributes to reliability in two ways. The first of these is through the detailing of 
operating requirements for equipment and airfield specifications. These outline safe 
operating parameters, therefore reducing the likelihood of an incident occurring and 
contributing to a reliable operation. The second way MOS 139 contributes to 
reliability is through emergency planning and exercising requirements. As a 
component of regulations, airports must maintain an aerodrome emergency plan 
(AEP), which includes regular testing and exercising. AEP requirements assist in 
both preparing the airport for an incident, should it occur, and having an appropriate 
response plan in place for such incidents.  Testing and training of AEP protocols 
further prepares staff to be able to respond in an appropriate manner should an 
incident occur.  
 
OTS, or the Office of Transport Security regulates transport security throughout 
Australia. While CASA dictates safety requirements, OTS maintains security 
regulation for airports. This security regulation details such components as access 
control, signage and the maintenance of sterile areas. Through the appropriate 
compliance to OTS security requirements, airports reduce the likelihood of a breach 
occurring, which therefore reduces the likelihood that functionality will be 
interrupted.  
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The outcome of these regulations are a raft of safety and security practices which 
airports must undertake in order to retain their licence to operate. If airports do not 
adhere to these regulations, the result can be as severe as an airport licence being 
revoked. However, the significance of emergency response and security regulations 
defines most risk-related response. Airports dedicate a large amount of resources to 
fulfilling these regulated processes, leaving fewer available for corporate emergency 
response processes such as BCM. Airports also possess a large amount of OTS and 
AEP relevant expertise, especially in staff. The same level of expertise is not present 
for BCM. While both these regulatory instruments act to ensure reliability, the focus 
detracts from the possibility of developing more mature BCM processes.  
 
Business Processes 
A number of different business processes were identified as contributing to a reliable 
operation. The first of these was observed during the design phase. Airports 
proactively considered risk-based thinking within the design phase of new 
infrastructure. This meant that a large amount of vulnerability was considered during 
this stage, and therefore airport infrastructure is designed with reliability in mind. 
Therefore, by design alone infrastructure is less vulnerable and more reliable. 
However, it is important to note that these approaches are applied to new 
infrastructure, not existing components of the airport.  
 
Compliance was the second identified business process linked to reliability. 
Compliance processes ensure that the organisation is meeting its legislative 
requirements. Compliance-related actions lead to reliability in two ways. The first of 
these actions ensures that the airport is not in breach of any legislative requirements, 
and therefore can continue operations without the potential risk of a closure. 
Regulatory authorities (CASA and OTS in this instance) maintain far-reaching 
powers, whereby an operating licence can be suspended, and an airport immediately 
shut down.  An effective compliance protocol ensures that cases of non-compliance 
do not occur, which mitigates the aforementioned risk of closure. Secondly, 
compliance activities themselves aid in achieving reliability. This is due to the safety 
and security focus of the appropriate regulations, as discussed previously, which 
ensure fewer failures occur due to safe and secure operation.  
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Emergency response and incident review were the third category of business 
processes identified. Some elements of emergency response are compliance 
regulations, as discussed previously (see Section 2.7). Emergency response 
procedures assist in generating reliability by allowing for effective response and 
recovery to incidents. Accompanying emergency response procedures are incident 
reviews. Incident reviews allow for the airport to critique their response and to learn 
from any shortcomings discovered. The combination of these two processes seeks to 
respond and recover from incidents, and improve response where possible.  
 
Business Continuity Management (BCM) was identified as the final business process 
contributing to reliability. In a similar vein to emergency response, BCM allows for 
continued functionality of the organisation following a disruption. Further, the 
process of implementing BCM often also results in the identification of 
vulnerabilities and proactive risk mitigation practices. The four business processes 
(design processes, compliance, emergency response/incident review and BCM) 
identified collectively inform the picture of reliability at Australian airports.  
 
Management Practice 
Management Practice was the third category of reliability factors identified, 
specifically including board support, council support and management support. 
Board support was present in airports which were privatised and governed by a 
responsible board. A board which supports reliability in both attitude and action (in 
regard to resourcing) is a great contributor to reliability. Within those airports that 
are council owned, council support is the equivalent, acting in a similar fashion. 
Finally, senior management support for reliability and reliability processes is 
paramount in achieving reliability. This top down support encourages staff to act in a 
reliable manner.   
 
Staff Roles 
Themes present at the staff level are the final component in detailing the complexity 
of reliability at Australian airports. The first area identified is that of commitment to 
reliable operations. When staff themselves commit to reliability, they take out their 
day-to-day tasks with reliability in mind, and are less likely to engage in actions 
which can interrupt reliable functioning. This element goes hand in hand with staff 
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understanding the unique operational requirements and the need for the airport to 
operate in a reliable manner. A focus on safety and security was further identified as 
endorsing reliability as an outcome.  This approach was identified predominantly 
within the operational area, where safety and security are the driving forces behind 
any action or decision. As identified previously, safety and security are extensive 
drivers for reliability.  
 
The final component identified within the area of staff, flexibility in small teams, 
was primarily observed within the small and medium sized airports. Small staff sizes 
require staff to know and understand the roles of others, which results in higher 
levels of flexibility and adaptability.  
 
7.2.1.2 Comparison of Identified Reliability Factors and Those Suggested in 
Literature 
 
As these areas of reliability have been identified, it is important to compare the 
observed reliability components with those represented in literature. As discussed at 
length in Chapter 5 Analysis Study One, there was definitive evidence of literature 
suggested reliability factors within the three airports identified. Section 7.2.1.1 
grouped the key components of airport reliability under the four categories of 
Industry Factors, Business Processes, Management and Staff. This Section (7.2.1.2) 
discusses each of these factors in reference to the relevant reliability traits existing in 
literature, and comments on differences between the reliability traits identified 
during this study and those previously discussed in literature. These are identified in 
the following Table 7.2.1.2. 
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Table 7.2.1.2 
Comparison of Identified Reliability Factors and Those Suggested in Literature 
Category of Reliability Specific Item High Reliability Trait 
(from extant literature) 
Industry Factors OTS Trait 9: Strong Presence of 
External Groups with 
Access to Credible and 
Timely Information 
CASA MOS 139 
Business Processes Design Processes Not associated with any 
existing trait Compliance 
Emergency Response 
Incident Review 
BCM 
Management Practice Board Support Trait 1: Commitment to 
Reliable Operations 
Trait 8: Organisational 
Culture of Reliability 
Council Support 
Senior Management Support 
Staff Roles Commitment to Reliable 
Operations 
Trait 1: Commitment to 
Reliable Operations 
Flexibility in Small Teams Trait 3: Structural 
Flexibility and Redundancy 
Focus on Safety and Security Trait 7: Reliability not 
Marginalisable Understanding of Need for 
Reliability 
 
 
The first component of reliability to be discussed in relation to literature identified 
traits is Industry Factors. Industry Factors referred to federal legislation in the areas 
of safety and security, which were consistently applied to all three airport case study 
sites. CASA (Civil Aviation Safety Authority) Manual of Standards Section 139 
dictates safety requirements, including emergency planning and response, with OTS 
(Office of Transport Security) conversely outlining security requirements.  These are 
classed as Industry Factors as they are factors that affect the entire aviation industry 
(which deals with regular passenger transport flights).  
 
Industry Factors can be linked to the identified reliability trait of Strong Presence of 
External Groups with Access to Credible and Timely Information (Trait 9). This is 
due to the role these agencies play in regulating airport activities, their ability to 
access information and the kind of actions they can take in instances of non-
compliance. However, this is where the similarity ends. Existing literature discusses 
Trait 9 in regards to the oversight powers and influence on operating practices of 
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high reliability organisations. What was not discussed is the specific role of 
legislation and regulation in ensuring organisational reliability. These two regulatory 
instruments influence reliability as they ensure a safe and secure aviation 
environment. This reduces the likelihood of a failure occurring and affecting the 
operations of the airport and, by extension, the wider aviation network. This 
demonstrates the role of regulation in ensuring reliable and effective functioning in 
critical infrastructures. Importantly, this regulation is only effective when it exists 
alongside auditing and inspections. If auditing and inspections do not occur, there is 
no means of ensuring airports are complying with relevant regulation.  
 
Business Processes were identified as the second component of reliability at airports 
(as discussed in Section 7.2.1.1). Business Processes consisted of BCM, emergency 
response, compliance and design processes. These were areas that were not identified 
as having a strong association to existing reliability processes in themselves, but 
would produce outcomes which could assist in the development of reliability traits. 
Similarly, there was no observable connection to existing literature reliability traits 
identified for the category of business processes. The most prominent of these is 
BCM, and further detail of how BCM can produce reliability is discussed in Section 
7.2.1.4. These identified Business Processes assist in illuminating some of the means 
organisations can use to become reliable, other than traits suggested in literature.   
 
The third component identified (Staff) included the components of commitment to 
reliable operations, flexibility in small teams, focus on safety and security and 
understanding of need for reliability. Staff components related quite clearly to 
reliability traits identified in extant literature. Commitment to reliable operations, as 
observed, is a direct representation of some elements of Trait 1 (Commitment to 
Reliable Operations). Trait 1 describes that HROs understand the need for reliability, 
and this should also be formalised in relevant documentation, such as mission 
statements or goals. In all three airports a commitment to reliability was consistent as 
an organisational priority, and this was documented to some extent (although often 
not directly).  
 
Further, flexibility in small teams was linked to Trait 3, Structural Flexibility and 
Redundancy. Flexibility in small teams was identified more prominently within 
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regional airports, as teams contained more generalists and fewer specialists. These 
generalists were able to fill different roles during an event if needed. This was 
contrasted against capital city airports, whose staffing mix contained more specialists 
and fewer generalists. This can be explained by the operating circumstances of each 
airport. Regional airports have smaller staff bases, providing more opportunity and 
requirement for staff members to understand each other’s roles. Capital city airports 
have more staff with more varied responsibilities, with individual staff working in 
specialised roles. This approach was less conducive to flexible teams than that of the 
smaller regional airports.  
 
The final two elements within the area of staff identified were focus on safety and 
security, and understanding the need for reliability. These elements were evidence of 
Trait 7, Reliability not Marginalisable, with an aviation specific interpretation. First, 
the consequences of not maintaining a reliable operation were well understood. This 
was in particular reference to safety and security matters, which were the driving 
force behind reliability-based decisions.  
 
The fourth and final area of reliability identified was that of management support. 
Management support existed in three areas, being council support, management 
support and board support. Council support and board support are interchangeable, 
depending on the type of airport under consideration. An important distinction must 
be made within this area between the role of board and council support. Regional 
airports which are business units of regional councils are governed by councillors. 
Councillors, being elected by the constituency, generally do not have specific risk 
and business knowledge. This is in distinct contrast to privatised airports, which are 
governed by responsible boards. Responsible boards had a higher knowledge of the 
importance of risk and business continuity, making it easier to garner support for 
these processes than in regional councils. Therefore, differences in BCM maturity 
can be attributed to the different governance structures in place at different airports. 
These forms of management support clearly represent Trait 1: Commitment to 
Reliable Operations as all these areas consist of levels of upper management support 
for reliable operations.  
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In addition to representing Trait 1, these management elements further assist in 
creating Trait 8, Organisational Culture of Reliability. Organisational culture of 
reliability relies on two processes occurring. The first of this is a strong directive 
from management regarding reliable functioning and approach to standard operations. 
This is achieved through the senior management support component. The second is a 
within-group (at the lower organisational levels) understanding of the operating 
attitude. An understanding of a culture of reliability exists within the airport case 
study sites within the commitment to reliable operations, an element of staff 
processes. Therefore, a commitment to reliable operations exists within both the 
management from a top-down approach, and at a vertical level within the staff group. 
This provides some evidence that as an outcome of these processes an Organisational 
Culture of Reliability (as depicted in Trait 8, Organisational Commitment to 
Reliability) exists.  
7.2.1.3 Operational Strength in High Reliability 
 
As previously discussed, a number of instances of reliability traits were evident 
within each of the three case study sites (a matter examined in detail during Chapter 
5 Analysis Study One). Some traits were observed to manifest in a very direct 
manner from literature, such as understanding the need for reliability, and 
redundancy of hard systems. Other traits were observed in a different form to that 
presented in relevant literature, such as worst-case scenario testing and training being 
observed as airport emergency planning testing. Overall, reliability traits observed 
were consistently (across all three case study sites) observed  to a greater extent in 
airport operational areas as compared to other functional areas of the airport. In fact, 
a number of factors, including worst-case testing and training, were only observed 
within operational areas17. The following Table 7.2.1.3 Operational Strength in HR 
Traits identifies the areas where high reliability traits were observed within 
operations. These high reliability traits are numbered in the same manner as first 
introduced in Chapter 2, Section 2.2.3.  
 
 
                                                         
17In this instance, operational areas refer to the roles required for the operation of aircraft movements 
and supporting management 
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Table 7.2.1.3 
Operational Strength in HR Traits 
Trait Indicators Manifestation of Trait 
3. Structural flexibility and 
redundancy 
Redundancy of staff 
functions 
Redundancy at operational 
level 
Levels of cross-skilling of 
staff 
Cross-skilling of operational 
staff 
4. High degrees of 
responsibility and 
accountability 
Staff reporting their own 
failures 
Safety and security focussed 
Difference between operational and non-operational 
5. Flexible decision-making 
process and collegial 
patterns of hierarchy 
Operating procedure changes 
during an incident 
Different levels of 
operational change due to 
nature of incident  
Changes in operating 
procedure for operations area 
only 
6. Continual search for 
system improvement and 
training for worst-case 
scenarios 
Worst-case scenario testing limited to operations 
Incident-based testing and training utilised within operations 
but not in other components of the organisation 
8. Organisational culture of 
reliability 
Staff understanding and 
prioritising of reliable 
operations 
Strongly established in 
aviation operations 
Situational awareness of 
staff 
Exists within aviation 
operations 
 
This evidence demonstrates that within a number of areas (as outlined in Table 
7.2.1.3), reliability factors were more advanced in the operational areas. This 
presents a dichotomy within airport organisations, in that the operations area 
demonstrates high reliability factors, while these factors are substantially less 
developed elsewhere. The outcome of operations-based reliability is airports having 
the ability to effectively deal with operational-based disturbances, while being 
substantially less practiced in non-operational crises. As identified by Mitroff, 
Pauchant and Shrivasrava (2006), causes of crises can range from technical and 
economic to people, social or organisational (see Section 2.3.1 Crisis as a Concept).  
Airports, as a whole, must be able to respond to non-operational crises and ensure 
that their reliability is not only concentrated within operational areas.  
 
Therefore, while reliability is firmly observed as a concept within operations, this is 
underdeveloped within other business areas of airports, particularly corporate 
functions that do not directly deal with aviation operations. This lack of development 
creates a significant vulnerability when considering preparation for organisational 
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disturbance. Airports are well practiced, trained and reliable when dealing with 
operational incidents. However, this level of preparedness and response does not 
exist to nearly the same degree outside operational issues. Airports must invest in 
creating prepared and reliable organisations from a holistic level, and understand the 
wide range of threats they face. Without significant investment in enhancing the 
reliability of the whole organisation, airports cannot reduce their vulnerability, and 
ensure necessary levels of preparedness to respond to any resulting incidents.  
 
7.2.1.4 BCM and High Reliability Relationship 
 
This thesis sought to investigate theorised relationships between BCM and reliability 
outcomes. Through a review of outcomes of BCM and high reliability factors, a 
relationship was proposed for certain levels of BCM implementation to lead to 
corresponding levels of reliability (see Section 3.4). As this work was exploratory in 
nature (there have been no previous attempts to connect the practitioner discipline of 
BCM with existing theoretical approaches such as high reliability), the research 
question posed discussed if BCM could generate reliability outcomes?  
 
Before discussing identified relationships between BCM and high reliability, a 
number of observations must be made regarding the nature of both BCM and 
reliability in the three airport case studies conducted. The first of these was the stage 
of BCM implementation. None of the three airports studied had completed a full 
implementation of BCM, which did not include some of the key stages where 
proposed relationships to high reliability were suggested, such as testing and training, 
for example (see Section 3.3). Therefore, the full nature of any potential links 
between effective BCM implementation and high reliability could not be fully 
explored. Second, as noted previously (Section 7.2.1.1 Generic Factors Impacting 
Airport Reliability), reliability was a complex picture at each of the three airports, 
with many factors combining together to form a contemporary representation of 
reliability. This complexity made it more difficult to separate out a single process 
(such as BCM) and examine its specific impact on generating reliability.  
 
While specific relationships between reliability and BCM were difficult to identify, a 
number of ways in which BCM could lead to reliability factors were observed. 
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Serious comment can be made to identified linkages between BCM and reliability, 
which demonstrate some level of relationship between these two phenomena. The 
following Table 7.2.1.4 Alignment of BCM and HR Traits outlines the relevant 
BCM component or process, and the trait it could produce, which is more fully 
elaborated on in the following paragraphs.  
 
Table 7.2.1.4 
Alignment of BCM and HR Traits 
BCM Component BCM Process HR Trait 
Commencement Establishing importance of 
BCM 
Commitment to reliable 
operations in mission and 
goals 
BIA Identification of critical 
systems and 
interdependencies 
Sustained high technical 
performance 
System understanding and 
interdependencies 
Organisational culture of 
reliability 
Continuity plans Specific plans to ensure a 
continued level of operation 
Structural flexibility and 
redundancy 
Establishment of 
workarounds 
Flexible decision-making 
process and collegial patterns 
of hierarchy Allocating decision making 
power to individuals with 
expertise 
Testing and training Full scale tests Continual search for system 
improvement and training for 
worst-case scenarios 
Monitoring, review and 
learning 
Incident review and feedback 
loops 
Communication and 
consultation 
Giving information to 
stakeholders 
Strong presence of external 
groups with access to 
credible and timely 
information 
 
Commencement can produce in some form a commitment to reliable operations in 
mission and goals. Commencement consists of a number of activities to begin the 
business continuity process. The act of commencing a continuity management 
process implies an understanding of both the need for implementation and the 
commitment to a continuous operation. The result of this is both an understanding of 
the need for organisational reliability and a commitment towards processes which 
can assist in achieving reliability.  
 
BIA activities and continuity plans can assist in creating high sustained technical 
performance. A key outcome of the BIA is the identification of critical systems and 
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their interdependencies, with specific reference to the amount of time systems can be 
non-operational. This identification would assist in establishing the boundaries of 
systems which require a sustained level of technical performance, and allow 
organisations to more effectively monitor their performance. Continuity plans are 
developed with specific reference to the critical business functions identified in the 
BIA, providing plans that seek to respond, continue and recover functionality. 
Continuity plans, when constructed appropriately, should provide a continued level 
of performance for those key systems, therefore contributing to Trait 2, sustained 
high technical performance.  
 
Continuity plans further assist in developing the reliability trait of structural 
flexibility and redundancy. Continuity plans contain workarounds critical business 
functions and processes, in the case of a process or function being interrupted. This 
provides another means of completing a key process, in the form of a workaround. 
These workarounds provide for a flexible process and a different means of achieving 
an outcome, the same parameters described in Trait 5, flexible decision-making 
process and collegial patterns of hierarchy. Continuity plans further assist in 
developing Trait 5, by allocating authority to individuals with the most knowledge of 
that process or system, by making them responsible for a particular continuity plan.  
 
Evidence was noted that Trait 6, continual search for system improvement and 
training for worst-case scenarios, is produced by two different BCM components, 
being testing and training, and monitoring, review and learning. Testing and 
training within BCM consists of a number of different kinds of activities, including 
walkthroughs, desktops and full-live exercising (Armit 2007, 328-336).  In the case 
of full-live exercising, this can assist in contributing to testing and training for worst-
case scenarios, given that the context and parameters of the test adequately support 
this. Secondly, monitoring, review and learning can provide the second component 
of Trait 6. Monitoring, review and learning provides for feedback from incidents and 
training practices. Review provides organisations with critical feedback as to the 
strengths and weaknesses of their approach, and the opportunity to adjust response 
where necessary. The combination of these two BCM components can assist 
producing high reliability Trait 6.  
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The BIA has further impacts on high reliability traits. During the BIA critical 
business functions are identified, along with their interdependencies on other systems. 
This provides order as to which systems must be reinstated and in what order. By 
understanding the role of critical business functions and their interdependencies, this 
can provide for a higher level of situational awareness for staff, as they have higher 
understanding of what normal operations is.  
 
Communication and consultation is the final BCM process identified as having a 
potential link to reliability traits. Trait 9 of highly reliable organisations involves the 
presence of external groups with access and power to the organisation. 
Communication and consultation practices are concerned with informing key 
stakeholders of relevant issues during plan development and during plan activation. 
Communication and consultation allows for an effective means of communication 
with these groups, and means they are fully informed of the situation. 
 
7.2.2 Optimal Levels of BCM Implementation 
 
Research question one was principally concerned with investigating high reliability 
in airports, and examining potential relationships between effectively implemented 
BCM and organisational reliability. However, this does not represent the whole 
research problem. As detailed in Chapter 1, Introduction, airports require effective 
strategies in order to maintain a reliable level of functionality. This research argues 
that BCM can be utilised as a means of achieving continued functionality of airports. 
Key to this issue is providing a means of implementing BCM in a range of airports, 
which have varied needs and markets, and therefore different BCM requirements.  
 
A number of issues must be considered before proposing a means for BCM 
implementation. The first of these is that any proposed implementation must take 
into account the varied nature of airport infrastructure in Australia. Airports range 
from large, capital city ports through to a large number of smaller organisations, 
servicing regional centres. Most often these regional airports are business units of 
regional councils and therefore have different needs and governance arrangements 
compared to larger, privatised airports. Moreover, smaller airports may have fewer 
resources that can be dedicated towards BCM, particularly throughout intensive 
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development and implementation phases. Therefore, any implementation approaches 
must take this into account. Airports must be able to select the appropriate level for 
BCM, which meets the current needs of their airport.  
 
Further, implementation practices must have the ability to understand the levels of 
BCM functionality in practice at a given time. If airports cannot assess their current 
levels of BCM, then they do not have the ability to identify what areas of their BCM 
process that may require further growth in maturity. To summarise, any solution 
prescribing effective implementation of BCM in airports must contain the following:  
scalability to different airport size and need, and the contained ability to assess and 
understand current levels of maturity and how to improve processes in identified 
areas.  
 
Research Question Two sought to examine the optimal approaches for BCM 
implementation in a number of different types of airports. It proposed the following:  
What are the optimal approaches for BCM implementation in a range of Australian 
airports? How can these approaches best be implemented and understood? 
 
It is conventional in most systems-based implementation processes, especially ICT, 
to apply scaled maturity models in order to understand the existing levels of practice. 
The model developed for this research study, the BCM Maturity Assessment Tool, 
represents literature suggestions of different levels of maturity within each of the 
BCM components. The BCM Maturity and Assessment Tool (Figure 7.3.2) allows 
for each BCM approach to be assessed, and understood. During the data collection 
phase each of the three airport’s BCM policy, processes, and activities were assessed 
against the model, using a combination of semi-structured interviews and 
documentary analysis (where relevant). A detailed analysis of the findings of this 
study is contained in Chapter 6. The following Sections (7.2.2.1-7.2.2.6) discuss the 
key findings from this analysis and how these relate to addressing the research 
context, in particular findings related to Research Question Two.  
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7.2.2.1 Current Levels of BCM Implementation 
 
One of the key outcomes of study one was the assessment of BCM maturity in each 
of the three airports. Two key findings of relevance to the discussion chapter were 
present (for a full and detailed analysis see Chapter 6). The first finding related to the 
stage of implementation of BCM. Consistently across all three airport case study 
sites, overall BCM maturity was assessed at the novice or intermediate levels. This 
indicated that implementation was generally at the lower end of the established scale.  
The following Table 7.2.3.1 Overall BCM Maturity compares the current levels of 
overall implementation. 
 
Table 7.2.2.1 
Overall BCM Maturity 
Maturity Level Airport A Airport B Airport C 
Novice    
Intermediate    
Advanced    
Mature    
 
The second key finding was in relation to the range of BCM measures present. None 
of the airports investigated had completed a full implementation of all stages of the 
BCM cycle. Further, in particular, none of the airports had completed a review cycle. 
This means that none of the airport organisations had the chance to critically review 
their BCM approaches, identify weaknesses and work to improve them. A lack of 
review could also indicate that plans are out-dated and do not reflect the current 
operational and business environment. 
 
A number of implications can be inferred from these key observations. The first of 
this is that BCM, while understood as an important management process, has not 
been given significant priority and resources within each airport. Therefore, this 
indicates that while BCM has recognised importance in principle, this has not 
translated into practice. This can perhaps be attributed to the relatively low number 
of serious incidents that occur in airports, leading to a false belief that systems 
already possess the required levels of reliability and that formalised BCM is not in 
serious need. Key stages of BCM implementation have not occurred, most 
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prominently testing and training, and monitoring, review and learning. This indicates 
that there has been insufficient organisational drive to complete the BCM 
implementation process. It was further noted and discussed that within the areas that 
had been implemented, significant improvements could be made in terms of process 
maturity.  For further detail as to specific BCM maturity of case study sites, refer to 
Chapter 6.  
 
7.2.2.2 Explanations of Current Levels of BCM Implementation 
 
It is important to discuss some of the underlying drivers that may assist in explaining 
the current levels of BCM maturity observed in this study. Three underling drivers 
were identified which may provide some explanation as to why BCM exists in its 
current form. These drivers consist of (1) the role of regulation, (2) lack of relevant 
BCM expertise, and (3) staff availability and organisational priorities. These three 
drivers are interrelated, and contribute to a picture of BCM implementation in 
airports. This relationship is graphically represented by Figure 7.2.2.2 BCM 
Implementation Drivers. The following paragraphs detail each of these three factors 
in more specific detail.  
 
 
Figure 7.2.2.2. BCM Implementation Drivers 
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Driver 1 - Regulation 
As previously highlighted and discussed throughout both analysis chapters (5 and 6), 
airports are subject to a raft of federal safety and security regulations (see Section 
2.7). Safety requirements in particular require a significant amount of organisational 
resources in order to achieve the required standard and be compliant. As a large 
amount of resources are required in order to meet compliance obligation, fewer 
remaining resources are available to dedicate to processes such as BCM. Importantly, 
a key component of safety regulations is emergency planning and exercising. 
Emergency planning and exercising consists or a number of activities, which all 
assist in creating a comprehensive testing and training program. Airports may 
consider current levels of testing and training, conducted for compliance purposes, 
are adequate for their requirements. This may provide some explanation as to why 
none of the airports have implemented testing or training of their BCM protocols, as 
they may view their organisations as fulfilling their testing and training requirements. 
 
Driver 2 – Lack of Expertise 
Linking to the first identified driver of BCM development is the current levels of 
BCM expertise within airports. At the time of research, none of the airports had any 
employees with specific BCM expertise, and no individual maintained BCM as their 
sole or principal responsibility. This can be attributed to two means. First is the large 
resource requirement of compliance-related emergency response testing and training.  
This large amount of resources often detracts from that which is available for other 
process, such as BCM, which are not legislative requirements.  Business processes, 
such as BCM, are therefore allocated a lower priority as they are not legislative 
requirements, and as such a failure to have BCM does not have the ability to result in 
airport closure.    
 
Driver 3 – Organisational Priority 
Finally, staff availability and organisational priorities is the final driver for BCM 
implementation. The three airport case study sites maintained lean staff bases, with 
available staff often having to deal with a range of different priorities. Often, staff 
were too busy responding to day to day matters to engage in future planning and 
strategizing. On many occasions, BCM fell into this non-essential category. As 
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discussed in Chapter 2 (section 2.5.3), senior management support and commitment 
is a key ingredient for the success of BCM (Howe 2007, 119).  
 
7.2.2.3 BCM Improvement through Existing Processes 
 
As previously mentioned, a number of existing processes were observed in 
organisations that could be utilised in order to assist BCM implementation, and 
increase the maturity of existing practice. These processes are presented in the 
following Table 7.2.2.3, and further explained in the following paragraphs. 
 
Table 7.2.2.3 
BCM Improvement through Existing Processes 
BCM Process Existing Process Means of improving BCM 
Continuity Plans Emergency Plans Utilising pre-existing 
emergency response templates 
as a draft for continuity plans 
Emergency and Crisis Plans Continuity plans as a reference 
document to other response 
plans 
Testing and Training Operational Testing and 
Training 
Utilising operational testing 
and training protocols 
AEP Testing Attach a simultaneous BCP 
test to annual AEP testing 
Monitoring, Review and 
Learning 
Review Processes Utilise pre-existing review 
frameworks from other 
components of the 
organisation 
 
The first BCM process to be discussed is continuity plans. Only one of the airports 
studied demonstrated stand-alone continuity plans, indicating a general lack of 
implementation of this component.  Two implementation options are possible when 
considering utilising existing documentation and processes. The first of these, and 
the easiest to implement, is the creation of a master document that refers to existing 
processes and procedures. This document could serve as a form of continuity plan, 
and refer staff members to the relevant response protocols to follow during an event. 
This is an advisable option, especially for smaller airports, as all airports are required 
to have AEPs, which detail responses to a number of likely scenarios.  A step further 
in maturity than this involves using existing response protocols as a framework to 
develop specific continuity plans. This process would involve removing the detail of 
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these plans, and using the bones or framework of the document to use as the starting 
point. Following this, continuity plan specific detail could be included under the 
previous headings. An advantage of such an approach would allow for consistency 
with current emergency response approaches, and reduce the need for duplication of 
plan development. Both of these suggested implementation options are effective in 
airports with little or no current BCM in place. Both these options serve as a starting 
point, allowing for further development of plans to occur when the organisation is 
able. 
 
The second area testing and training, has been identified as another BCM 
component whereby expertise can be borrowed from other areas of an airport. All 
three airports investigated practiced a wide range of testing and training, particularly 
within aviation operations. The first potential crossover exists by utilising the current 
training programme. Current training schedules and frameworks could easily be 
customised for BCM requirements. The second component of testing and training 
relates to AEP testing and training which the airports are required 
(as a compliance obligation) to conduct annually. BCP testing could be attached to 
AEP testing and run as a parallel process. This will result in a level of testing and 
training in BCP protocols, and further has the potential to increase the breadth of 
response capability as it is currently heavily focused on aviation incidents. By adding 
BCP testing to any AEP testing this will provide airports with a greater ability to 
respond to a wider variety of organisational crises.  
 
The final area where current organisational processes can be used to improve BCM 
is within the area of monitoring, review and learning. As observed within the three 
airports, a number of post incident review strategies were in place. These strategies 
were concerned with understanding what occurred during the response, identifying 
potential weaknesses and incorporating changes to procedure. These procedures were 
principally related to aviation related incidents. Current frameworks and procedures 
could be utilised within continuity management, and customised in order to suit the 
particular needs of continuity management monitoring, review and learning  
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7.2.2.4 BCM Improvement through Other Processes 
 
A number of BCM processes existed in all three airport case study sites with no 
direct links to existing processes that can be borrowed from. However, there are a 
number of recommendations that can be implemented in order to ensure increased 
maturity of continuity management from a component perspective and an overall 
perspective. The BCM components discussed in this section are Commencement, 
Risk Assessment, BIA, and Communication and Consultation.  
 
Commencement activities were diverse among the three airports studied. The 
airport with the strongest commencement strategies had completed the highest level 
of BCM implementation (Airport B). While this is not conclusive evidence that 
higher levels of commencement result in higher levels of overall maturity, there are a 
number of elements that logically assist in implementing BCM. Elements such as 
scope, aims and timeframes allow for sequential implementation of BCM and 
provide external frameworks to assess performance. It is recommended that airports 
adopt a stronger approach to commencement, and most importantly set formal 
guidelines for the process.   
 
All three airports had activities which fell under the umbrella of Risk Assessment. 
Activities constituted in the most part a formalised risk strategy or risk register, 
complemented by risk assessment activities themselves. The key deficiency in this 
area was the lack of integration from the outcomes of risk management and risk 
assessment to business continuity. None of the airports investigated conducted risk 
assessment as a component of BCM, it existed was a separate organisational process. 
Further, none of the airports had a means of directly utilising the knowledge gained 
from risk assessment and using it to inform the priorities of BCM. As outlined by 
Elliott (2006, 401) risk assessment informs BCM by outlining the events with a low-
likelihood and high-consequence that have no other mitigation strategies available. 
By integrating these two processes more effectively, continuity planning can address 
the key vulnerabilities of the organisation, and therefore fulfil its key goal 
 
The BIA, while one of the cornerstones of BCM, was one of the areas within the 
process that was less developed than others. Only one airport of the three studied had 
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undertaken a formalised BIA process. The lack of BIA maturity indicates that the 
airports may not yet have a thorough understanding of both the requirements of a 
BIA and the benefits that result from a comprehensive BIA. Key to improving the 
level of BIA maturity is fairly simple in this respect. Airports must undertake 
comprehensive BIAs in order to gain an understanding of their critical business 
functions, and form a basis to develop targeted and accurate continuity plans. A 
number of guidance documents can assist in developing a BIA, the Australian 
Standard for Business Continuity 5050:2010 amongst them.  
 
Communication and Consultation practices can further be improved through a 
number of strategies. Strategies can either be adopted from existing protocols within 
the organisation, or implemented for the specific purposes of BCM. All airports 
studied contained communication and consultation protocols for each of their various 
types of stakeholders. The appropriate protocols should be adapted for the purposes 
and requirements of BCM.   
 
7.3 BCM Maturity and Assessment  
A significant outcome of Study Two was the realisation of the incompleteness of the 
BCM Maturity and Implementation Tool to assess the maturity of current continuity 
management practice. The analytical model used throughout Study Two consisted of 
four levels of maturity, being Novice, Intermediate, Advanced and Mature. The 
outcome of Study Two suggested that two of the airports had the same overall 
ranking of a Novice airport. However, there were noticeable differences within the 
individual component ratings of these two airports. The overall assessment (using the 
four-level framework) did not provide enough differentiation between airport study 
sites. Therefore it is proposed that that the four-level model is created into a five 
level model, creating a new stage of “Established” to sit in the middle of the 
continuum.  
 
The advantage of a five-level model is it offers a higher level of differentiation 
between organisations. A more accurate understanding can be gained by utilising a 
five level model, as subtlety in maturity differences can be more easily recognised. 
This was something that could not be achieved under the previous four-level model, 
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as discovered throughout Study Two. The significance of this can be most easily 
demonstrated through the difference in maturity of Airports A and C. Airports A and 
C both assessed at the level of intermediate, but this assessment fails to note the 
differences between these two Airports. Airport C has completed an initial round of 
continuity planning, and whilst this is not finished in some areas, it is more complete 
than that of Airport A, which is in the very nascent stage of development. The end 
results of a five level model would be able to differentiate the maturity of these two 
airports and provide a more informed result.  
 
Another advantage of this model is that it allows for airports to understand their 
current level of implementation, where they have been deficient, and what they need 
to implement to successfully move to the next level. Further, the model does not 
require that airports undertake each stage in a sequential order before moving on to 
the next. Organisations can jump stages of the process if they wish, for example by 
moving from novice straight to intermediate. Importantly, this model is able to 
prescribe different levels of BCM implementation for different kinds of airports. By 
using the included colour scale, it is easy to identify what level of implementation is 
required to achieve certain levels of maturity.   
 
7.3.1 BCM Maturity and Implementation Matrix 
 
The development of five levels rather than four within the BCM Maturity 
Implementation Tool was the first outcome of data collection. The second, more 
significant outcome was the development of the BCM Maturity Implementation 
Matrix. To recall, the second research question addressed the need for appropriate 
levels of BCM implementation, that also were responsive to the varied needs of 
Australian airport infrastructure. Further critical to this cause was the ability to both 
understand current approaches and give guidance as to appropriate implementation.  
 
In order to address both components of Research Question Two, two models have 
been developed. The first (Figure 7.3.1) is the BCM Maturity Implementation Matrix. 
This matrix demonstrates what level of BCM implementation organisations should 
be aiming for, depending on their classification as a small, medium or large airport. 
This matrix works upon the premise that a small airport requires less continuity 
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management activity than a larger airport to achieve a similar level of maturity. This 
is due to the less complex organisational needs, as smaller airports (as defined for 
this study) have fewer flights, less commercial agreements and lack of international 
traffic. Similarly, a larger airport will require more sophisticated continuity 
management practice than a smaller airport to achieve a similar level of 
implementation. Further, larger airports are complicated by their international and 
domestic connections. The more complex connections also result in a delay at a 
larger airport having a more significant impact upon the global aviation network.  
 
The role of the BCM Maturity and Implementation Matrix is to establish what level 
of maturity would be appropriate for different types of airports at different stages of 
the BCM implementation lifecycle. The model details five levels of implementation, 
with one being the lowest and five being the highest, along with the type of airport 
(small, medium or large). By selecting the desired level of implementation (for 
example Level 3) and the airport type (for example Medium), an airport can then 
identify their appropriate maturity level (in this case Established). The airport can 
then consult the second model, the BCM Maturity and Assessment Tool to identify 
the required steps to be taken to achieve the desired maturity level.  
 
The second is the BCM Maturity and Assessment Tool (Figure 7.3.2). Once airports 
have selected their desired level of implementation, they can use the BCM Maturity 
and Implementation Tool in order to specifically understand what processes need to 
be completed to achieve that level of maturity. The same procedure can occur in 
reverse, with organisations being able to first assess their current level of BCM 
maturity using the BCM Maturity and Implementation Tool, and then refer to the 
BCM Maturity Implementation Matrix to identify their desired level of continuity 
management maturity. Figure (7.3.1) is the BCM Maturity Implementation Matrix. 
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Small airport 
 
 
Medium Airport 
 
Large Airport 
Level 1  
Novice 
 
  
Novice 
 
Intermediate 
Level 2   
Novice 
 
  
Intermediate 
 
Established 
Level 3   
Intermediate 
 
 
Established 
 
Advanced 
Level 4  
Established 
 
 
Advanced 
  
Mature 
Level 5  
Advanced 
 
 
Mature 
 
Mature 
 
Figure 7.3.1. BCM Maturity and Implementation Matrix 
 
The following Table 7.3.1 (Maturity Level Descriptors) provides a brief qualitative 
description of each of the maturity levels detailed in the BCM Maturity and 
Implementation Matrix. These descriptors were developed from an overview of the 
BCM Maturity and Assessment Tool, and further refined using the key themes 
identified during Study Two analysis. These descriptors give a broad overview of 
each maturity level, much like those presented within Section 3.3.3. The advantage 
of the descriptors presented in Figure 7.3.1 are refined through empirical research 
and have a more direct representation to operational reality of business continuity 
and high reliability in Australian airports.  
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Table 7.3.1 
Maturity Level Descriptors 
Level Descriptor 
 
Novice 
Novice can be described as the first step in business continuity 
planning. Approaches may be applied directly from a standard 
with limited specialisation to the individual organisation. Testing 
and training has not yet occurred, and there is limited 
integration with other business processes.  
 
Intermediate 
 
Intermediate describes a further development of BCM practices. 
Approaches may resemble relevant standards that possess 
some level of specialisation. Testing and training has occurred to 
some degree. The beginnings of integration with other business 
components is present.  
 
Established 
Established describes a mid-level of BCM practice. Approaches 
are informed by standards and specialised to the unique 
organisational requirements. Testing and training is established, 
although the process has not undergone a formal review cycle. 
Integration with other business processes is present.  
 
Advanced 
 
Advanced describes an advanced level of BCM practice. 
Approaches are informed by best practice and address the 
unique requirements of the organisation. Testing and training 
occurs regularly and at least one review cycle has been 
undertaken. High level of integration with other business units.  
 
Mature 
 
Mature describes and advanced and mature level of practice. 
Approaches are best practice and highly specialised to the needs 
of the organisation. Testing and training occurs regularly with 
effective review, and plans have high levels of monitoring. High 
levels of integration with other business processes.   
 
 
7.3.2 BCM Maturity Assessment Tool 
 
Figure 7.3.2 (below) is the BCM Maturity Assessment Tool. This works hand in 
hand with the BCM Maturity and Implementation Matrix (Figure 7.3.1) to assess and 
understand current and proposed measures of continuity management. The Figure 
below details how each component of BCM appears at different levels of maturity. 
Therefore the model can serve in two forms. First is to assist in understanding 
current levels of implementation, by auditing continuity management practice. The 
second use of the model is to identify the desired level of maturity, and examine 
what processes need to be implemented to achieve the identified maturity level.  
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Novice Intermediate Established Advanced Mature 
Commencement 
No formalised 
commencement  
Little to no top 
management 
support 
Basic documented 
commencement 
Some level of top 
management support 
Commencement 
activities 
documented with 
top management 
support 
 
Well established 
commencement 
documentation with 
some links to other 
processes, top 
management support  
Thorough 
documentation with 
links to other 
processes, top 
management 
priority, BCM 
champions 
Risk Assessment 
Rudimentary or 
non-existent risk 
management. No 
integration with 
existing 
frameworks. 
Basic risk 
assessment in place, 
no links to existing 
frameworks. 
Minimal links to 
BCM. 
Basic risk 
assessment in place 
with links to 
existing 
frameworks.  
 
Good risk 
assessment in place, 
links with existing 
frameworks. Direct 
links to BCM. 
Thorough risk 
assessment in place, 
firms links with 
other processes. 
Direct links from 
risk assessment to 
BCM. 
Business Impact Assessment 
No BIA activities 
undertaken 
Critical business 
processes identified, 
no MAOs or RTOS. 
No 
interdependencies 
Critical business 
processes 
identified, along 
with MAOs, RTOs  
 
Critical business 
processes identified, 
MAOs and RTOs 
established as are 
interdependencies  
Critical business 
processes, MAOs, 
RTOs and 
interdependencies 
established, feeds 
directly to continuity 
plans 
Continuity Plans 
No continuity 
plans currently in 
place 
Continuity plans as a 
component of 
another response 
protocol or a 
reference document. 
No unique 
continuity plans. 
Stand-alone 
continuity plans 
established with 
some level of 
workarounds, 
although these are 
not comprehensive 
Continuity plans 
informed by BIA, 
contain appropriate 
procedures for 
response, continuity 
and recovery 
Continuity plans 
informed by BIA, 
contain 
comprehensive 
response, continuity 
and recovery 
procedures, well-
communicated to 
staff 
Testing and Training 
No testing and 
training currently 
in place 
Initial testing or 
training has 
occurred 
Testing and 
training has 
occurred, further as 
a component of 
other response 
procedure testing 
and training 
Testing and training 
occurs on a regular 
basis with different 
staff levels.  
Testing and training 
occurs on a regular 
basis with different 
staff levels, wide 
variety of different 
testing types. 
Communication and Consultation 
No established 
communication 
and consultation 
protocols 
Communication and 
consultation exists 
internally, limited 
external  
Communication 
and consultation 
for internal and 
external purposes 
 
Established internal 
and external 
communication and 
consultation 
Internal and external 
communication and 
consultation actively 
used to gain the 
most information 
possible 
Monitoring, Review and Learning 
No monitoring, 
review or learning 
practices in place 
Plans reviewed on a 
calendar basis, no 
monitoring or 
learning in place 
Plans reviewed on 
a calendar basis, 
and monitored on 
certain trigger 
points. No learning 
strategies in place 
Plans reviewed on a 
calendar basis and 
monitored on certain 
trigger points. 
Learning strategies 
in place. 
Plans reviewed on a 
calendar basis and 
monitored on certain 
trigger points. 
Learning strategies 
in place. A full 
review cycle has 
taken place.  
 
Figure 7.3.2. BCM Maturity Assessment Tool   
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7.4 Theoretical and Scholarly Significance of the Research 
 
This thesis centred around the key issue of ensuring the continued operation of 
airports during disturbances. Whilst in many ways this was an exercise focused on 
practical application, a number of significant scholarly contributions can be 
identified. The first of these related to the exploration of High Reliability within a 
non-militarised context. This research study identified that a number of High 
Reliability Traits were present within airports, although some manifested in a manner 
that was quite different to that presented in literature. This finding proves that in 
essence, the theoretical approach is still valid in these instances. Further, a gap was 
identified between the existence of organisational reliability (as defined by High 
Reliability Theory), and a practical means of achieving such traits. This thesis 
explored the potential for BCM to be utilised as a means to achieve organisational 
reliability. As identified previously, this research identified that both BCM and 
existing organisational processes could be employed to enhance organisational 
reliability. This finding in itself a theoretical contribution, as previously no links had 
been established between extant risk and crisis management literature and the 
practitioner process of BCM.   
 
7.5 Practical Significance of this Study 
 
A number of outcomes with practical significance have been identified by this 
research. The first of these is the development of a maturity assessment framework 
developed for BCM. The implementation and maturity assessment framework allows 
for the assessment of current levels of continuity management maturity, and depicts 
what improvements need to be made to increase maturity.  This ability to understand 
and audit current levels of BCM practice, and improve processes in the same 
diagram is a novel outcome. This result can provide organisations a practical means 
of implementing and assessing the level of implementation of BCM. Another goal of 
this research was to provide BCM solutions that are suitable for the range of airport 
infrastructure in Australia. The BCM implementation and maturity matrix details 
how different types of airports can achieve appropriate levels of BCM ability. In 
addition to the development of models and guides for appropriate levels of BCM, a 
number of existing processes and procedures were identified that could be utilised to 
improve current practice in airports. The combination of both the development of 
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implementation models, in amongst other recommendations provides for a multitude 
of practical steps for BCM process improvement in complex infrastructure.   
 
Data analysis identified a number of ways that BCM could produce reliability 
outcomes (see Section 7.2.1.4).  It utilised correctly, these BCM traits could 
potentially imbue HR traits in airports. For example, airports must test and train their 
aerodrome emergency plans (AEPs). BCP testing could be conducted to this existing 
training requirement, in a parallel fashion.  Key to the maturity of both BCM and 
high reliability are two fundamental changes to risk and crisis management 
philosophy in airports. The first of these changes is the imperative to move beyond 
emergency management alone. Emergency management within airports is a 
compliance requirement, and therefore receives significant organisational focus. 
However, in order to create a holistically reliable organisation, managers must move 
beyond an emergency management only focus, and utilise BCM to address a wider 
range of organisational failures. While using a similar skill base, emergency 
management focuses on a very narrow form of incident, while the incorporation of 
continuity management approaches allows for items of a wider nature (corporate 
emergencies) to be considered. The second change requires the sharing of 
operational practices with other areas of the organisation. As noted previously, a 
number of practices already exist within airports that could easily be adopted for 
BCM purposes.   
 
7.5.1 Implications for Managers  
This study has identified a number of strategies which airports, and other similar 
complex socio-technical infrastructures, can utilise to improve both BCM and 
organisational reliability. These strategies were discussed in further detail in Sections 
7.2.1.4 (BCM and HR relationship), 7.2.2.3 (BCM improvement through existing 
processes) and 7.2.2.4 (BCM improvement through other process). The BCM 
Maturity and Implementation Matrix (Section 7.3.1) and the BCM Maturity 
Assessment Tool (Section 7.3.2) allow managers to understand their current levels of 
BCM implementation, and assess what measures need to be undertaken in order to 
improve BCM maturity. Of particular note in these models is the element of 
scalability, in that the BCM Maturity and Implementation Matrix proposes different 
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levels of practice for each type of airport. This allows a suitable level of BCM 
practice to be achieved at different types of airports, with a matching amount of 
resourcing.  The following Table 7.5.1 Summary of Implications provides a brief 
summary of relevant outcomes for airport managers, in reference to improving BCM 
maturity and functionality.  
 
Table 7.5.1 discusses implications under two broad categories:  those components of 
BCM that can be improved through existing processes and those which can be 
improved through other means. BCM processes that can be improved through 
existing practices are continuity plans, testing and training and monitoring, review 
and learning. Many of the identified existing processes are conducted as a 
component of legislated safety or security activities, and therefore are significantly 
practiced within the airports. The areas of BCM that can be improved through other 
processes include commencement, risk assessment, business impact assessment and 
communication and consultation. Simple measures identified within Table 7.5.1 can 
be utilised by relevant managers to improve the maturity of these components of 
BCM.  
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Table 7.5.1 
Summary of Implications 
BCM improvement through existing processes 
BCM Process Existing Process Means of improving BCM 
Continuity Plans Emergency Plans (AEP and 
other) 
Utilising pre-existing 
emergency response 
templates as a draft for 
continuity plans 
Emergency and Crisis Plans 
(AEP and other) 
Continuity plans as a 
reference document to other 
response plans.  
Testing and Training Operational Testing and 
Training 
Utilising operational testing 
and training protocols 
AEP Testing Attach a simultaneous BCP 
test to annual AEP testing 
Monitoring, Review and 
Learning 
Review Processes Utilise pre-existing review 
frameworks from other 
components of the 
organisation 
BCM improvement through other processes 
BCM process Means of improvement 
Commencement Formalised commencement strategies using 
formalised guidelines 
Risk Assessment Integrating outcomes of risk assessment into 
continuity planning 
BIA Undertake formalised BIA processes using a 
respected methodology 
Communication and Consultation Adoption of existing processes for specific 
continuity management needs 
 
Aside from these practical recommendations, the uppermost implication for 
managers is the need to prioritise continuity management practices within their 
organisation. Without this prioritisation and commitment, little maturity and 
development can be achieved.  
 
7.5.2 Applications of BCM Maturity and Implementation Matrix 
 
The BCM Maturity and Implementation Matrix and BCM Maturity Assessment Tool 
were developed within the context of this study, which focused on Australian 
airports. However, there are wider applications for both these frameworks in other 
industries. As identified during Section 1.2.1, airports are forms of critical 
infrastructure and wider considerations for both tools could relevant to other forms of 
critical infrastructure. This cross-application would be feasible as critical 
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infrastructures share many structural similarities, and face many of the same 
operational issues.  
 
Both the BCM Maturity Implementation Matrix and BCM Maturity Assessment Tool 
can address initial assessments and ongoing process development in other types of 
critical infrastructure.  Given that there are of the close dependency relationships 
between instances of critical infrastructure, often forming networks, the matrix and 
assessment tool might assist in development and improvement of business continuity 
management within other sectors especially in relation to anticipating and limiting 
cascading failures.  Other locations that seem relevant for such tools could be 
maritime ports and large transport nexuses.  
 
7.6 Future Research Directions 
 
Future research for this study is principally focused on expanding the context of 
research. Links between BCM and reliability outcomes could be investigated within 
other industries to determine if the same patterns exist outside Australian airports. 
Another area of future research could be specifically aimed at investigating 
organisations which have completed a full implementation of BCM. This is 
particularly prevalent, as none of the organisations within this study had fully 
implemented continuity management.  There may be further knowledge to be gained 
by focussing investigation on these organisations which are further along the 
maturity scale.  
 
7.7 Conclusion  
This chapter discussed the answers to each of the research questions, and the further 
implications to both practice and research. A demonstrable link between continuity 
management and reliability outcomes was established, however the exact nature of 
this relationship was not identified. Rather, BCM was a component of a suite of 
factors that contributed to reliability in airports. In regards to the nature of 
appropriate BCM implementation, a number of practical steps were identified, that 
can assist practitioners in improving continuity management in organisations. 
Improvement steps utilised both existing processes, such as the AEP, and alternative 
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steps to improvement. The most significant outcome of this chapter is the BCM 
Maturity and Implementation Matrix. This Matrix and accompanying Maturity 
Assessment Tool provides a number of key outcomes for BCM implementation. 
These consist of (1) the ability to self-assess current levels of BCM; (2) identification 
of appropriate levels of BCM for different size and type of airport infrastructure; and 
(3) the ability to identify what steps need to be undertaken to improve BCM maturity.  
 
Combined, these outcomes provide for significant improvement within the areas of 
BCM and organisational reliability, and contributed to scholarly knowledge of both. 
More information was gleaned from the study of reliability in modern, commercial 
organisations, and clearer pathways to the implementation of business continuity in 
the same businesses.   
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Appendices 
Appendix A: Further Detail of BCM Characteristics Leading to HR  
Outcomes Outputs 
Organisational awareness Effects of risk explained 
Prioritisation of activities 
Identification of system weaknesses 
Awareness of critical organisational 
objectives and performance levels to be 
achieved 
Key personnel required 
Normal operational resource 
requirements 
Requirements during disruption 
Critical dependencies with other critical 
business functions, internal and external 
third parties (system awareness) 
Contact details for key contacts 
Awareness of areas requiring alternate 
workarounds 
Processes or activities that cannot 
proceed 
 
Situational awareness Awareness of risk exposure facing the 
organisation 
Awareness of vulnerabilities 
Communication (inside and outside the 
organisation) 
Assessment of risk impact   
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Appendix B: Interview Protocol 
Appendix B1: Study One Interview Protocol 
 
1. Commitment to reliability 
• Do you think your organisation is committed to being reliable? 
o Can you give some reasons why? 
 Do you have processes or procedures that show how the 
organisation is committed to being reliable? 
o Is this formalised in the mission and/or goals of the organisation? 
 
2. Sustained high technical performance 
• Do you have a requirement to maintain a high level of performance of your 
systems?  
o Is this level of performance to set standards? 
o If so, how do you maintain it? 
o What are the consequences of not maintaining it? 
 
3. Structural flexibility and redundancy 
• Do you have redundancy in your key functions? 
• Can you change the way you get a key task completed? 
• Are staff trained in multiple roles? 
 
4. High degrees of responsibility and accountability 
• Are staff encouraged to report their own failures? And those of fellow staff 
members? 
• Is the discovery of error rewarded?  
• Is internal reporting effectively used to identify problems and fix them? 
 
5. Flexible decision making processes and collegial patterns of hierarchy 
• Is decision making power given to those with the most knowledge of a 
process, wherever they are in the organisational hierarchy, or does 
management make all-important judgements on a situation? 
• Does operating procedure change in times of an incident, or stay the same? 
Explain how 
 
6. Continual search for system improvement and training for worst-case scenarios 
• Does your organisation conduct regular training and testing in order to 
prepare for worst-case scenarios? 
o What does this testing and training consist of? 
o Does this testing and training also search for system weaknesses? 
o What other processes, outside training, search for weaknesses in the 
organisation? 
• How does your review cycle for response procedures operate? 
 
7. Reliability not marginalisable, cannot be traded off 
• Do you think the organisation prioritises reliability over everything else? 
• What are the consequences if you do not maintain reliable operations? 
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8. Organisational culture of reliability 
• Do individual staff think a lot about ensuring reliable operations? 
• Are staff aware of what normal operations are, and when the situation begins 
to become different than normal? 
• Is adherence to safety and standard procedure viewed as important? 
 
9. Strong presence of external groups with access to credible and timely information 
• What external groups have power over your organisation? 
o What kind of information can these groups obtain?  
• What kind of action can these groups take against your organisation if 
standards are not met? 
• What means do you use to communicate information to these group? 
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Appendix B2: Study Two Interview Protocol 
 
Thank you for giving your time in assisting with this interview. The following 
questions in addition to the questionnaire are centred around Business Continuity 
Management. All answers remain confidential and are to be used for the purposes of 
this research project only.  
 
Introductory Questions 
 
1. To begin, can you tell me what your role involves and how long have you been 
with the organisation? 
 
2. What has been your involvement in the development of the BCPs? 
Gauge detail of level of engagement, satisfaction with process. 
 
3. Has there been an incident where you have had to use your BCP?  
Have participant elaborate on this if they indicate yes 
 
4. Why have you indicated that level of BCM commencement? 
Elaborate on what practices explain this level of commencement maturity 
Make sure participant discusses specific components like policy, scope etc. 
 
5. Why do you rate your risk assessment at that level? 
Can you briefly explain the risk reporting and assessment practices present in 
your organisation? 
How do these processes relate to BCM/how is this combined into the 
process? 
 
6. Why have you rated yourselves at (insert level) for your business impact 
assessment? 
Do you conduct this process internally or utilise consultants? 
How do you identify critical business functions? 
Do you identify MAOs and RTOs? Are these significant to you? 
 
7. Why do you rate your continuity plans at that level of maturity? 
Discuss specific components, if they feel these adequately address these issues. Is 
there sufficient knowledge of the detail of plans? 
 
8. What specific BCP testing and training procedures exist? 
Have participant discuss what testing and training currently exists and who for. 
Discuss how this may change in the future 
 
9. How do you communicate and consult internally and externally during plan 
development? 
Link this back to maturity levels discussed 
 
10. What kind of communication and consultation exists during plan activation?  
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If the plan has not been activated ask as to what is suggested in the BCP. Also 
discuss the relationship with other crisis communication protocols.   
 
11. Why have you rated monitoring, review and learning at (insert level)? 
How are plans monitored? 
When does review occur? Are there trigger points? 
Are formalised learning and post-mortem activities in place? How do the 
findings of these processes feed back into the plans? 
 
12. Can you explain why you have given that level of maturity for your 
organisation’s overall BCM process? 
What do you see as the next steps towards having a more mature process? 
What impediments exist to making this transition? 
 
13. What is the purpose of BCM in your organisation? 
What is its significance – strategic, operational, other?  
 
Thank you for your time. Is there anything else you would like to add? 
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Appendix B3: Study Two Interview Questionnaire 
Business Continuity Management Questionnaire 
 
The purpose of this questionnaire is to gauge the level of BCM (Business Continuity 
Management) in your organisation. Please indicate where your organisation sits in 
response to the following criteria, which you can mark at any point along the scale.  
 
1. Commencement 
Commencement refers to the beginning stages of BCM. It includes setting the scope, 
priorities, purpose and guidelines for the process, as well as appointing responsible 
officers. This section also includes the level of top management support and 
commitment to BCM. Please indicate the maturity of BCM commencement 
activities in your organisation. 
 
Low 
 
Medium High 
 
2. Risk assessment 
The risk assessment process involves an identification of threats to the organisation, 
a calculation of likelihood and consequence and a classification of these risks as 
tolerable or intolerable. This includes items such as risk registers and processes such 
as risk reporting. Please rate the level of your risk assessment activities.  
 
Low 
 
Medium High 
 
3. Business Impact Assessment (BIA) 
The BIA involves identifying critical business functions, the impacts of an 
interruption to these functions, the maximum allowable outage time, recovery time 
objective and in which order these must be restored. Please rate the level of 
maturity of the BIA.  
 
Low 
 
Medium High 
 
4. Continuity Plans 
Continuity plans refer to the documented plans to be utilised in case of an event. 
These contain appropriate workarounds, required equipment and personnel, and 
relevant contact lists. Please rate the maturity of your organisation’s Continuity 
Plans.  
 
Low 
 
Medium High 
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5. Testing and training 
Testing and training of BCPs involves practical testing, exercising (can include 
desktop review, desktop walkthrough, desktop scenario exercise, callout and 
notification communications exercise, recovery exercise and live scenario exercise) 
as well as training of staff in BCPs. Please rate the level of BCP testing and training 
present in your organisation.  
 
Low 
 
Medium High 
 
6. Communication and Consultation 
This question refers to two components of BCM communication and consultation, 
during plan development and during enactment of BCM plans.  
 
Part A: Communication during plan development 
Please indicate the level of communication and consultation (both within and 
outside your organisation) during the development of BCM and BCPs.  
 
Low 
 
Medium High 
 
Part B: Communication during incidents 
Please indicate the level of communication and consultation (internal and external 
to your organisation) occurring during incidents (i.e. when BCPs are enacted). This 
includes communication to your employees as well as external stakeholders and 
interest groups. If you have not utilised the BCP please indicate the maturity as it is 
indicated in the plan.  
 
Low 
 
Medium High 
 
7. Monitoring, Review and Learning 
Monitoring refers to surveillance of plans to ensure they still contain accurate 
information. Review is the formal process of reviewing the content of plans to 
ensure they are still relevant. Learning occurs when formalised processes are in 
place to examine outcomes of incident and then feed this back into a revised 
version of the plan. Please indicate the maturity of these BCM processes in your 
organisation. 
 
Low 
 
Medium High 
 
8. Overall BCM maturity 
Please indicate the overall level of BCM maturity in your organisation. 
 
Low 
 
Medium High 
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Appendix C: Participant Consent Form  
Appendix C1: Study One Consent Form  
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Appendix C2: Study Two Consent Form 
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Appendix D: Document Analysis List  
Airport A 
 
APTA1: Business Impact Analysis for Airport 
 
 
Airport B 
 
APTB1: Confidential Reporting Policy 
APTB2: Whistle Blower Policy 
APTB3: Risk Management System (2010) 
APTB4: BIA Airside Operations 
APTB5: BIA Terminal Assets 
APTB6: BIA Environment 
APTB7: BIA Terminal Operations 
APTB8: BIA Information Technology 
APTB9: BIA Operations – Domestic Terminal 
APTB10: BIA Operations – Utility, Civil and Building Projects 
APTB11: BIA Operations – Engineering Group (Modelling) 
APTB12: BIA Emergency 
APTB13: BIA Operations – Hydraulics 
APTB14: BIA Operations – Airport Lighting 
APTB15: BIA Building and Approvals 
APTB16: Consolidated View of Operation’s Key BIA Findings 
APTB17: BIA for Finance 
APTB18: BIA Airport Planning 
APTB19: BIA for Chief Executive Office 
APTB20: BIA Corporate Relations 
APTB21: BIA Human Resources 
APTB22: BIA OH&S 
APTB23: BIA Commercial Property 
APTB24: BIA Parking 
APTB25: BIA Terminal Retail 
APTB26: BIA Aviation Services 
APTB27: BIA Company Secretariat 
APTB28: BIA Legal 
APTB29: BIA Risk and Compliance 
APTB30: Continuity Plan Airside Operations 
APTB31: Continuity Plan Airside Regulation Compliance and ASIC Office 
APTB32: Continuity Plan Car Park Operations 
APTB33: Continuity Plan Chief Executive Office 
APTB34: Continuity Plan Civil Projects 
APTB35: Continuity Plan Corporate Relations 
APTB36: Continuity Plan Environment 
APTB37: Continuity Plan Finance 
APTB38: Continuity Plan Infrastructure and Facilities: Airport Lighting 
APTB39: Continuity Plan Infrastructure and Facilities: Hydraulics 
 273 
APTB40: Continuity Plan Infrastructure and Facilities: Maintenance 
APTB41: Continuity Plan Information Services 
APTB42: Continuity Plan OH&S 
APTB43: Continuity Plan Organisational Resilience 
APTB44: Continuity Plan People and Culture 
APTB45: Continuity Plan Risk and Compliance 
APTB46: Continuity Plan Terminal Assets 
APTB47: Continuity Plan Terminal Operations: Domestic 
APTB48: Continuity Plan Terminal Operations: International 
APTB49: Continuity Plan Terminal Operations Screening 
 
 
Airport C 
 
APTC1: Business Impact Analysis Worksheet 
APTC2: Risk and Vulnerability Analysis 
APTC3: Threat Context – Critical Business Objectives 
APTC4: Airside and Landside Risk Register  
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